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Abstract
This thesis characterizes the important role of US ethnic scientists and entrepreneurs for in-
ternational technology diffusion. Chapter 1 studies the transfer of tacit knowledge regarding
new innovations through ethnic scientific communities in the US and their ties to their home
countries. US ethnic research communities are quantified by applying an ethnic-name data-
base to individual patent records. International patent citations confirm knowledge diffuses
through ethnic networks, and manufacturing output in foreign countries increases with an
elasticity of approximately 0.3 to stronger scientific integration with the US frontier. To ad-
dress reverse-causality concerns, reduced-form specifications exploit exogenous changes in US
immigration quotas. Consistent with a model of sector reallocation, output growth in less
developed economies is facilitated by employment gains, while more advanced economies expe-
rience sharper increases in labor productivity. The findings suggest tacit knowledge channels
partly shape the effective technology frontiers of developing economies.
Chapter 2 further exploits this heterogeneous technology diffusion through ethnic networks
to test the importance of Ricardian technology differences for international trade. Panel regres-
sions find technology growth increases manufacturing exports. To establish a causal relationship
between technology and trade, instrumental-variables specifications exploit uneven technology
diffusion from the US through ethnic scientific networks. The instrumented elasticity of export
growth to the exporter's technology development is 0.9 in the preferred specification. Supple-
mental specifications show this elasticity is robust to controlling for the importer's technology
development and to Rybczynski effect due to factor accumulation. Exogenous reforms of US
immigration law again test for reverse causality. The findings suggest technology differences
are an important determinant of trade patterns.
As a supplement to these first two studies, Chapter 3 provides detailed documentation
on the ethnic-name strategy employed with US patent records. The growing contribution of
Chinese and Indian scientists to US technology formation, especially in high-tech industries, is
described. The institutional and geographic dimensions of US ethnic innovation are further
characterized. Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with an independent study of income inequality
and social norms for compensation differentials and government-led redistribution. This work
demonstrates that short-run responses in social norms do not amplify income inequality shocks
(e.g., due to skill-biased technical change).
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Chapter 1
Ethnic Scientific Communities and
International Technology Diffusion
Summary 1 This study explores the importance of tacit knowledge transfer for international
technology diffusion by examining ethnic scientific communities in the US and their ties to their
home countries. US ethnic research communities are quantified by applying an ethnic-name
database to individual patent records. International patent citations confirm knowledge dif-
fuses through ethnic networks, and manufacturing output in foreign countries increases with
an elasticity of approximately 0.3 to stronger scientific integration with the US frontier. To
address reverse-causality concerns, reduced-form specifications exploit exogenous changes in US
immigration quotas. Consistent with a model of sector reallocation, output growth in less devel-
oped economies is facilitated by employment gains, while more advanced economies experience
sharper increases in labor productivity. The findings suggest tacit knowledge channels partly
shape the effective technology frontiers of developing economies.
1.1 Introduction
The adoption of new technologies and innovations is a primary engine for economic growth,
improving worker productivity and spurring higher standards of living. Invention, however, is
concentrated in advanced economies. OECD countries account for 83% of the world's R&D
expenditure and 98% of its patenting (OECD 2004). Even within the OECD, a disproportionate
9
share of R&D is undertaken in the US. Diffusion of new innovations from technologically leading
nations to following economies is thus necessary for the economic development of poorer regions
and the achievement of global prosperity.
Economic models often describe a worldwide technology frontier, where new ideas and in-
novations travel quickly to all countries.1 Rapid diffusion may be a good approximation for
industrialized economies, but many advances are either not available or not adopted in poorer
countries. Case studies in the business sociology and economic history literatures suggest this
poor adoption may result from inadequate access to the informal or practical knowledge that
complements the codified details of new innovations.2 Be it between two people or two coun-
tries, knowledge transfer is much more complicated than sharing blueprints, process designs,
or journal articles. Intellectual spillovers are often thought to be important for the forma-
tion of cities and high-tech clusters, and perhaps heterogeneous access to the tacit knowledge
associated with new innovations shapes the effective technology sets of following countries.3 ,4
Recent research stresses the importance of ethnic scientific communities in frontier countries
for conveying new technologies to their home countries. In surveys of Silicon Valley, 82% of
Chinese and Indian immigrant scientists and engineers report exchanging technical information
with their respective nations; 18% further invest in business partnerships (Saxenian 2002a,
2002b). Studies of software off-shoring suggest 30% of India's systems workforce rotates through
the US to obtain the tacit knowledge necessary for their work (Piore 2004). Moreover, some
observers believe the success of India versus Mexico and other countries in this field derives
in part from India's strong US entrepreneurial community. More generally, explorations of
1 For example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Recent descriptions of
multiple technology frontiers instead build on geographic distances to major R&D nations (e.g., Keller 2002b),
the innovative efforts of trading partners (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, Coe and Helpman 1995), or
international patenting decisions (e.g., Eaton and Kortum 1999). Keller (2004) reviews the technology transfer
literature.
2An intuitive example is the construction of an atomic bomb. While the basic designs are available on the
internet, efforts to stem nuclear weapons proliferation focus extensively on the scientists with the tacit knowledge
necessary for implementation. Other examples are drawn from Lester and Piore (2004), Amsden (2001), Feinstein
and Howe (1997), Kim (1997), and Lim (1999). Polanyi (1958, 1966) introduces tacit knowledge.
3 Marshall (1890) and Jacobs (1970) describe the forces contributing to spatial agglomeration, while Dumais,
Ellison, and Glaeser (1997) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003) provide more recent empirical tests.
40ther country-specific differences that inhibit adoption include barriers to technological investment, capital-
labor or human-capital disparities, differences in the organization of production, and the appropriateness of
technology. Representative papers in this literature are Parente and Prescott (1994), Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1969), Nelson and Phelps (1966), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), respectively.
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knowledge diffusion find countries with a common language have larger R&D spillovers and
international patent citation rates (e.g., Keller 2002b, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999).
Ethnicity thus offers an observable channel for exploring whether and how international
networks transmit the tacit knowledge of new inventions. The primary question this project
addresses is whether a larger ethnic research community in the US improves technology dif-
fusion to foreign countries of the same ethnicity. US research communities are quantified for
ethnicities by applying an ethnic-name database to individual US patent records (e.g., identifies
inventors with Chinese versus Hispanic names). These matched records describe the ethnic
composition of US scientists and engineers with previously unavailable cross-sectional and lon-
gitudinal detail. These trends are joined with industry-level manufacturing data for foreign
countries (e.g., Chinese computer research in the US is paired with China's computer industry)
in an econometric framework that isolates the role of scientific integration by exploiting within-
industry variation. This approach affords a more structured characterization of ethnicity's role
in the diffusion process; it further allows the outcomes of different ethnicities and industries to
be contrasted.
To clarify this empirical methodology, the next section develops a theoretical model focusing
on tacit knowledge and technology transfer. The model considers a technology follower that
depends on the imitation of frontier innovations for technical progress in its manufacturing
sector. In order to imitate these frontier technologies, however, scientists in the following
country require tacit knowledge with respect to the frontier inventions. This tacit knowledge
is acquired and transferred through the scientists of the following country's ethnicity who work
in the frontier economy. The model thereby relates the technology follower's manufacturing
output and productivity growth to its scientific integration with the technology leader. The
primary estimating equations employed in this study are determined within this framework,
and the conditions under which ordinary least squares estimations capture causal relationships
are identified.
Section 1.3 then describes the ethnic patenting dataset constructed, and a first character-
ization of ethnicity's role in international knowledge transfer is undertaken through citation
patterns. Foreign researchers are found to cite US researchers of their own ethnicity 50% more
frequently than researchers of other ethnicities, even after controlling for detailed technology
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classes. A further examination divides the sample into different time lags from the filing dates
of the cited US patents to the dates of the citing foreign patents. This analysis reveals that
the own-ethnicity effect is most important during the first four to five years of the diffusion
process.
While informative, citation patterns do not demonstrate that following countries realize
economic benefits from better access to US innovations. To characterize foreign output and
productivity realizations, the US ethnic patenting data are combined with industry-level manu-
facturing data for foreign countries in Section 1.4. Ethnic research communities are quantified
at the industry-year level by aggregating individual patent records. Stringent fixed-effects
estimations then test whether output increases in foreign countries as their respective ethnic
research communities in the US develop. The specifications only exploit within-industry vari-
ation, and robustness checks further consider human-capital and physical-capital developments
abroad, general country trends, and so on. The results suggest growth in ethnic scientific
communities in the US increases foreign output with elasticities of 0.2-0.4, with the elasticity
estimate depending upon how the data are weighted. The parameter estimates are statistically
significant and robust across a wide class of specifications. The positive benefits are evident
throughout the manufacturing industries studied, and the output expansion is decomposed into
employment and labor productivity gains.
Estimated technology transfers between countries may be capturing the true diffusion process,
or they could simply be correlated with omitted factors. Reverse causality is also a prominent
concern, where human-capital developments in the foreign country could simultaneously result
in higher output growth and more ethnic researchers emigrating to the US. Section 1.5 returns
to the theoretical model to highlight how immigration quotas offer a foothold for addressing
these issues. The resulting reduced-form strategy is applied in the context of the Immigration
Act of 1990, a major revision of the US quotas system that led to a surge in the immigration
of scientists and engineers from previously constrained countries. The immigration quotas
exercise suggests that growth in US ethnic research communities increases foreign output with
elasticities of 0.3-0.4. While the coefficients of the two approaches cannot be directly compared,
the qualitative directions support each other.
Finally, the diverse set of countries studied affords additional insights regarding how the
12
benefits accruing to technology followers differ by development stage. An extension to the the-
oretical model allows sector reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing. After a transition
point to full employment in the manufacturing sector, greater technology transfer raises labor
productivity and output levels with constant employment. This is the steady-state description
developed in Section 1.2. Prior to this transition, however, the following country responds
with growth in manufacturing employment as well as labor productivity gains. Consistent
with these predictions, interactions with development stage show labor productivity growth
is mostly concentrated in economies that have transitioned to full manufacturing employment
(e.g., the Asian tiger economies); countries with large agricultural sectors instead increase in-
dustry output through higher employment levels (e.g., Mainland China, India).
The results of this project suggest poor access to the tacit knowledge regarding new in-
novations does contribute to slow technology diffusion. Ethnic channels are important for
the transfer of this practical or informal information, and thus differences in ethnic research
communities in frontier economies are partly responsible for the heterogeneous technology op-
portunities of developing countries. The chapter concludes in Section 1.6 with a discussion
of related projects currently being pursued with the ethnicity approach that will further refine
our understanding of how these tacit knowledge channels operate. 5
1.2 Theoretical Framework
This section outlines a simple technology transfer model between a frontier country and a fol-
lowing nation. Both economies feature a manufacturing sector characterized by an expanding-
product-variety production function where technological progress occurs through the adoption
of new intermediate products used in production of final goods. Entrepreneurial scientists
living in each country supply these new technologies for profit, and they can either invent the
intermediate products themselves or imitate foreign innovations.
The invention process is characterized by a "standing on the shoulders of giants" framework,
where spillovers from past innovations increase the research productivity of current scientists
5In addition to characterizing technology diffusion, quantifying these ethnic linkages is important in its own
right. Saxenian's work is frequently discussed in the "brain drain" versus "brain circulation" debate regarding
high-skilled immigration to advanced countries. The structured econometrics of this study are an important
complement to case studies for evaluating these arguments.
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and generate endogenous growth.6 Knowledge is local, however, in that a country's research
productivity for invention builds only on its own past research. That is, the capabilities of the
two nations to invent evolve separately.
Researchers can alternatively imitate foreign inventions for use in their own country. Their
effectiveness in doing so, however, depends upon their tacit knowledge with respect to the foreign
country's innovations. In preparation for the empirical analysis, ethnicity is incorporated into
the framework to model this tacit knowledge channel. Specifically, the following country is of
homogeneous ethnicity; the frontier country is primarily of another ethnicity but is home to
some researchers of the following country's ethnicity. These frontier expatriates acquire and
transmit the tacit knowledge necessary for effective imitation in the following country.
To greatly simplify the exposition, the frontier economy is labeled the US and the following
economy is labeled China. Variables for the US economy are denoted by a tilda (e.g., Y), while
China's variables are in plain font (e.g., Y). Superscripts and subscripts further distinguish
ethnicity and sector as required. The first section outlines the core elements of China's economy,
followed by differences in the US economy. The steady-state outcome is then characterized.
The section closes with simulations of the transitional dynamics to this steady-state. 7, 8
1.2.1 China's Economy
China's economy contains L workers of homogeneous ethnicity employed in manufacturing and
research. Its labor market is competitive, such that workers are free to move between the two
sectors and are paid their marginal product of labor in each. Denote the workers employed in
manufacturing and research by LM and LR, respectively. The behavior of the manufacturing
sector is first described, followed by the research sector and a brief description of the consumer
side of the economy.
The competitive manufacturing sector produces final goods YM that can be consumed or
used to make intermediate manufacturing goods. The price of final goods is normalized to one.
6For example, Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
7Technology flows are the only interactions between the two countries. The model abstracts from trade, and
immigration is restricted in the base scenario.
8"China" is selected for the following-country label due to the prominence of the Chinese ethnicity in the
empirical findings. This labeling brings to the forefront the contrast of Mainland China and the Chinese tiger
economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan discussed below.
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Production for a representative firm i that employs labor LM, and non-durable intermediates
Xij of type j takes the form
N
= AL (Xij-)a. (1.1)
j=l
a is the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs (O < a < 1), A is a common
manufacturing productivity parameter, and N is the number of intermediate product varieties
currently available in China. In equilibrium firms employ equal amounts of all intermediate
inputs (Xij = Xi Vj) and (1.1) can be simplified to YM = ALl-aXN = AL1 (NXi)aN1-a.MA A
Thus, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and total intermediate
inputs NXi, but a larger number N of intermediate goods increases output by distributing the
total intermediate inputs over more goods and thereby raising the marginal product of each.
Technical progress takes the form of increases in N, either through inventions I or imitations
M of US inventions (N = I +M). Entrepreneurial research firms choose between invention and
imitation by comparing the productivity of the two techniques. The research productivity for
invention in China is determined by the existing stock of China's inventions, or dI/at = I. LR.
There are no international knowledge spillovers in the sense that researchers in China cannot
build on the US stock of inventions directly in innovation. China's researchers can alternatively
imitate US inventions at a rate
at (It [I [] (HC)O) LR, (1.2)
where I is the US invention stock and HC is the Chinese human-capital stock with respect to
US inventions. A larger stock of US inventions affords a larger pool of technologies that can be
imitated, thus raising the imitation productivity for a researcher in China. The imitation of
products exhausts the available pool, however, and the function decreases with the ratio of
imitated products to the available US stock, ' < 0. [1] = 0 when all available products have
been imitated, and T[0] is sufficiently large to ensure some imitation occurs with human capital
for foreign technologies. The (HC) 3 specification models that tacit knowledge of US inventions
is necessary for successfully adopting them in China. This human-capital stock depreciates at
a rate 6, and the population of Chinese researchers in the US undertaking inventive activity
adds to it: OHfC/Ot = -Ht C + LC . If the number of US Chinese researchers is constant, the
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steady-state stock of Chinese human capital with respect to US inventions is 6-1LC.
Regardless of how new products are acquired, the entrepreneurial research firms gain per-
petual monopoly rights over the production and sale of new intermediate goods in China. The
present discounted value of these rents for a good j at time t is
V(t) = (P - C)Xe-r(st)(s-t)ds, (1.3)
where Pj is the selling price and Cj is the cost of producing the intermediate good. (s, t) is
the average interest rate between times t and s, which is constant in equilibrium. Cj = 1 for
all research firms as one unit of YM is required to produce one unit of an intermediate input.
Monopoly rights afford research firms the power to set Pj in each period to maximize
(Pj - 1)Xj. As price takers, the manufacturing firms equate the marginal product of an inter-
mediate good, 0YMi/0Xij in (1.1), with its price Pj for a demand of Xij = (Aa/Pj) 1/(1-a)LM .
Substituting this demand function into the research firm's maximization problem, summing
across final-goods producers, and taking the derivative with respect to Pj yields the monopoly
price Pj = a- 1. Thus, research firms charge the same price (Pj = P) and face similar aggre-
gate demands of X = Al/(1-a)e 2/(1-a)LM. The constant interest rate, price, and aggregate
demand relationships simplify the value of inventing or imitating a new technology (1.3) to
V=(1 ) A1/(l1a)a2/(1a) LM (1.4)
a r
Constant intermediate demand functions also simplify China's aggregate output,
YM = A1/(1-a) C2a/(l-a)LMN . (1.5)
On the consumer side, households maximize a linear lifetime utility function U = 0 c(t)
e-Ptdt, where p is the rate of time preference. Consumers earn wage w and receive the interest
rate r on savings. In equilibrium, p = r.
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1.2.2 US Economy
Before the equilibrium for China's economy can be determined, the US economy must be
described. The US economy is identical to China's except in its ethnically heterogeneous labor
force and in its invention of new intermediate goods. Workers of both English and Chinese
ethnicity live in the US. English workers move between the manufacturing and research sectors,
but Chinese expatriates work only in the research sector (LM = L LR = E+ LC). The
Chinese population in the US is small enough to ensure some English scientists are always
required. The aggregate populations of China and the US are equal (L = L).
Researchers of both ethnicities contribute to and utilize the existing US invention stock
in developing new intermediate products: OlCcdt = I. LC and aIE/t = I. LE, where
I = IC + E. This research specification again highlights the role of past inventions I in
making current researchers more productive, and assumes inventions made in China do not
contribute to US researcher productivity for invention. More subtly, ethnicity does not matter
for invention in the US - Chinese and English scientists are symmetric with respect to the
US invention stock. Finally, US researchers of Chinese ethnicity can imitate products made in
China with a productivity analogous to (1.2).9
1.2.3 Steady-State Description: US Invents, China Imitates
This case determines the core estimating equation for this study. Without invention in China,
the US economy operates in isolation, and imitation does not occur (N = I). The US research
sector is competitive with respect to labor markets, and scientists earn the marginal product of
their innovative efforts. Denote by V the present discounted value of making a new invention
in the US. As researchers invent I new products each period (i.e., (I/0t)/LR = I), the wage
paid to scientists is V .1. Likewise, wages in the manufacturing sector are equal to the marginal
product of labor (1 - c)YM/LM. Labor mobility between sectors requires that these wages be
equal, V I = (1 - )YM/LM. Substituting into this free-entry condition the US versions of
the value of innovations (1.4) and aggregate output (1.5), and noting r = p, the steady-state
9 The potential crowding out of US workers and students from science and engineering fields by immigrants
is often debated (e.g., Borjas 2004). This model incorporates a crowding-out effect for analytical convenience
only.
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allocation of labor in the US economy is found to be LM = p/la and LR = L - p/a. Thus,
the growth rate of both the stock of US intermediate technologies and manufacturing output is
L - p/a.
Returning to China's economy, all intermediate products come through imitation of US
goods (N = M). Labor mobility again requires that wages be equal across China's research
and manufacturing sectors,
V. ([ I ] (HC)3) =(1-I) LM
Substituting in the value of new intermediates V from (1.4) and aggregate output YM from
(1.5),
r= IeP [I (Hc),aLM. (1.6)
With identical preferences and aggregate populations, China's interest rate and allocations of
labor to manufacturing and research are the same as the US.10 Equation (1.6) further shows
the steady-state ratio of China's imitated products to available US products M/I is constant
and increases with the Chinese human-capital stock with respect to US technologies (' < 0).
Stronger tacit knowledge improves researcher productivity for imitation in China and closes the
steady-state gap to the US frontier.
Simplifying (1.6) for economies of equal size relates China's imitated technology stock to
the US technology frontier and China's tacit knowledge for US innovations,
M = L ] (C)/ (1.7)
Substituting this relationship into China's manufacturing output (1.5),
YM = Al/(1-a)C2 a/(l-)LM. (i [M ] (IC)13)
Taking logs and collapsing time-invariant terms into a constant A, China's manufacturing output
depends upon its human-capital stock with respect to US research with elasticity /3, ln(YM) =
10These conditions hold for more general utility functions. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) note, techno-
logical diffusion can equalize rates of return without other interactions between economies.
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0 + ln(I) + /3 ln(fHC). The human-capital stock is - 1L C in steady-state, so that
ln(YM) = + ln(I) +/ 3ln(LR), (1.8)
where 5- 1 is absorbed into the constant. Equation (1.8) is the basis for the estimating equations
employed in Sections 1.4 and 1.5. The statistical framework will return to the intricacies of
empirically estimating this relationship, but the outlook is promising that the relationship will
be directly identified if this scenario holds.
The imitation-versus-invention decision in China determines the condition required for this
steady-state description. Specifically, the productivity of researchers for undertaking inven-
tion in China must be less than the researcher productivity for imitating US innovations in
equilibrium,
<i I[ ](HC). (1.9)
The assumption I = 0 requires (1.9) hold forever; without a knowledge stock on which to build,
a first invention is impossible. While this is a valid description for extremely poor regions,
the more interesting implication for developing or emerging countries is that even with a small
invention stock, the comparative benefit to imitation can be sustained so long as tacit knowledge
for a growing stock of frontier innovations is maintained. Section 1.5 discusses the case where
(1.9) no longer holds.l'
1.2.4 Agriculture to Manufacturing Sector Reallocation
The steady-state characterization of China's economy builds on the assumption of full employ-
ment in the manufacturing and research sectors. While the estimating equation (1.8) relates
China's output to its research presence in the US, the same elasticity would hold for labor
productivity specifications. With full employment, output gains can only come through la-
bor productivity enhancements. Many developing economies have large agricultural sectors,
however, and the migration from agriculture to manufacturing is important for characterizing
economic development (e.g., Harris and Todaro 1970).
1 lImmigration is restricted in this framework. Moreover, Chinese workers would prefer to emigrate to the US
as the US wage rate is higher ceteris paribus due to the larger stock of intermediate goods.
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This section incorporates into the basic model an agricultural sector in China. The frame-
work highlights how technology transfer induces a different response when sector reallocation
is possible. Specifically, as more technologies are transferred from the US to China, labor
shifts from agriculture to the manufacturing and research sectors. After a sufficient number
of frontier innovations have been imitated, China's economy transitions to full employment in
the manufacturing and research sectors. Thus, the steady-state of the expanded economy is
the same as the basic framework described above; numerical simulations of the transition path,
however, offer additional guidance for the empirical exercises this study undertakes.
The agricultural sector for China is characterized by a decreasing returns to scale technology
that employs only labor LA,
YA = BLA - LA (1.10)
B is a common agricultural productivity parameter, and the final goods from agriculture and
manufacturing are identical (Y = YA + YM). Labor is again free to move across sectors, and
the proportion of the labor force allocated to each of the three sectors along the development
path can be related to China's technology stock. China is assumed to possess only imitated
technologies (M = N).
First, the marginal products of labor for agriculture and manufacturing are B - LA and
(1 - a)A1/(1-a)c2l2/( 1-a)M, respectively. Wage equality between these two sectors relates the
size of the agricultural workforce to the number of imitated technologies,
LA = max[B - (1 - )A1/(1-)a2a/(1-a)M 0]. (1.11)
Thus, growth in China's technology stock lowers agricultural employment until the economy
reaches a transition point with full employment in the research and manufacturing sectors.
This transition occurs when M > (1- c)-lA-l/(l-)o-2a/('l-')B. If this condition is satisfied
in the current period, it will hold in all future periods as the wages of the manufacturing and
research sectors continue to grow with further technological advancement.12 Likewise, the size
of the manufacturing labor force can be related to China's existing technology stock and the
12The agricultural production function (1.10) bounds the marginal productivity of labor from above at B.
This function does not satisfy the Inada conditions. An agricultural sector with a constant returns to scale
production function employing land and labor yields an ever shrinking agricultural sector.
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US technology stock through the wage equality of the manufacturing and research sectors (1.6)
and the interest rate r = p,
LM = - -1|-]( -P (1.12)
I a'
With LA and LM determined, the number of researchers follows from the labor endowment. l3
To characterize the transition path, a numerical solution for the steady-state without an
agricultural sector is first developed. The labor forces of the two economies are taken to
be of size 0.20. For parameter values of a = 1/3 and p = 0.05, the allocation of labor to
manufacturing and research is 0.15 (75%) and 0.05 (25%), respectively. As the growth rate
of inventions in the US is equal to the size of its research labor force (i.e., (I/0t)/I = LR),
the set of available frontier technologies grows at a rate of 5%; the same growth rate is in
turn found for China's imitated technology stock and the manufacturing outputs of the two
countries. Specifying A = 1, the steady-state value of new inventions or imitations in both
economies is given a numerical value of V = 0.22.
Examining more closely the technology transfer mechanism, the size of the Chinese research
population living in the US is modeled as 0.001 (or 2% of the US researcher total). Taking an
estimate of p = 0.3 from the empirical exercises in Section 1.4 and assuming a depreciation on
human capital of a = 0.15, the steady-state human-capital stock is given a numerical value of
HC = 0.0067. Finally, a functional form for I[M/I] must be specified to estimate the share of
US technologies imitated by China. The form J[M/I] = 0.5. (1 - M/I) retains the properties
of ' < 0 and I[1] = 0 and yields a steady-state imitation share M/I = 0.10.
Turning to the transition path simulations to this steady-state, the solid line in Figure 1.1
describes the evolution of China's economy from the initial conditions of 90% employment in
agriculture for China and 1% of US technologies imitated. 14 The size of the agricultural sector
corresponds to an initial stock of imitated technologies M(0) in China, while the gap to the
US frontier determines the technologies I(0) in the US; the parameter B = 0.2 is also specified.
The US, assumed to be in steady-state growth, evolves exogenously with a 5% growth rate in
1 3Even if the Chinese human-capital stock for US technologies is stable during the transition period, the relative
proportion of labor devoted to manufacturing versus research is not at its steady-state level due to adjusting
fraction of imitated technologies M/I.
14Full employment in agriculture is an unstable equilibrium if Chinese human capital to US technologies exists.
Once some labor is devoted to manufacturing and research, China's economy will eventually transition completely
out of agriculture if tacit knowledge with respect to the US frontier is maintained.
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its technology stock. From (1.11), (1.12), and the labor endowment, the evolution of China's
economy is subsequently characterized.
The leftmost panel describes the allocation of labor along the transition path. For the
baseline simulation, the Chinese human-capital stock with respect to US technologies remains
at its steady-state level of 0.0067. Initially, limited labor is devoted to manufacturing or
research. In this general equilibrium, the small market size of final-goods producers depresses
the value of new innovations and the researchers employed, even though the large gap to the
US frontier makes it very productive to imitate new intermediate products. Likewise, the labor
demand of final-goods producers is limited due to the small technology stock in China.
As the number of technologies steadily expands, however, the agricultural sector shrinks and
more labor is allocated to both manufacturing and research. This industrialization sustains
itself as the growth in market size increases the value of new innovations, while the larger tech-
nology base increases the labor demand of final-goods manufacturers. The sector reallocation
quickens as the economy approaches the transition point (t = 16). Around this transition,
the researcher share of China's labor force reaches its peak, before gradually declining to its
steady-state value of 25%. The manufacturing labor share also surges around the transition,
and continues to grow to its steady-state share of 75%.
The middle panel presents several growth rates evident in China during the transition.
Initial growth is slow due to the inertia of the large agricultural sector. Around the transition
point, however, growth in China's imitated technology stock surges due to the extensive labor
resources devoted to research and the still sizeable gap to the US frontier. This high rate
of technology adoption translates into higher growth in both manufacturing output and labor
productivity. The manufacturing output growth is not due solely to labor productivity gains,
however, as the growth in employment contributes approximately the same amount. After the
transition, the growth rates decline to their steady-state rates of 5%.
Finally, the rightmost panel exhibits several levels with respect to the US frontier. As
evident in research labor share, the linear preferences of consumers affords a substantial in-
vestment in the imitation of new technologies around the transition in return for higher future
consumption. During this convergence period, China's technology gap to the US frontier is
substantially narrowed. In the steady-state, the fraction of US technologies imitated by China
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translates directly into the steady-state fraction of US manufacturing output achieved, and the
transition path dynamics take the same shape. Note, however, that China's total output level
(including agriculture) relative to the US declines slightly during the transition period due to
the investment in imitation. Except in the immediate vicinity of the transition point, China's
output does not fall but instead fails to maintain pace with the US economy in steady-state
growth. After this investment period, however, the share rises sharply to a long-run level equal
to the manufacturing output share.
From this baseline, the dotted line in Figure 1.1 plots a second transition path for an
exogenous increase in the number of Chinese researchers living in the US from 0.001 to 0.004
on date t = 3.15 While these simulations are meant to be illustrative, the fourfold rise from
2% to 8% of the US research community is roughly in line with the growing Chinese research
contribution in several high-tech industries for the period studied in the empirical analysis
below. As the top left panel shows, this exogenous increase does not immediately translate
into a fourfold increase in the Chinese human-capital stock with respect to US technologies.
The human-capital stock instead grows over time with the higher rate of tacit knowledge gain
in each period following the US Chinese researcher growth.
As the boost in technology transfer is realized, however, the transition from agriculture
proceeds at a more rapid pace. The growth rate of manufacturing output spikes upward due
to both higher growth in imitated technologies and more labor reallocation. An economy
without an agricultural sector would only experience output growth due to labor productivity
gains. In the new steady-state, the fourfold increase in China's human-capital stock results
in an approximate 40% levels gain in imitated technologies and output; the percentage of US
technologies imitated is also higher. China's growth rate and allocation of labor, though, are
the same as in the simulation without the exogenous increase in scientific integration.
In summary, technology transfer to economies with large agricultural sectors can increase
manufacturing output through both labor productivity gains, as in the steady-state scenario,
and through employment growth. In this particular framework, the productivity gains and
employment gains are of roughly similar magnitude. In alternative models, however, output
15 The simulations abstract from any growth in the overall size of the US labor force due to this inflow.
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growth would come only through labor reallocation. 6 After evaluating the core steady-state
specification (1.8), Section 1.4 empirically evaluates how the responses of economies with large
agricultural sectors differ from those with constrained labor resources.
1.3 Ethnic Patenting and International Citations Analysis
Estimation of the : parameter requires quantifying each ethnicity's human-capital stock with
respect to US research. This section outlines the dataset built for this exercise, and presents
an initial analysis of knowledge flows using international patent citation records. The ethnic
patenting data are then joined with foreign output metrics in the next section to evaluate (1.8)
directly.
1.3.1 Ethnic Patenting Records
Ethnic technology development in the US is quantified through the NBER Patent Data File
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001). This dataset offers detailed records for all patents granted
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1975 to December
1999. Each patent record provides information about the invention (e.g., technology classifica-
tion, citations of prior art) and the inventors submitting the application (e.g., name, city). To
estimate ethnicities, a commercial database of ethnic first names and surnames is mapped into
the inventor records. The match rate is 99% for US patent records, and the process affords the
distinction of nine ethnicities: Chinese, English, European, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean,
Russian, and Vietnamese.
Table 1.1 describes the 1985-1997 US sample. The trends demonstrate a growing ethnic
contribution to US technological development, especially among Chinese and Indian scientists.
Also matching popular perceptions, ethnic inventors are more concentrated in high-tech indus-
tries like computers and pharmaceuticals and in gateway cities relatively closer to their home
countries (e.g., Chinese in San Francisco, European in New York, and Hispanic in Miami).
16 For example, specifications with constant outside wages and a fixed stock of physical capital. As the
technology transfer increases the marginal product of labor, producers hire more labor to bring the marginal
product of labor back down to the external wage. The agricultural sector's production function (1.10) instead
allows the marginal product of labor in agriculture to increase in step with the manufacturing sector's wage.
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The final three rows demonstrate a close correspondence of the estimated ethnic composition
to the country-of-birth composition of the US science and engineering workforce in the 1990
Census.17 Figure 1.2 illustrates the evolving ethnic contribution to US technology development
as a percentage of patents granted by the USPTO, while Figure 1.3 provides a more detailed
glimpse of ethnic shares by broad technology groups. While the name-matching procedure
certainly misclassifies the ethnicities of some inventors, the aggregate trends important for this
study appear remarkably accurate.
The ethnic-name database is also applied to foreign patent records registered in the US.
Inventions originating outside the US account for just under half of USPTO patents, with
applications from Japan comprising 45% of this foreign total. The rows of Table 1.2 present
the matched characteristics for countries and regions grouped to the ethnicities identifiable with
the database. From a quality-assurance perspective, the results are very encouraging. First,
the ethnic-name database assigns ethnicities to a large percentage of foreign records (overall
matching rate of 98%). Second, the estimated inventor compositions are quite reasonable, with
the own-ethnicity contributions in all but three regions being greater than 80%. Similar to the
US, own-ethnicity contributions should be less than 100% due to foreign researchers. l s,1 9
1.3.2 International Patent Citation Analysis
In addition to serving as a quality-assurance check, patents registered with the USPTO by for-
eign inventors afford an initial characterization of international knowledge flows through ethnic
scientific networks. Each patent record includes citations of prior inventions on which the
current patent builds, and the pattern of these citations can be informative about communica-
tion channels between researchers. This first exercise simply compares the ethnic composition
17The estimated European ethnic contribution is naturally higher than the immigrant contribution measured
by foreign born.
18Details on the matching algorithms and additional descriptive statistics are presented in Chapter 3.
19A further supplement to the NBER patent data is important to highlight. The USPTO issues patents by
technology categories rather than by industries. Combining the work of Johnson (1999) and Silverman (1999),
concordances are developed between the USPTO classification scheme and the three-digit industries in which
new inventions are manufactured or used. The main estimations focus on industry-of-use, affording a composite
view of the technological opportunity developed for an industry. Studies of advanced economies find accounting
for these inter-industry R&D flows important (e.g., Scherer 1984). Keller (2002a) reports inter-industry R&D
flows aid productivity growth significantly within OECD countries, equal to half or more of the own-industry
,development. Estimations with manufacturing industries support the using-industry specifications.
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of cited US inventors across different foreign inventor ethnicities. That is, do Chinese inven-
tors living outside of the US tend to cite more Chinese inventors living in the US than their
technology field would suggest?
Inventor names are only included with patents granted from 1975-1999, and the data are cut
in two ways to form a uniform sample. First, only the citations of foreign patent applications
to the USPTO from 1985-1997 are considered. Second, the application year of the cited US
patent must be within ten years of the application date of the citing foreign patent. That
is, citations of 1975-1984 US domestic patents are considered for foreign patents applied for in
1985, while 1976-1985 is the appropriate ten-year window for 1986 patents. In addition, all
within-company citations and patents with inventors in multiple countries are excluded.20
From this sample, citation counts are developed by cells that contain four dimensions: 1)
the ethnicity of the citing foreign inventor, 2) the ethnicity of the cited US inventor, 3) the
technology class of the citing foreign inventor, and 4) the technology class of the cited US
inventor. The latter two dimensions are necessary for isolating ethnicity's role since patents
cite other patents within their technology field far more frequently than those outside of their
field. If ethnicities concentrate in different industries in the US and abroad, measured ethnic
flows could be merely capturing that technologies build upon prior art in their own discipline.
More than 100,000 cells are formed with this organization, and many cells contain zero
values. The zero values are due to both the small sizes of some ethnicities (e.g., Vietnamese
inventors outside of the US) and that researchers in a given field simply do not cite the universe
of technologies in their work. Count data containing zero values can be appropriately handled
with a Negative Binomial model.21 The counts are regressed on an indicator variable for
whether the citing foreign ethnicity and cited US ethnicity are the same, as well as vectors
of fixed effects for each of the four dimensions on which cells are formed. These fixed effects
remove basic levels differences between the series (e.g., the English ethnicity in the US receiving
uniformly more citations, Vietnamese researchers abroad making uniformly fewer inventions and
citations). An indicator variable is also included for whether the cited and citing technology
20 Patents may have multiple inventors with different ethnicities. The reported regressions only consider
citations for which a dominate ethnicity can be assigned to both patents (i.e., a single ethnicity accounts for
strictly more than 50% of multiple inventors). English-ethnicity inventors abroad are excluded.
21Wooldridge (Ch. 19, 2002) describes the statistical properties of the Negative Binomial regression.
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category are the same.
The coefficient on the indicator variable for same-ethnicity is transformed into an incidence
rate ratio that gives the higher rate of citations within an ethnic group. The first column
of Table 1.3 reports the incidence rate ratio for all citations, finding a moderate effect that
own-ethnicity citations are 50% higher than citations to other ethnicities, once the basic levels
and industry effects are removed. This coefficient is statistically different from one, the level
where own-ethnicity citations have the same frequency as citations of other ethnicities. To
further study the time path of these knowledge flows, the Negative Binomial regressions are
performed separately for each citation lag of one to ten years, rather than collapsing the data
into a single regression. The coefficients from these regressions are also reported in Table 1.3.
Common ethnicity appears most important for international technology diffusion in the first
few years after a patent is made, peaking in a citation lag of four to five years.2 2
1.4 Output and Productivity Analysis
The international patent citation exercises confirm knowledge diffusion occurs at an uneven
rate across countries and further verify that knowledge networks are important for short-run
technology transfer from the US. The focus of this study, however, is whether greater tacit
knowledge with respect to all US innovations translates into economic improvements for for-
eign countries. To evaluate this proposition, the US ethnic patenting trends are joined with
additional data on foreign manufacturing industries. The combined dataset is first described,
and an empirical extension of specification (1.8) that accounts for the features of the combined
dataset is developed and estimated.
22 Thompson and Fox-Kean (2004) criticize the USPTO categories as being too broad to control effectively
for technology specialization. Thompson (2005) proposes an alternative approach that compares inventor-
added citations to those added by the USPTO examiner, a distinction only made after 2000. Estimations using
Thompson's technique and dataset yield a quantitatively similar role for own-ethnicity in international citations.
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty (2002) provide additional documentation on inferring communication channels
from patent citations, while Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), Peri (2004), Hu and Jaffe (2004), and
Agrawal, Cockburne, and McHale (2004) are examples of applications in an international distance context.
27
1.4.1 Foreign Manufacturing Data
The benefit of knowledge integration for foreign development is evaluated through the Indus-
trial Statistics Database of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
The UNIDO collects industry-level manufacturing statistics for The International Yearbook of
Industrial Statistics and specialized publications on topics like development and competition.
Researchers at the UNIDO supplement the data resources of the OECD with national records
for non-OECD members, creating a unique global resource. The UNIDO's stated objective
is the compilation of internationally comparable and internally consistent series (e.g., variable
definitions, accounting units, collection procedures).
Table 1.4 describes the sample and lists the three-digit ISIC industries.2 3 The panels include
all country-industry observations surveyed at least four times from 1985-1997 that correspond
to non-English ethnicities identifiable with the ethnic-name database (e.g., Canada, the United
Kingdom, Africa, and the Middle East are excluded). Three industry characteristics are
considered: output, employment, and labor productivity measured as output per employee.
Table 1.4 aggregates the annual industry-level data to describe the country-level manufacturing
sectors. While direct comparisons across countries are limited with an unbalanced panel, the
output and labor productivity differences between industrialized countries (e.g., Japan) and
developing nations are clearly evident. The underlying industry-level metrics also agree with
published UNIDO and World Bank statistics.
The UNIDO dataset is inappropriate for studies of industry creation or destruction due to
its unbalanced panel and industry aggregation. Recognizing this limitation and in order to
enhance the quality of estimations, country-industry observations must maintain ten employees
and one US ethnic patent per annum. These minimums exclude poor quality data, but raising
or removing these hurdles does not significantly affect the findings.24
23 The UNIDO collects data at the three-digit and four-digit industry levels of the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC). This presentation focuses on the three-digit aggregation, but the four-digit
data delivers similar results. While sacrificing industries (28 versus 80), the three-digit dataset contains more
countries (43 versus 20), better coverage of Chinese economies, and more capital data.
24 Specifications employing alternative UNIDO data on industry value-added and establishments mirror the
output and employment results presented below. The 1985-1997 period balances data inclusion with maintaining
a consistent sample, as data for earlier or later years are quite limited. Similar outcomes are evident if all 1980-
2000 data are employed or if the sample is restricted to a 1985-1997 balanced panel of continually surveyed
countries and industries.
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1.4.2 Output and Productivity Estimation Framework
The combined dataset affords an industry-level analysis of technology transfer with multiple
countries and ethnicities. Extending (1.8) to industry i and country c of ethnicity e,
ln(Yc) = bci + n(i) + ln(LR,ei). (1.13)
While analytically convenient, this steady-state description must be adapted for the empirical
exercises. In particular, the ethnic human-capital stocks for US technologies change over the
1985-1997 period (and are indeed the source of identification for the parameter). The citation
regressions in Table 1.3 highlight that ethnic ties have an important lag structure, especially
for the first five years of knowledge dissemination. Rewriting (1.13) in discrete time to model
this five-year dependency,
ln(Ycit)= i + ln(Iit) + ln ( LR,ei,t-s) (1.14)
Unfortunately, existing data on the ethnicity of the US scientific workforce are limited.
While Census estimates provide strong cross-sectional descriptions (i.e., country-of-birth, indus-
try), they lack the necessary longitudinal detail. Other resources like the Current Population
Survey and National Science Foundation reports offer only coarse cross-sectional distinctions.
Ethnic patenting data, however, are a solid foothold for estimating the scientific research of
ethnicities in the US. Rewriting the US researcher productivity function into a discrete-time
form for industry i and ethnicity e, = t LR,eit. The measured patenting of ethnicity
e in year t again depends upon the overall stock of US knowledge and the size of the ethnic
research group in the US (measured at the beginning of the year). By abstracting from the
endogenous growth stimulus, the researcher productivity becomes time-invariant: it = lito.
Thus, the US ethnic research community can be inferred from the patent flow divided by the
constant researcher productivity (LR,eit = tol I 7). Substituting this simplified form into
(1.14),
ln(Yit) = Oi + ln(it) + i n Eeit-s .
s=1
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The time-invariant researcher productivity Io 1 is separated from the patent sum and incor-
porated with ln(Iit) into an industry-year fixed effect it. Likewise, the base productivity
constants cd are extended into country-industry fixed effects.
To keep the exposition simple, define PAT US to be the five-year sum of recent US ethnic
patenting in an industry. The core estimating equation becomes
ln(Ycit) = + 3 ln(PATU S) + kci + fit + ecit, (1.15)
where Ai and nTit are the vectors of country-industry and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.
These fixed effects warrant careful discussion. First, the country-industry effects Oci remove
levels differences between series. Without Oci, a positive would be found if output in China's
computer industry and US Chinese research in the computer industry are higher than average.
Incorporating 5,ci nstead requires the output growth in China's computer industry be above
average if the US Chinese computer research growth is above average. Focusing on relative
growth rates removes time-invariant factors that potentially confound the analysis (e.g., the
productivity parameters A, ethnicity size).
The derivation of (1.15) highlights two important roles for the industry-year fixed effects 7it .
First, Tit extract the overall growth in the US knowledge stock for an industry (e.g., the strong
increase in computer and pharmaceutical research vis--vis mechanical research). Second, nTit
control for the invention productivity of researchers, so that ethnic patenting flows are viable
proxies for ethnic research in the US. More generally, the industry-year effects remove all
industry trends common to the countries in the sample (e.g., higher worldwide demand for
computers and pharmaceuticals) and fluctuations in patent statistics due to changes in USPTO
resources (Griliches 1990).25
These fixed effects are crucial for the interpretation of the /l parameter. This project does
not estimate the effect of US patenting on foreign output and productivity; indeed, isolating that
specific channel from other knowledge flows between countries is not feasible with industry-level
outcomes. Moreover, the substantial increase in the number of patents granted by the USPTO
25Industry-year effects extract industry-specific price movements (e.g., the rapid decline of computer prices).
The UNIDO converts output data from foreign currencies to nominal US dollars using average yearly exchange
rates (IMF International Financial Statistics Series rf).
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over the last two decades is difficult to interpret.2 6 Instead, (1.15) forces variation to be within
industries, isolating the size of ethnic communities from aggregate industry trends. A positive
3 coefficient requires that higher relative growth of Chinese computer research compared to
Indian computer research in the US correlate with higher relative output growth in China's
computer industry compared to India's computer industry.
Finally, the five-year patent sums PATeUS are developed for each ethnicity-industry from the
patent database. Multiple nations map into the nine ethnicities available with the ethnic-name
database, and the same industry-level patenting series from the US is applied to each country
within an ethnicity (i.e., Mexican or Chilean scientists cannot be separated from the Hispanic
total). The empirical analysis accounts for this multiplicity by conservatively clustering stan-
dard errors at the ethnicity-industry level; this cross-sectional clustering further addresses the
serial-correlation concerns of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Robustness checks also
examine whether the large European and Hispanic blocs significantly influence the results.27 ,28
1.4.3 Basic Output and Productivity Regressions
Table 1.5A reports the primary results for (1.15). The first row demonstrates that output
consistently rises with strong scientific integration to the US. As both variables in logs, the
0.241 coefficient in the upper-left corner finds a 0.24% increase in foreign output with a 1% in-
crease in US ethnic research. As discussed earlier, industry output expansion can come through
both labor productivity gains and expansion in employment. Disaggregating the output re-
gression, Panels B and C find labor productivity growth facilitates most of the manufacturing
development captured in this sample.
Three weighting schemes are tested: no weights, weighted by the 1985-1987 industry-level
patenting in the US, and weighted by the 1985-1987 size of the foreign manufacturing industry.
The : coefficients in the patent-weighted regressions are consistently larger than the unweighted
26For example, Kortum and Lerner (2000), Kim and Marshcke (2004), and Hall (2004).
27Some country to ethnicity mappings are debatable (e.g., placing Spain and Portugal with European rather
than Hispanic, including the Scandinavian countries in European), as is the inclusion of communist countries.
The results are robust to these marginal reclassifications. The ethnic matching procedure does not attempt to
distinguish the Filipino ethnicity from Hispanic, as was done in an earlier version of this paper, but the results
are very similar if the division is made.
28The five-year sum gives equal weight to each year. Regressions weighting the lagged community sizes by
the coefficients from the international citation exercises yield similar results.
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regressions as this scheme emphasizes high-tech industries and the strong interactions of the
Chinese and Indian research communities with their home countries. The output weights
instead focus on the largest industries and offer a sense of the average treatment effect for
industries. Coefficient estimates tend to marginally lower for the output weights than the patent
weights due to their greater emphasis on traditional economic sectors (e.g., food products,
textiles). Both approaches, however, yield more consistent results by focusing attention on
larger countries and industries.
Many empirical analyses first difference the levels specification (1.15) for estimation,
A ln(Ycit) = a + P/A ln(PATUSt) + Tit + it, (1.16)
where 8cit = cit - cit-1. The efficiency of this first-differences form versus the levels spec-
ification turns on whether the error term ECit is autoregressive. If autoregressive deviations
are substantial, the first-differences form is preferred; a unit-root error is fully corrected. If
there is no serial correlation, however, first differencing introduces a moving-average error com-
ponent. Estimations of the autoregressive parameter in the levels specification for this study
find serial correlations of 0.5-0.6, while -0.1 is evident in the first-differences form. Table 1.5B
demonstrates that the first-differences form yields similar results to the levels specification; both
specifications are presented below.
1.4.4 Foreign Country Development Controls
The industry-year fixed effects create an empirical environment where US ethnic patenting
serves as a viable metric for the strength of ethnic research communities. Moreover, the
focus on within-industry variation circumvents many problems in interpretation that could
arise from different industry trends (e.g., rapid high-tech growth). As the constructed panel
includes multiple industries within a country, additional tests can be performed that further
control for country-wide development. Table 1.6 undertakes three such tests, finding continued
support for output expansion with stronger scientific integration.
Panel A begins by replicating the base foreign output regressions from Table 1.5. An
immediate concern is whether the results are capturing only foreign human-capital development,
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which could reasonably lead to an expansion in foreign manufacturing and the emigration of
researchers to the US. The National Science Foundation collects annual data on the US Ph.D.
science and engineering graduates by country-of-birth. As an initial robustness check on the
general human-capital development story, Panel B adds the log trend in these graduates as
an additional covariate. The role of the US ethnic scientific community remains strong and
significant. (These Ph.D. trends and the reverse causality question are extensively studied in
Section 1.5's immigration analysis.)
More generally, Panels C and D incorporate into (1.15) linear country time trends and non-
parametric country-year fixed effects, respectively. These additional controls remove trends
common to the industries within a country, including the overall growth in each ethnicity's
US research community (e.g., the strong increases in Chinese and Indian patenting in the US).
For foreign output, the country effects extract national business cycles and trend manufac-
turing gains, countries entering trade agreements or multi-national bodies (e.g., World Trade
Organization), and so on.
A positive : coefficient in these estimations requires higher relative growth of Chinese com-
puter research to Chinese pharmaceutical research in the US be partially correlated with higher
relative output growth in China's computer industry to its pharmaceutical industry (after world-
wide industry trends are removed). The triple combination of country-industry, industry-year,
and country-year fixed effects is a very stringent test, as much of the variation is removed
from the sample. While the positive correlations are lost in the unweighted specifications, the
weighted regressions continue to support the conclusion of foreign output growth with stronger
scientific integration. The decline in coefficient magnitudes suggests, moreover, that a sub-
stantial portion of the growth in each ethnicity's US research community is uniform across
industries (i.e., the within-industry Chinese contributions to US computer and pharmaceutical
research expand at similar rates).
:1.4.5 Foreign Country Capital-Labor Controls
Table 1.7 next explores the role of capital development in explaining the labor productivity
growth evident in Table 1.5. Section 1.2's theory only models non-durable intermediate in-
puts, a simplification that removes the need to track two state variables. Labor productivity
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grows with capital deepening as well as technology adoption, however, and it is important to
distinguish the two. The UNIDO data unfortunately lack capital records for several countries.2 9
Thus, Panel B of Table 1.7 first re-estimates the basic labor productivity regression with the
observations that have capital data. The results are close to the Full Sample replicated in
Panel A, although some statistical significance is lost with the reduced sample size. Panel C
finally incorporates into the estimating equation the contemporaneous log capital-labor ratio
Kcit/Lcit,
ln(Yit/Lcit) = + 3 ln(PATUt s) + y ln(KcitlLcit) + Oci + Tit + Ecit,
The coefficients in Panel C are quite stable to the introduction of capital stocks, indicating
that the technology transfer operates beyond just capital accumulation.3 0
1.4.6 Sector Reallocation and Sample Composition
The theoretical model in Section 1.2 delineates how the benefits of technology transfer depend
upon the following country's stage of development. In the specified framework, countries with
large agricultural sectors realize gains in output from technology transfer due to both labor
productivity development and employment reallocation. In an alternative framework where
the outside wage is held constant, the output growth comes only through labor shifts. On
the other hand, following economies with full manufacturing employment only realize output
growth through labor productivity enhancements.
To test these predictions, Table 1.4 lists the 1980 share of national employment in agriculture
for each economy.3 1 The three smallest agricultural sectors are found in Hong Kong (1%),
29Sufficient capital data are only available for the countries noted in Table 1.4 and do not always cover the
years listed in the UNIDO3 Panel column. Capital stocks are estimated using the perpetual inventory method
with a depreciation rate of 15%. Initial stocks are developed using 1980 and 1981 investments, and subsequent
investments are deflated using weighted deflators taken from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity Data-
base (Bartelsman and Gray 1996). Breaks in the capital series for Chile (1987, 1988), Macao (1987), Mexico
(1992, 1993), Panama (1986), and Peru (1993) are bridged in the reported regressions; the results are robust to
instead dropping the years after the breaks.
3°Technology improvements and investments may occur together if new technologies are embodied in machines
that are purchased and installed. Additional tests suggest embodied technical change may be present, but
the results are not consistent across specifications. Foreign investment may be important for realizing the
productivity gains from knowledge ties to the frontier country.
31Agricultural shares are from the United Nations Statistical Division and Sun, Fulginiti, and Peterson (2003).
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Singapore (2%), and Belgium (3%), while the three largest sectors are India (70%), Vietnam
(73%), and Mainland China (74%). A modified form of (1.15) interacts the ethnic scientific
community regressor with this pre-period agricultural share,
ln(Ycit) = : + ln(PATts) + y ln(PATts) AGR%oc,1980s + Oci + tlit + Ecit,
where the main effect for the agricultural share is absorbed into the country-industry fixed
effects. A positive y coefficient indicates output growth due to scientific integration is stronger
in countries with larger agricultural workforces in 1980.32
Tables 1.8A and 1.8B report the results from these interacted regressions. In both the levels
and first-differences specifications, foreign country output growth due to stronger US ethnic
research integration is higher in economies with large agricultural shares in 1980. Panels
B and C again disaggregate the output regression into labor productivity and employment
shifts, respectively. Labor productivity gains are weaker in the less developed economies, while
substantial sector reallocation through employment growth is clearly evident in Panel C. The
interacted regressions thus support the model's predictions regarding the stage of development
being important for how technology transfer gains are realized.
Finally, the UNIDO dataset is a diverse group of countries and industries, and it is informa-
tive to identify which observations are most responsible for the aggregate findings. Table 1.8
investigates this question for the patent-weighted regressions in Columns 4-8. Case studies of
successful technology diffusion often focus on the computer and pharmaceutical industries, and
the exceptional outcomes of Asian scientific communities in Silicon Valley are widely noted.
While the industry-year effects control for the overall growth in each industry's research and
output (e.g., Griliches 1994), it would be important to note if ethnic differences in high-tech
industries alone are responsible for the positive correlations. The fourth column excludes the
computer and pharmaceutical industries from the Full Sample and finds that while the main
effect on output declines, the coefficient pattern is very similar. In general, dropping these two
industries from the samples below does not significantly affect the outcomes discussed.
Chinese economies, more often than not, are also the centerpieces of technology transfer
32 Both of the main effects are demeaned prior to the interaction to restore the 3 coefficient to close to its base
level.
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stories. Column 5 excludes Mainland China from the sample and finds very similar results.
The stability of the interactions is especially comforting as Mainland China had the largest
1980 agricultural share of the sample. Unreported regressions further find that the parameter
estimates do not depend significantly on the inclusion of any one country in the sample. Column
6 demonstrates, however, that excluding the full Chinese ethnicity can be important. In the
both the levels and first-differences specifications, the main effect of output increasing is lost
due to opposite movements in labor productivity and employment. Given that the Chinese
grouping includes three of the four Asian "tiger" economies (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Taiwan) and Mainland China, it is not too surprising that the main effect is sensitive to their
inclusion. Reassuringly for the sector reallocation finding, the interactions remain in their
predicted directions in both specifications despite excluding the three most extreme economies.
The Full Sample also includes several industrialized economies that are undertaking ex-
tensive R&D themselves. For example, Japanese inventors living in the US, who are well
identified with the ethnic-name database, patented less than 10,000 inventions from 1985-1997;
almost 300,000 patents were awarded to Japanese inventors living outside of the US during
this period.3 3 Positive correlations of foreign productivity growth to US ethnic research may
simply be capturing reverse technology flows, intra-company patenting, or defensive patenting
from these advanced economies. Exploring this issue, Columns 7 excludes Japan, European
countries, and Russia from the Full Sample. The sharper contrast of the Chinese and Hispanic
economies increases the productivity main effects, but the overall coefficient pattern is again
evident. Finally, the UNIDO descriptive statistics noted that European and Hispanic countries
each account for about 40% of the sample. The last columns drops Hispanic countries, finding
results similar to the Full Sample estimations, although the output interaction is diminished.
In summary, the sample composition adjustments find positive benefits to scientific inte-
gration with the US are evident throughout the panel studied. While manufacturing output
growth is pervasive, it is especially strong in economies with large agricultural sectors that fa-
cilitate sector reallocation. In countries with minimal agricultural employment, output growth
comes through labor productivity gains.
33 The estimates are sums over inventor ethnicity percentages at the patent level. Japanese inventors are
associated with more patents due to multiple inventors.
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1.5 Exogenous Changes from US Immigration Reforms
While OLS regressions establish partial correlations present in the data, they frequently fail
to identify causal relationships due to the endogenous relationships between outcomes or due
to omitted variable biases. Domestic human-capital developments in Chinese economies, for
example, could lead to both higher productivity and output growth at home and the export
of scientists to the US. Alternatively, R&D in Japan might be responsible for the growth of
its Asian neighbors and feed into higher US research output. Despite the strong fixed-effect
specifications employed, further exercises can aid in the interpretation of the positive outcomes
evident in patent-based regressions.
The earlier model helps understand and address these concerns. Consider the initial transi-
tion from the equilibrium described in Section 1.2 following an industrialization push in China.
China's government temporarily subsidizes invention until condition (1.9) no longer holds. As
I > I[M/I](Hc) 0 , it is more profitable for researchers in China to invent rather than imitate;
China's output growth and sector reallocation are now driven solely by domestic innovations.
In the US, Chinese researchers switch from inventing to imitating, as the latter is initially very
easy (i.e., I[O] is high). If international property rights are weak, so that US Chinese can
register their imitations with the US patent office, a positive : coefficient will be found in the
core estimating equations even though China's manufacturing gains no longer depend on its
research community in the US. In fact, data trends will show contemporaneous accelerations
in the growth of foreign output and US ethnic patenting. 34
The US population of Chinese researchers is a foothold for establishing greater confidence
in the direction of technology flows as they only influence China's development through their
transmission of knowledge regarding US innovations. If the size of this research population is
34 China's economy still depends on previously imitated products, as well as new inventions. How the system
evolves from this initial disturbance depends on the relative populations of the Chinese researchers in the US
and China. If the US Chinese group is sufficiently small, they will continue imitating a large invention stock
developed abroad forever, and the Chinese human-capital stock with respect to US inventions will decline to
zero. China's researchers will continue inventing, and the gap between China's researcher productivity for
invention versus imitation will become entrenched. On the other hand, if the US Chinese research community is
sufficiently large relative to China's, the declining imitation productivity will require at least some US Chinese
resume direct invention to maintain full employment. In this scenario, the initial reverse technology flows yield
to either a sustained mixing strategy, with Chinese researchers in both countries inventing and imitating, or the
US Chinese resuming the leading role.
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exogenously determined by immigration restrictions, a reduced-form strategy for the size of the
ethnic research community can be developed within the quotas system. US immigration law
does not control the population size of foreigners in the US, but it does control the inflow of new
immigrants. Define the quota on Chinese inflows of researchers to the US to be QUOTARc,t.
Assuming that only the previous three years of immigration matter for a research stock35 , a
reduced-form immigration estimator for ethnic scientific integration to the US is modelled as
ln(IMMRFt) = In [(QUOTARct-s + QUOTARc,tsl- + QUOTARc,t-s-2) (1.17)
The summation over the previous five years maintains the human-capital modelling technique
employed with the ethnic patenting dataset. This section designs and implements an empirical
version of (1.17) using exogenous changes in US immigration quotas.
Before proceeding, it is worth outlining why the US quotas are employed for a reduced-form
estimator rather than in an instrumental-variables specification. The unobserved regressor in
this study is the human-capital stock of each ethnicity with respect to US technologies. The
patent metrics employed in Section 1.4 proxy, albeit imperfectly, for this scientific integration.
Immigration quotas directly influence the size of ethnic research communities in the US, and
thus the unobserved human-capital stocks. Scientific bonds, however, can operate through
other channels besides formal patenting and the informal or tacit knowledge of new technolo-
gies that the patent metrics represent. As the exclusion restriction required for two-stage least
squares does not hold, coefficient estimates from using the immigration estimator as an instru-
mental variable would be upward biased. The reduced-form approach, however, offers a direct
check for the patent-based findings using exogenous changes in the populations of immigrant
researchers living in the US.
1.5.1 The Immigration Act of 1990
The disproportionate influence of immigrant scientists and engineers (ISEs) in the US is stag-
gering: while immigrants account for 10% of the US working population, they represent 25%
3 5The immigration reform examined below focuses on a very sharp surge in immigration that makes this
assumption reasonable.
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of the US science and engineering workforce and 50% of those with doctorates. Even looking
within the Ph.D. level, immigrant researchers have an exceptional contribution to science as
measured by Nobel Prizes, election to the National Academy of Sciences, patent citation counts,
and so on.3 6 Yet, the US immigration system significantly restricted the inflow of ISEs from
certain nations prior to its reform with the Immigration Act of 1990 (1990 Act).
US immigration law applies two distinct quotas to numerically restricted immigrants.3 7
Both of these quotas were increased by the 1990 Act, and their combined change dramatically
released pent-up immigration demand from researchers in constrained countries. The first
quota governs the annual number of immigrants admitted per country. This quota is uniform
across nations, and the 1990 Act increased the limit from 20,000 to approximately 25,620.38
Larger nations are more constrained by country quotas than smaller nations and benefited
most from these higher admission rates. Second, separately applied quotas govern the relative
admissions of family-based versus employment-based immigrants. Prior to the 1990 Act, the
quotas substantially favored family-reunification applications (216,000) to employment appli-
cations (54,000). The 1990 Act shifted this priority structure by raising employment-based
immigration to 120,120 (20% to 36% of the total) and reducing family-based admissions to
196,000.39 Moreover, the relative admissions of high-skilled professionals to low-skilled work-
ers significantly increased within the employment-based admissions.
The uniform country quotas and weak employment preferences constrained high-skilled im-
migration from large nations, and long waiting lists for Chinese, Indian, and Filipino applicants
formed in the 1980s. When the 1990 Act simultaneously raised both of these quotas, the
number of ISEs entering the US dramatically increased. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 use records from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to detail the response. Figure 1.4 plots
the number of ISEs granted permanent residency in the US from 1983-1997 for selected eth-
36For example, Stephan and Levin (2001), Burton and Wang (1999), Johnson (1998, 2001), and Streeter (1997).
37US immigrants are admitted through numerically restricted categories, governed by the quotas discussed in
this section, and numerically unrestricted categories (e.g., immediate relatives of US citizens). The reduced-form
estimator centers on the numerically restricted categories that admit 75% of ISEs (versus 43% of all immigrants).
Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1998) outline US immigration policy and the 1990 Act; they further discuss
behavioral responses to changes in quotas. ISE inflows through the unrestricted categories are stable in the
years surrounding the 1990 reform.
38 The worldwide ceiling for numerically restricted immigration now fluctuates slightly year-to-year based on
past levels; maximum immigration from a single country is limited to 7% of the worldwide ceiling.
39The employment limit increased to 140,000, but 120,120 corresponds to the previously restricted categories.
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nicities (summed over countries within each ethnicity). Prior to the 1990 Act, no trends are
evident in ISE immigration. The 1990 Act took effect in October 1991, and a small increase
occurred in the final three months of 1991 for Chinese and Indian ISEs. Immigration further
surged in 1992-1995 as the pent-up demand was released. Figure 1.5, on the other hand, shows
low-skilled immigration during the same period. While Chinese and Indian immigration are
substantially higher than Hispanic immigration for science and engineering, the opposite is true
for low-skilled immigration. Moreover, low-skilled immigration did not respond to the 1990
Act. 4 0
The extremely large Chinese response and sharp decline is partly due to a second law that
slightly modified the timing of the 1990 Act's reforms. Following the Tiananmen Square crisis
in June 1989, Chinese students present in the US from the time of the crisis until May 1990
were permitted to remain in the US until at least 1994 if they so desired. The Chinese Student
Protection Act (CSPA), signed in 1992, further granted this cohort the option to change from
temporary to permanent status during a one-year period lasting from July 1993 to July 1994.
The CSPA stipulated, however, that excess immigration from the CSPA, over Mainland China's
numerical limit, be deducted from later admissions. The timing of the CSPA partly explains
the 1993 spike, and the ability of graduating Chinese science and engineering students to remain
in the US in 1990 should factor into the timing of the reduced-form estimator.
Finally, National Science Foundation surveys of graduating science and engineering doc-
toral students, the group most important for developing human capital with respect to US
innovations, confirm the strong responses evident in the INS data. The questionnaires ask
foreign-born Ph.D. students in their final year of US study about their plans after graduation.
Figure 1.6 exhibits the percentage intending to remain in the US for available countries. The
60% to 90% jump for Mainland China from 1990 to 1992 is striking. Substantial increases are
also apparent for India and Western Europe.
40 Immigration trends are developed from immigrant-level INS records. The permanent residency admissions
include ISEs already working in the US on temporary visas. The trends for "new arrival" ISE are very similar.
Temporary visas can only be renewed once, so the total shift in ISE population should include workers gaining
permanent residency. The analysis below does not depend on this distinction. Science and engineering categories
are defined as Engineers, Natural Scientists, and Mathematical and Computer Scientists; low-skilled categories
are Administrative Support, Farming, Laborer, Precision Production and Repair, Service, and Sales occupations.
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1.5.2 Immigration Responses
The reduced-form strategy exploits differences in the extent to which countries were affected
by the 1990 reform. It is inappropriate, however, to use the outcomes exhibited in Figures 1.4
through 1.6 to determine treatment and control groups. A proper designation of the affected
countries requires a more formal analysis of researcher immigration responses to the legislation
change. Let ISE% dm be the mean ISE arrivals from country c divided by an approximate
country-level numerical limit for employment-based workers during the 1983-1990 pre-period.
The theoretical numerical limit is taken to be the 20,000 country limit multiplied by the 20%
worldwide allocation given to employment-based applications (i.e., 54,000/270,000).41
Define POSTt as a indicator variable taking the value of zero from 1983-1990 and one for
1991 and after (i.e., the 1990 Act's effective date). Regressing annual ISE admissions ISE adm
on an interaction of ISE% Adm with POSTt quantifies the immigration response of constrained
countries,
ISEAdm = + yISE -oAd m . POSTt + Xc + rt + ect. (1.18)
The main effect for ISE%At dm is absorbed by the country fixed effects X, along with levels
differences between nations in US immigration. The year effects r, remove aggregate changes
in US permanent residency admissions and control for the main effect of POSTt.
The y coefficient in (1.18) will be positive and significant if raising the two numerical limits
spurred ISE immigration from previously constrained countries (i.e., high values of ISE%ctm).
Table 1.9 shows this to be true, and economies with high values of ISE%Adm become the
treatment group regardless of actual responses. From the waiting list and 1983-1990 flow data
presented in Table 1.9, the treated groups are determined to be India, Mainland China, the
Philippines, and Taiwan.42 The reduced-form immigration estimator (1.17) then takes the
41The total employment immigration column in Table 1.9 demonstrates the theoretical limit works quite well.
The scientific percentages are even larger than they initially seem since family members of employment-based
admissions count towards the two quotas. The specific years selected for the pre-period are not important.
42Hong Kong is not included in the treatment group as its immigration status was not affected by the 1990
reform. The main results are robust to instead defining the treatment group at the ethnicity level, although the
additional variation inherent in the country-level approach enhances performance in falsification exercises.
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form
ln(IMMcit) -In E(QUOTAEnff + QUOTAE _ + QUOTAEff_2) , (1.19)
s=l 
where QUOTA E ff is the effective quota for country c in year t. Raising the numerical ceilings
did not change the effective quotas for nations unconstrained by the former immigration regime
(i.e., low ISE%dm), and their effective quotas are held constant at the pre-reform theoretical
limit. For constrained countries with high ISE%Aodm values, the effective quota increases to
reflect both the higher country limit of 25,600 and the larger employment preference allocation
of 36% (i.e., 120,120/336,000). This quota increase occurs in 1991, and the shift is moved
forward to 1990 for Mainland China to account for the CSPA.
This simple reduced-form approach abstracts from several issues: return migration (e.g.,
Taiwanese scientists in the mid 1990s), occupational or industry changes by ISEs, second-
generation immigrant demographics, shifts in research productivity, and others. If these types
of concerns are overwhelming, regressions of US ethnic patenting on the reduced-form estimator
will yield weak coefficients. The right-hand side of Table 1.9 shows instead that they are quite
strong despite the design's simplicity. However, two more serious reservations regarding the
estimator should be addressed before viewing the results.
First, the quota change affected all skilled workers seeking admission into the US, not just
researchers, and the impact of other occupations should be considered. The reduced-form
estimator should only influence foreign manufacturing output and productivity through the
development of human capital with respect to US technologies. Most skilled occupations
can be dismissed immediately, yet Table 1.9 shows immigration of business executives and
lawyers also increased after the 1990 Act. It is possible this business group might influence
foreign output growth through better sales contacts or higher foreign investment independent
of technology transfer. The relative volumes argue against this concern, as the size of the influx
relative to the existing base for advanced-degree researchers dwarfs other occupations. The
planned inflow of Chinese science and engineering Ph.D.s for 1991-1995, as measured by the
NSF surveys, would have doubled the existing Chinese-born Ph.D. stock in the 1990 Census.
The business inflow over this period is only about 20% of the 1990 stock.
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A second liability is that the reduced-form estimator may be correlated with other factors.
Here, the simplicity of its design is a concern. While determined by the data, the quotas
technique only distinguishes between the treatment group (i.e., India, Mainland China, the
Philippines, and Taiwan) and the remainder of the sample. Other changes occurring around
1991 that affect the output growth of the treatment group differentially from the control group
could confound the analysis. Figure 1.7 gives some weight to this omitted variable concern
for Mainland China. Mainland China was on a clear upward trend in science and engineering
Ph.D. graduates in the US prior to the 1990 Act.43 A similar expansion of researchers at
home is likely and may have directly impacted manufacturing development. These concerns
are evaluated empirically below.
1.5.3 Reduced-Form Results
The reduced-form regressions for 1985-1997 mirror the patent-based approach,
ln(Y t) = a + / ln(IMMCRF) + ci + rit + Ecit, (1.20)
with ln(IMMtF) defined by (1.19). Table 1.10 exhibits the main results in a format similar
to that of Table 1.5. The reduced-form estimator suggests foreign output increases with an
elasticity of 0.3-0.4 to higher ethnic research in the US. While the 3 coefficients should not
be directly compared to the patent-based approach, the interpretation that greater scientific
integration with the US boosts foreign manufacturing development is supported. The lower
variance in Table 1.10's estimates across weighting schemes reflects the country-level design of
the immigration estimator.
In contrast to the patent-based results, Panels B and C find output growth comes mainly
through higher employment levels rather than labor productivity gains. This difference is easily
explained with the sector reallocation model. Three of the four treated economies had large
agricultural sectors in 1980 that supported significant expansions in employment (Taiwan is the
one exception at 8%). The immigration estimator contrasts the outcomes in these economies
with the control sample and thus emphasizes the sector reallocation process. The patent-
'
130n a logarithmic scale, Figure 1.7 exhibits a smooth trend for Mainland China from 1985-1991 with a
marginal decrease in the growth rate thereafter.
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based regressions, on the other hand, paid greater attention to the outcomes of Hong Kong,
Macao, and Singapore through the application of the US Chinese ethnic patenting series to all
economies within the Chinese ethnicity. Without an agricultural sector from which to draw
labor, these economies experienced sharper labor productivity gains.
Table 1.11 next turns to robustness checks on the output growth finding, with the first row
simply replicating the core regression set. As a test of the foreign human-capital development
story, Panel B incorporates Figure 1.7's trends in foreign graduates from US science and en-
gineering Ph.D. programs. Both the levels and first-differences specifications hold up well in
the augmented specification. Given the specific concern regarding Figure 1.7's trend growth
in Mainland China's Ph.D. graduates, it is reassuring that this country can be again excluded
in Panel C with only minor shifts in the outcomes. As before, the results are also robust
to dropping any other country, the computer and drug industries, the full Chinese ethnicity,
advanced or Hispanic economies, and so forth.44
Finally, Panel D incorporates a linear ethnic time trend that removes the trend growth in
both the foreign country output and the US immigration estimator. By doing so, the frame-
work emphasizes the discontinuity of the 1990 reform for the identification of the : parameter.
Despite losing about about half of their size, the coefficients remain economically and statisti-
cally significant in the augmented specification. Given the stringency of this test, this strong
performance provides confidence against the estimator reflecting a spurious correlation.
Table 1.12 completes the immigration analysis by incorporating into (1.20) two counterfac-
tual estimators that move the 1991 effective date of the immigration reform earlier to 1987 or
later to 1995. The results with the 1987 counterfactual are mixed. Encouragingly, the coef-
ficients on the true estimator retain 60%-90% of their value and are still statistically different
44 The robustness of the Full Sample results to excluding India is important. The INS quotas design does not
consider shifts in the US ethnic populations of temporary workers (e.g., the H-1B program). The temporary
visa program up to the mid-1990s looked quite different from today. Fewer visas were issued, and the most
significant occupation and country were medical professionals and the Philippines, respectively. An explosion
in Indian temporary workers, mostly for systems analysis and computer programming jobs, began in the 1990s.
From 1989-1999, India's share of temporary visas issued rose from 9% to 48% (e.g., Lowell 2000).
Temporary visas can only be renewed once, for a maximum stay of six years, so long-term growth in ethnic
research communities requires permanent immigration. Outside of India, the trends for temporary visas are
fairly stable for the period studied, and the science and engineering component appears small compared to
permanent residency changes. While the jump in India's temporary visa community could affect the final few
years of the 1985-1997 period, the results do not depend on its inclusion.
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from zero. Moreover, the standard errors for the placebo estimators are 100%-300% larger
than those of the true estimator, and the placebo estimators are not statistically significant.
The coefficient estimates on the 1987 estimator, however, are of similar magnitude to the true
reform, and it cannot be rejected that the coefficients are the same. Panel E, on the other
hand, shows better performance with the 1995 counterfactual. Table 1.12 thus supports the
conclusion of stronger scientific integration leading to foreign output growth, but also highlights
that the estimated elasticity with the immigration estimator may be partly capturing an earlier
differential change for the treatment group.
Establishing the causal direction of international technology flows is a very daunting task.
The reduced-form quotas estimator offers more confidence than the patent-based approach that
coefficient estimates are not determined by reverse causality (especially foreign human-capital
developments). The price for this exogenous determinant, however, is the loss of industry vari-
ation that can be exploited. This reduced variation may leave the quotas estimator exposed to
omitted variable biases contemporaneous to or slightly preceding the reform, although the ro-
bustness checks on sample composition, ethnic time trends, and so on strongly suggest spurious
correlations are not solely responsible for the outcomes measured. Overall, the reduced-form
regressions support Section 1.4's conclusion that foreign manufacturing output increases with
stronger ethnic scientific integration to the US frontier.
1.6 Conclusions
The international diffusion of new innovations from frontier countries is necessary for broad
economic development. Even when the codified details of new technologies can be easily
disseminated, successful adoption may be complicated by the difficult exchange of the associated
tacit knowledge. This project considers the role and importance of knowledge networks for
exchanging this practical information through the observable channel of ethnicity, specifically
examining the ties between US ethnic research communities and their home countries. A
new tool is developed for studying the role of ethnic scientists and engineers in the US in the
technology transfer process by applying an ethnic-name database to individual patent records.
The resulting cross-sectional and longitudinal detail affords new insights about how knowledge
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diffuses across countries.
First, ethnic knowledge networks are important for explaining international patent citation
patterns, with inventors living outside of the US citing US-based inventors of their own eth-
nicity with a 50% higher rate. The core specifications further suggest a stronger US ethnic
research community boosts foreign manufacturing output with an elasticity of about 0.3. These
estimates are robust to multiple specification checks, and the pattern of results is consistent
with a model of sector reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing. In economies with
large agricultural sectors, manufacturing output expansions occur primarily through employ-
ment growth; in advanced economies with full manufacturing employment, the output gains
are achieved via higher labor productivity. Finally, a reduced-form strategy using exogenous
changes in US immigration law also finds qualitatively similar effects. These findings suggest
that US ethnic communities play an important role in technology diffusion to their home coun-
tries, and more generally that inadequate access to the tacit knowledge complementing new
frontier innovations can slow development in following countries.
This paper is a first step for characterizing the complex role of tacit knowledge in tech-
nology diffusion, and two promising extensions are currently being pursued with the ethnicity
approach. One project examines the relative importance of trade and FDI channels for the
technology transfer considered in this study.45 Second, a companion study explores ethnic-
ity's role in local knowledge diffusion within the US using the ethnic citation data. Special
attention is given to high-tech clusters like Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128, and ongoing
research concentrates on the linkages between these high-tech clusters and foreign inventors
(e.g., international collaborations between inventors of the same ethnicity). These extensions
will further characterize how knowledge networks shape the effective technology frontier for
emerging economies.
45 Rauch (2001) discusses the importance of business and social networks in trade, and Rauch and Trindade
(2002) demonstrate a substantial trade boost from Chinese networks. Technology diffusion is also facilitated by
foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises (e.g., Branstetter 2004, Singh 2003).
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Chapter 2
Heterogeneous Technology Diffusion
and Ricardian Trade Patterns
Summary 2 This study tests the importance of Ricardian technology differences for interna-
tional trade. Panel regressions find technology growth increases manufacturing exports. To
establish a causal relationship between technology and trade, instrumental-variables specifica-
tions exploit uneven technology diffusion from the US through ethnic scientific networks. The
instrumented elasticity of export growth to the exporter's technology development is 0.9 in the
preferred specification. Supplemental specifications show this elasticity is robust to incorporat-
ing the importer's technology development and to controlling for the Rybczynski effect due to
factor accumulation. An exogenous reform of US immigration law also confirms the results
are not due to reverse causality. The findings suggest technology differences are an important
determinant of trade patterns.
2.1 Introduction
Trade among countries due to technology differences is a core principle in international eco-
nomics. Countries with heterogeneous technologies focus on producing goods in which they
have comparative advantages; subsequent exchanges afford higher standards of living than are
possible in isolation. This Ricardian finding is the first lesson in most undergraduate courses
on trade, and it still undergirds many modelling frameworks on which recent theoretical ad-
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vances build (e.g., Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 1977, Eaton and Kortum 2002). In
a famous response to Stanislaw Ulam's challenge to name a true and nontrivial theory in the
social sciences, Paul Samuelson chose this principle of comparative advantage due technology
differences.
While empirical tests of this framework date back to its original proponent David Ricardo
(1817), the underlying technology differences across countries are very difficult to quantify.
Proxies for technology (e.g., total factor productivity) allow substantial progress but do risk
confounding heterogeneous technologies with other country-specific determinants of trade, es-
pecially in cross-sectional exercises. In principle, the relationship between technology and trade
is best estimated through panel data models that remove time-invariant characteristics of each
nation (e.g., distances, colonial history) and afford explicit controls of the time-varying deter-
minants deemed important (e.g., factor accumulation, economic development, trading blocs).
Of course, quantifying the dynamics of uneven technology advancement across countries is an
even more challenging task, and whether the uncovered partial correlations represent causal
parameters still needs to be addressed.1
This study develops this form of empirical environment by exploiting differences across coun-
tries in their access to the US technology frontier. Recent research emphasizes the importance
of ethnic scientists and entrepreneurs living in the US for the diffusion of US technologies to
their home countries. These frontier expatriates facilitate the transfer of the codified details
of new innovations, but perhaps more importantly also convey the tacit knowledge required
for successful adoption. The first chapter of this thesis (Kerr 2005a) finds that a larger eth-
nic research community in the US improves technology diffusion to foreign countries of the
same ethnicity. That is, new computer technologies flow faster to Chinese economies than
to Latin America if the Chinese computer research community in the US is stronger than the
Hispanic community. Moreover, the foreign countries realize substantial manufacturing output
and productivity gains from the stronger scientific integration. As invention is dispropor-
tionately concentrated in the US, these ethnic channels significantly influence the technology
1The panel exercises in this paper are closest in spirit to Harrigan (1997b), who evaluates the importance
of both technology and factor supply differences across countries for determining industry specialization. This
paper differs, however, in its direct study of trade flows, its substantial attention to non-OECD economies, and
in its IV analysis using heterogeneous technology diffusion. Other tests of the Ricardian model are McDougall
(1951, 1952) and Stern (1962).
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opportunities of imitating economies. 2
This uneven technology diffusion through ethnic networks offers an empirical foothold for
evaluating the importance of technology differences across countries in explaining trade pat-
terns. The empirical specifications, however, must be carefully designed to isolate technology's
role, and the next section of this paper utilizes the multi-country Ricardian model of Eaton and
Kortum (2002) to guide the form of the estimating equations. Eaton and Kortum construct
a special theoretical framework that relates trade flows among countries to the technology ca-
pabilities, distances, and input costs of each economy. A simple application in Section 2.2
replaces Eaton and Kortum's random technology parameters with country-specific technology
capabilities that depend upon a frontier country's technology state and the technology follower's
human-capital stock with respect to the frontier innovations. The follower's human-capital
stock is acquired through scientists of the following country's ethnicity who work in the fron-
tier economy. Reduced-form expressions thereby relate the trade patterns of the technology
follower to its ethnic scientific community in the technology leader.
After the appropriate estimating specifications are developed, Section 2.3 describes the
dataset constructed for this project. Ethnic scientists working in the US are identified by
applying an ethnic-name database to individual US patent records (e.g., identifies inventors
with Chinese versus Hispanic names). The matched dataset describes the 1980-1997 ethnic
composition of US inventors with unparalleled cross-sectional and longitudinal detail, and the
sizes of ethnic research communities are determined at the industry level by aggregating indi-
vidual patent records. These research communities are joined with detailed export data for
foreign countries (e.g., US Chinese computer research is paired with China's trade in the com-
puter industry) in an econometric framework that follows from theoretical model. Total factor
productivity (TFP) indices are also developed as proxies for aggregate technology states.
The fourth section presents the main empirical results using bilateral manufacturing exports
aggregated over industries from 1980-1997.3 Following the reduced-form equations developed
2 Kerr (2005a) provides additional references on the role of ethnic networks in transmitting new technologies.
Other sources of heterogeneous technology frontiers are geographic distances to major R&D nations (e.g., Keller
2002b), the innovative efforts of trading partners (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, Coe and Helpman 1995,
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1997), or international patenting decisions (e.g., Eaton and Kortum 1999). Keller
(2004) reviews the technology transfer literature.
3As discussed below, exports to the US are excluded from the trade patterns examined in this paper due to
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in Section 2.2, tests of the Ricardian theory first regress these bilateral exports on the ex-
porter's ethnic human-capital stocks for US technologies as measured in the ethnic patenting
dataset. Panel fixed effects remove time-invariant determinants of bilateral trade and global
developments in technology and trade; gravity covariates are also included to isolate technol-
ogy's role. Export volumes rise with an elasticity of about 0.6 to better human capital for the
US technology frontier, with the coefficient statistically different from zero. The results are
robust to a number of sample decomposition exercises and specification variants. The strong
elasticity of exports to the exporter's integration to the US frontier is also preserved when the
importer's technology integration is added as an additional regressor. Moreover, the elasticity
estimates for the importer's technology regressor are smaller and not statistically different from
zero. The combined pattern suggests countries export more manufacturing goods when they
develop a comparative advantage due to uneven technology diffusion from the US.
These initial reduced-form estimations assume the following order of events: technologies
are developed in the US, ethnic scientists in the US transmit the technologies to their respective
countries, and trade patterns are determined. Reverse causality, however, is an important con-
cern, with a plausible alternative being that foreign human-capital development is responsible
for both the export growth, perhaps with industry reallocations due to the Rybczynski effect,
and the emigration of ethnic researchers to the US. If true, the ethnic human-capital stock for
US technologies measured through the patenting data would not be a valid instrument for the
exporter's technology set. To begin addressing this issue, Section 2.4 continues by develop-
ing a second estimator using exogenous, differential changes in the sizes of US ethnic research
communities following the US Immigration Act of 1990. Reduced-form regressions with this
immigration quotas estimator also find positive export growth following stronger scientific in-
tegration with the US, and the strong contrast with the importer's integration is again evident.
While the new elasticity estimate of 0.5 is not directly comparable to the ethnic patenting
estimator, the directions of the two exercises support each other.
After establishing these two estimators for heterogeneous technology diffusion, Section 2.4
concludes with the full OLS and IV regressions of bilateral export volumes on the exporter's and
potential network effects operating alongside technology transfer. Kerr (2005b) separately analyzes the role of
ethnic scientific networks in US bilateral trade.
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importer's technology states. Aggregate technology capabilities are proxied with country-level
TFP indices. In the OLS regressions, growth in the exporter's technology set correlates with
positive export growth, but the elasticity estimates are sensitive whether the gravity covariates
are included; the importer's TFP coefficients are much weaker. IV regressions instrument
for technology development in both countries using the heterogeneous diffusion from the US
through ethnic scientific networks. First-stage regressions with both the patent-based and
quotas-based instruments find a robust growth in foreign technology levels with a stronger US
ethnic research community.
The second-stage regressions exhibit instrumented elasticities of exports to the exporter's
technology development that range from 0.6 to 1.1 with the patent-based instruments; the higher
estimates are for specifications that exclude the (potentially endogenous) gravity covariates.
The range of elasticities evident with the quotas-based instruments is 1.1 to 1.6. In all cases
these elasticity estimates are statistically different from zero. By contrast, the instrumented
elasticities of exports to the importer's technology state are smaller and not consistently different
from zero, especially when the gravity covariates are included. The conclusion from these
country-level exercises is that Ricardian technology differences are important determinants of
trade patterns.
Section 2.5 extends these core tests of the Ricardian model by exploiting the additional
industry and geographic variation available in the combined trade and ethnic patenting dataset.
These extensions are of interest in their own right, and more importantly provide additional
confidence that the measured role for technology development is not reflecting an omitted factor
accumulation. In contrast to the Ricardian framework, Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) models
describe trade as resulting from factor differences across countries (e.g., labor, capital, natural
resources). 4 During the period studied, some countries experienced significant growth in their
skilled labor forces and physical capital stocks, as well as their technology sets, and the former
could lead to significant growth in manufacturing exports due to the Rybczynski effect.
Section 2.5 tests this alternative hypothesis by contrasting industries within each country
4 See Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933), and Vanek (1968). Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980) provide a
classic HOV model, while Schott (2003) and Romalis (2004) offer state-of-the-art extensions and empirical tests.
Trefler (1994, 1996), Harrigan (1997b) and Davis and Weinstein (2001) also jointly explore technology and factor
differences as determinants of trade.
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of similar factor input intensities. Technology's important role is preserved in these detailed
matching exercises. Exploiting the within-country variation also ensures the findings are ro-
bust to other country-level explanations like nations entering trade agreements or multinational
bodies (e.g., the World Trade Organization), asynchronous business cycles, and so on. Section
2.5 concludes by analyzing the geographic margin of trade expansion with technology improve-
ments. Export growth is strongest in bordering and nearby countries, but positive growth is
evident at all distances.
The results of this project confirm technology is an important determinant of trade; more-
over, it is relevant for explaining changes in trade patterns over time. Section 2.6 concludes
this paper by discussing future projects that will utilize the uneven transmission of technologies
through ethnic networks to characterize how Ricardian technology differences shape interna-
tional exchanges.
2.2 Theoretical and Estimating Frameworks
This section develops the estimating equations employed in Section 2.4's empirical analysis. It
begins by briefly sketching a recent multi-country Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
This framework is unique in relating trade to technology differences across several countries,
and a simple application builds into this theory ethnic research networks and heterogeneous
technology diffusion. From this analysis, reduced-form specifications are developed that relate
bilateral exports to ethnic human-capital stocks with respect to frontier technologies. The
second half of this section in turn manipulates these theoretical specifications into a framework
suitable for empirical analysis.5
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework
The world consists of N countries producing and consuming a continuum of goods j E [0, 1].
Consumers maximize utility in each period by purchasing these goods in quantities Q(j) ac-
5See also Alvarez and Lucas (2004). The Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) approach to Ricardian
trade is not readily extended to multiple countries, although some local comparative statics are feasible (e.g.,
Wilson 1980).
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cording to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) objective function,
U = (1 Q(j)(er-1)/adj)/ ( r- l) (2.1)
subject to prices determined below. > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods for the
consumers. Consumers earn wage w and consume their full wages in each period. Accordingly,
time subscripts are omitted throughout most of this discussion.
Countries are free to produce or trade all goods. Inputs can move among industries within
a country but not across countries. Industries are characterized by identical Cobb-Douglas
production functions employing labor with elasticity ca and the continuum of produced goods,
also aggregated with (2.1), with elasticity 1 - a. Factor mobility and identical production
functions yield constant input production costs across goods within each country, ci(j) = ci Vj.
Technology differences exist across countries, so that country i's efficiency in producing good
j is zi(j). With constant returns to scale in production, the unit cost of producing good j in
country i is c/zi(j). While countries are free to trade, geographic distance results in "iceberg"
transportation costs so that delivering one unit from country i to country n costs dni > 1 units
in i. Thus, the delivery to country n of good j made in country i costs
Pni(j)= ( ) dni (2.2)
An increase in country i's efficiency for good j lowers the price it must charge. Perfect
competition allows consumers to buy from producers in the country offering the lowest price
(inclusive of shipment costs). Thus, the price that consumers in country n pay for good j is
Pn(j) = min[Pni (j); i = 1, ... , N]. (2.3)
The technology determining the efficiency zi(j) is modelled as the realization of a random
variable Zi drawn from a country-specific probability distribution Fi(z) = Pr[Zi < z]. Draws
are independent for each industry j within a country. The core innovation of Eaton and
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Kortum's model is to use Frechet functional distribution to model technologies,
Fi(z) = e -Ti - ° (2.4)
where Ti > 0 and > 1. The country-specific parameter Ti determines the location of the
distribution, while the common parameter determines the variation within each country's
distribution. By the law of large numbers, a larger Ti raises the average efficiency of industries
for country i, and therefore its absolute advantage for trade. A larger , on the other hand,
implies a tighter distribution for industries within every country and thereby limits the scope
for comparative advantage across nations.
To model heterogeneous technology diffusion through ethnic ties to the frontier economy,
the technology location parameter is specified as
T = T (Hi)H. (2.5)
T is the exogenously determined frontier technology stock.6 Hi is the human-capital stock
of country i with respect to the frontier innovations, including both the codified and tacit
knowledge required for successful adoption. This human-capital stock depreciates at a rate 6,
and the population of researchers of country i's ethnicity (Li) working in the frontier country
replenishes it: Hi/&t = -Hi + Li. If the number of expatriate researchers is constant, the
steady-state human-capital stock of country i with respect to frontier inventions is 6-1Li. The
elasticity /H is empirically estimated below.
2.2.2 Estimating Framework
The Fr6chet distribution (2.4) allows prices from equations (2.2) and (2.3) to be determined.
The probability that country i is the lowest-cost producer of an arbitrary good for country n is
7ni = Ti(cidni)-/ EN Tk(Ckdnk) - 0 .7 With a continuum of goods, 7rni is also the fraction of
6 Variables referring to the frontier economy are generally denoted by a tilda.
7 The distribution of prices country i presents to country n is Gni(p) = Pr[Pnj < p] = 1 - F(cdni/p) =
1 - exp(-Ti(cjdni)-°p°). Country n buys from the lowest cost producer of each good, so that its realized price
distribution is Gn(p) = Pr[Pn < p] = 1 - Hi[1 - Gni(p)] = 1 - exp(-po iN=1 Ti(cidni)-°). The probability
is 7rni = Pr[Pni(j) < min{Pns(j); s 7 i}] = fjo HSii[ - Gn(p)]dGni(p). See Eaton and Kortum (2002) for the
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goods country n purchases from country i. Country n's average expenditure per good does not
vary by source country, so that the fraction of country n's expenditure on goods from country
i is also
Xni Ti(cidni)-=t 2 (2.6)
X72 ~k=1 Tk(Ckdnk) (26
where Xn is total expenditure in country n. Holding input prices constant, technology growth
in country i increases its exports to country n through entry into industries in which it was
previously uncompetitive. Looking across import destinations for an industry in which it
already exports, country i also becomes the lowest-cost producer for more distant countries it
could not previously serve due to the markup of transportation costs. Condition (2.6) also
shows how trading costs d lead to deviations in the law of one price.
For the case of frictionless trade or constant trading costs (dnk = d Vn, k)8, condition (2.6)
can be rearranged into the structural estimating equation for year t,
In (Xnmt) = ln(Tit) - 0 ln(cit) + n (Xnt) - n (Ek=l1 Tkt(ckt)-)
Panel estimations of bilateral exports are used to evaluate this structural relationship. A vector
of year effects rt control for the world price and technology aggregate in (k=- 1 Tkt(ckt)-O); the
year effects also remove uniform growth in trade volumes and price changes during the period
studied. A vector of cross-sectional effects Oni further extract time-invariant determinants
of bilateral exports from country n and country i (e.g., distances, colonial ties). Aggregate
expenditure in the importing country (Xnt) is proxied by the importer's GDP level in year t.
To integrate the estimations with the empirical trade literature, most specifications further
add the gravity covariates of the exporter's GDP and both countries' GDP per capita. The
exporter's GDP per capita also captures broad changes in the input costs cit. 9 These gravity
covariates are interacted following Frankel (1997) and Rauch (2002). The primary estimating
full derivation of the price index.
8 The assumption of constant trading costs is unimportant for the upcoming panel estimations if the number of
countries is large. The numerator's bilateral distance d-° is time-invariant and absorbed into the cross-sectional
effects. The error from modelling the denominator's world price and technology aggregate with year effects is
small, lim [n(k= 1 Tkt(cktdnk)-)/aln(Ti)] = O.
9 Input costs can be endogenized through a specification of the labor market. This study does not undertake
this step, instead measuring export growth due technology transfer net of input costs increases from general-
equilibrium wage pressure.
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equation is
in (Xnit) - + /3Tln (Tit) + y ln(GDP/CAPit GDP/CAPnt) (2.7)
+( ln(GDPit GDPnt) + qbni + r7t + Enit,
where the theoretical elasticity of one between technology and bilateral exports is empirically
evaluated with the /3 T coefficient.10
The OLS specification (2.7) is evaluated in Section 2.4 with the aggregate technology pa-
rameter Tit measured through country-level TFP indices. While this Ricardian framework
clearly assigns a causal relationship of export growth to technology development, in practice
the empirical estimation of (2.7) can be confounded by reverse causality or omitted variable
biases. Moreover, the possible simultaneous accumulation of factor endowments and new tech-
nologies is particularly worrisome for isolating the Ricardian impetus for trade from relative
factor scarcities. Technology is the only channel promoting export growth in this framework
due to identical factor endowments and no intertemporal factor accumulation.11
Anticipating these issues, this section closes with how heterogeneous technology transfer
from the frontier economy (2.5) provides a foothold for establishing causality when these com-
plications are introduced. The human-capital stock of country i with respect to the frontier
innovations (Hi) affects country i's exports only through technology transfer and can thus serve
as an instrument for country i's technology in the structural specification (2.7). This human-
capital stock is acquired through researchers of country i's ethnicity (Li) working in the frontier
economy, and two instruments are developed in Section 2.4 using ethnic scientific communities
in the frontier US economy. Substituting (2.5) into the structural equation (2.7) yields the
10The interaction of the gravity covariates is further discussed below. The gravity relationship in the Eaton
and Kortum model arises due to technology differences interacting with distances and production costs. An
alternative derivation through Armington or monopolistic competition builds on imperfect substitution among
goods for consumers. The former predicts trade growth at the extensive margin with technology development,
while the latter two predict trade growth at the intensive margin.
ifferences in preferences or non-homothetic utility functions can also promote trade, but Hunter and
Markusen (1988) and Hunter (1991) cap these stimulants at 20% of world trade. The specified production
function also abstracts from trade due to increasing returns to scale (e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1985, Antweiler
and Trefler 2002).
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reduced-form contribution of these communities for exports from their home countries,
in (Xnit) = I+ /H in (Hit) + ? ln(GDP/CAPit GDP/CAPnt) (2.8)
+ ln(GDPit GDPnt) + q3,i + rTt + Enit,
where the log frontier technology state Tt is separated from the ethnic human-capital stock
Hit and absorbed into the year effects rt and/5H = f3T / H .1 2 The empirical exercises below
commence with this reduced-form relationship, and then analyze (2.7) in a two-stage least
squares framework.
2.3 Dataset Preparation
To test empirically these Ricardian predictions, a dataset is prepared combining bilateral trade
data, foreign-country technology measures, and US ethnic human-capital stocks. The core
industry-level and country-level variation exploited in this study is dictated by the ethnic
patenting metrics developed first. Once this panel foundation is established, the mapping
in of trade and foreign-country TFP measures is easily motivated.
2.3.1 US Ethnic Human-Capital Stocks
This paper exploits technology differences across countries arising due to uneven technology
diffusion from the US through ethnic scientific networks. The ethnic human-capital stocks
with respect to US technologies are developed through the NBER Patent Data File (Hall, Jaffe,
and Tratjenberg 2001). This dataset offers detailed records for all patents granted by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1975 to December 1999. Each
patent record provides information about the invention (e.g., technology classification, citations
of prior art) and the inventors submitting the application (e.g., name, city). To estimate
inventor ethnicities, a commercial database of ethnic first names and surnames is mapped into
the inventor records. The match rate is 99% for US patent records, and the process affords the
12Time-invariant differences in access to the frontier technology state, Tt = Tt Ti (Hjt) ~H, are absorbed
into the cross-sectional effects rnm in the log specification (2.8). These differences could arise due to geographic
distance from the US (e.g., Keller 2002), heterogeneous production techniques (e.g., Davis and Weinstein 2001),
and so on.
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distinction of nine ethnicities: Chinese, English, European, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean,
Russian, and Vietnamese.
Table 2.1 describes the 1980-1997 US sample. The trends demonstrate a growing immigrant
contribution to US technology development, especially among Chinese and Indian scientists.
Also matching popular perceptions, ethnic inventors are more concentrated in high-tech indus-
tries like computers and pharmaceuticals and in gateway cities relatively closer to their home
countries (e.g., Chinese in San Francisco, European in New York, and Hispanic in Miami). The
final three rows demonstrate a close correspondence of the estimated ethnic composition to the
country-of-birth composition of the US science and engineering workforce in the 1990 Census.13
Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolving immigrant contribution to US technology development as a
percentage of patents granted by the USPTO, while Figure 2.2 provides a more detailed glimpse
of immigrant contributions by broad technology groups.1 4
From this matched database, the ethnic human-capital stocks Hi to the US frontier are
easily developed. Recall that these stocks depend upon the number of frontier researchers
undertaking inventive activity of country i's ethnicity (Li): Hi/t = -Hi + Li. Define the
patenting productivity of a US researcher to be P, so that the measured patenting of ethnicity
i in year t is expected to be 1iFlow = P. Lit. Inverting this expression suggests the size of
the ethnic research community can be inferred annually using the observed number of ethnic
patent applications divided by the constant researcher productivity (Lit o Fw/P).
With the population of US ethnic researchers quantified annually, subject to a multiplicative
constant, the human-capital stocks Hi could be estimated through the perpetual inventory
method. The empirical results presented below, however, take a slightly different approach.
In an examination of international patent citations, Kerr (2005a) finds ethnic scientific networks
aid direct communications among inventors. Inventors living outside of the US cite US inventors
of their own-ethnicity approximately 50% more often than other US-based inventors, even after
controlling for technology classes. Moreover, by considering different time lags between the
13The estimated European ethnic contribution is naturally higher than the immigrant contribution measured
by foreign born.
14The third chapter (Kerr 2005c) further details the ethnic patenting dataset and provides additional descriptive
statistics. A quality assurance exercise matching the ethnic-name database to foreign patent records registered
in the US is also presented. The ethnic-name procedure assigns ethnicities to 98% of foreign inventor records,
and the average own-ethnicity contribution is 88%. Similar to the US, own-ethnicity contributions should be
less than 100% due to expatriate researchers.
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filing dates of the cited and citing patents, the ethnic bias is shown to be most important in the
first five years of the diffusion process. The human-capital stocks Hi are accordingly modelled
by aggregating the number of ethnic patents over the previous five years, with the panel fixed
effects controlling for any changes in patenting productivity P of US researchers.1 5' 16
These ethnic human-capital stocks for US innovations are developed at the four-digit level
of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system. This framework distin-
guishes 81 manufacturing industries at a level of detail that straddles the two-digit and three-
digit levels of the US Standard Industrial Classification system. Table 2.A1 in the appendix
lists the ISIC industries employed.7
2.3.2 Export Volumes
Bilateral exports are taken from the World Trade Flows Database (WTF), compiled by Statis-
tics Canada and Feenstra (2000). This rich data source documents the product-level values
of bilateral trade for most countries from 1980-1997. These product flows are aggregated
into the four-digit ISIC industries developed in the US patent dataset, and exporting countries
are grouped into the eight non-English ethnicities that are identifiable with the ethnic-name
database. Five ethnicities map to a single country, while the Chinese, European, and His-
panic ethnicities have larger blocs. Table 2.2 lists the countries studied and their summary
characteristics. 1 8
15In an influential survey, Griliches (1990) notes that annual fluctuations in US patents granted occur due
to changes in USPTO personnel resources, as well as technology development. Over the last two decades,
US patent grants have increased dramatically. While several explanations for this increase are put forth (e.g.,
Kortum and Lerner 2000, Kim and Marshcke 2004, and Hall 2004), it is clear that the number of patents awarded
has grown faster than the growth in research scientists would suggest. The time effects account for changes in
the underlying patenting productivity, effectively contrasting ethnic shares of US patents granted.
16 Similar results are found if the perpetual inventory method is employed. The two disadvantages of this
technique are the assignments of a depreciation rate for human capital and initial human-capital stocks. The
latter is particularly burdensome since the ethnicity of inventors can only be determined after 1975.
17 The USPTO issues patents by technology categories rather than by industries. Combining the work of
Johnson (1999) and Silverman (1999), concordances are developed between the USPTO classifications and the
four-digit ISIC industries in which new inventions are manufactured or used. The main estimations focus on
industry-of-use, affording a composite view of the technological opportunity developed for an industry. Studies
of advanced economies find accounting for these inter-industry R&D flows important (e.g., Scherer 1984, Keller
2002a). Estimations with manufacturing industries support the using-industry specifications.
1
"The empirical analysis verifies the multiple country mappings do not unduly influence the results. Some
country to ethnicity mappings are debatable (e.g., placing Spain and Portugal with European rather than His-
panic, including the Scandinavian countries in European), as is the inclusion of communist countries. The results
are robust to these marginal reclassifications.
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The first pair of columns present the mean 1980-1997 multilateral export volumes and
growth rates for each country (in nominal US dollars). Exports to all countries other than the
US are considered in this paper; trade relations with the US are excluded, however, due to the
strengthening network effects -which are also thought to increase trade flows - operating
alongside the heterogeneous technology transfer.19 The base panel is thus asymmetric in the
sense that exporters are limited to countries of non-English ethnicities contained in the ethnic-
name database, but in many specifications their bilateral exports to other countries are included
(e.g., exports to English or African countries). Variations on the base panel below restrict the
sample to be only bilateral flows among the eight non-English ethnicities, particularly when the
importer's technology growth is being contrasted with the exporter's technology development.
The forty-four economies account for 53% and 64% of global manufacturing exports in 1980
and 1997, respectively, with countries of English ethnicity accounting for most of the residual
(the US export share is 12% in 1980 and 13% in 1997). Not surprisingly, the largest exporters
are European nations (especially Germany) and Japan, while the smallest exporters are found
in Latin America. Vietnam (25%), Hong Kong (15%), Korea (13%), and Mainland China
(13%) experience the strongest compound annual growth in nominal exports; only Venezuela
demonstrates an absolute decline in trade volumes over the seventeen years.
2.3.3 TFP Indices and Development Indicators
This study employs country-level total factor productivity (TFP) as a proxy for the technology
location parameter Ti. Section 2.2's theory abstracts from capital stocks by specifying a Cobb-
Douglas production function of labor (with elasticity a!) and intermediate inputs from the CES
aggregator. Capital accumulation, however, is important for explaining economic development,
particularly the rapid advances made by several East Asian economies (e.g., Young 1992, 1995;
Ventura 1997). Accordingly, TFP indices are developed for each country c relative to the US
frontier with a production function employing capital and labor,
TFPc,us Y L - ( (2.9)
19 Kerr (2005b) explores how ethnic scientific networks facilitate bilateral trade with the US. See also Rauch
(2001) and Rauch and Trindade (2002).
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with the year subscripts omitted. This index is superlative (i.e., it is exact for the Cobb-Douglas
production function).20 As this index is also transitive (i.e., TFPac = TFPab TFPbc), the
choice of the base country is irrelevant, with the US baseline providing intuition only. The
second pair of columns in Table 2.2 presents the country-level TFP indices calculated from the
Penn World Tables (PWT) using data on aggregate GDP, workers, and capital stocks.21
The final pair of columns exhibit GDP per capitas for each country that are also used in
the estimations below. Comparing the TFP indices to the GDP per capitas highlights several
important points about the former. First, the mean country TFPs relative to the US range
from <1% for Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia to 34% for Germany and 46% for Japan. In
the GDP per capita series, the four lowest 1980-1997 means are India ($1364), Mainland China
($1653), Honduras ($1747), and Nicaragua ($2007), while the four highest are Switzerland
($19,258), Norway ($17,829), Denmark ($17,487), and Japan ($17,120). The levels and rank
correlations are 55% and 68%, respectively. The core difference between the two series is that
the relative TFP metrics of larger to smaller countries (e.g., Mainland China, India, and Brazil
vis-A-vis Scandinavian nations) tends to be greater than the relative GDP per capita metrics.
This difference may reflect how workers are measured in the underlying PWT data or may be
due to an increasing discrepancy in using the US labor share. The levels of both series are
inconsequential, however, as the estimations employ cross-sectional fixed effects.
The correlation in growth rates is much higher at 94%, and their rankings are closely tied.
The three fastest growing economies in both series are Mainland China, Taiwan, and Korea;
Vietnam's GDP per capita also experiences a fast 10% growth rate, but TFP measures are
unavailable due to insufficient capital data. Likewise, TFP metrics cannot be constructed for
Belize, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union. While these four economies are excluded from the
IV regressions, they are retained in the reduced-form exercises that form the bulk of this study.
Estimating country-level TFP indices is fraught with peril: the industrial structures of
2°Caves, Cristensen, and Diewert (1982) derive the general TFP index for the translog family. The Cobb-
Douglas index (2.9) is a special case where labor shares are constant.
21 See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). Real GDP levels are adjusted for PPP differences and for price
movements using the Laspeyres method (rgdpl, pop). Real capital stocks are measured beginning-of-year and
calculated from aggregate investment (ki) using the perpetual inventory method. Initial stocks are developed for
1970, and a depreciation rate of 15% is employed. Worker estimates are developed by the PWT from International
Labour Organization data, with linear interpolation between census or survey dates for each country (rgdpwok).
The share of labor ax is taken to be 0.67.
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countries differ, inputs are only coarsely measured, pricing differentials and exchange rates are
difficult to handle, and so on (e.g., Harrigan 1997a, 1997b). Measurement error is clearly
present in the TFP metrics constructed. However, errors confined to cross-sectional levels or
aggregate yearly fluctuations (e.g., due to mismeasurement in the US baseline) do not affect
the analysis due to the log specification and panel fixed effects. Idiosyncratic errors across
countries with time, however, are not captured by the panel effects and bias the estimated
elasticities towards zero. This scope for this concern, however, is also limited in that the TFP
indices are primarily used in the IV regressions, which circumvent measurement error in the
endogenous regressor.
2.4 Country-Level Estimations
This combined dataset is a unique laboratory for evaluating Ricardian technology differences in
international trade. This section evaluates country-level regressions of bilateral export volumes
using the derived specification (2.7), while the next section concentrates more on the industry
and geographic dimensions of the data. These later extensions provide a better platform
for distinguishing heterogeneous technology diffusion from shifts in factor endowments than
the country-level regressions. Accordingly, most discussion of the factor content of trade is
postponed until then.
The study deviates from the typical arrangement of empirical papers by presenting the
reduced-form specification (2.8) first, with the OLS and IV regressions using the exporting
country's TFP index held until the section's end. This ordering takes early advantage of the
richness of the ethnic patenting dataset; it further segues into the introduction of a second esti-
mator for US ethnic human-capital stocks that exploits exogenous changes in US immigration
law. Both of these estimators are used in the IV analysis. Throughout this section, technology
development is found to be a strong determinant of exports.
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2.4.1 US Ethnic Human-Capital Estimations
Table 2.3 evaluates the reduced-form specification (2.8). The dependent variable for each
regression is the log dollar value of bilateral exports from country n to country i.22 The base
regression includes the log of the exporting country's human-capital stock Hi with respect to
US technologies, as well as the interacted gravity covariates of the exporter's and importer's
log GDP per capitas and log GDPs. Although not reported in the table, vectors of cross-
sectional and year fixed effects are included as well. Finally, to account for the multiple
countries mapping into the Chinese, European, and Hispanic ethnicities, standard errors are
clustered at the ethnicity level. This conservative cross-sectional clustering further addresses
the serial-correlation concerns of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
As both variables are in logs, the 0.569 coefficient in the upper-left corner finds a 0.6%
increase in the value of bilateral exports with a 1% increase in ethnic human-capital stocks
with respect to US technologies. Stronger scientific integration with the US frontier clearly
correlates with an increase in exports to other countries. The gravity covariates are important
for isolating technology's role, as the growth in human-capital stocks could otherwise be con-
founded with other sources of growth in country size or standards of living that independently
promote trade. The economic development of the exporter, however, is clearly endogenous
- technology transfer in Section 2.2's model simultaneously increases the exporter's GDP and
trade. The second column finds the estimated elasticity increases to 1.3 if the gravity covariates
are excluded.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide a graphical view of these two regressions if export volumes are
summed across importers into single exporter-year observations,
In (Xit) = a + H n (Hit) + 7 ln(GDP/CAPit) + ( n (GDPit) + i q+ t + cit.
The data points in Figure 2.3 are the residuals of total non-US multilateral exports and US
ethnic human-capital stocks after the country and year fixed effects and the exporter's gravity
22Nominal dollar values are employed, with the vector of year effects extracting aggregate price changes. This
approach is motivated by the expenditure specification derived in Section 2.2. Section 2.5 demonstrates, however,
that the results are robust to individually deflating each industry's trade with the NBER shipments deflators
(Bartlesman and Gray 1996) before aggregating to country-wide exports.
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covariates are removed. The slope of the trend line through Figure 2.3's residuals is akin to the
/H coefficient estimated in the first column. Figure 2.4, on the other hand, follows the second
column and does not partial out the gravity covariates. Without the gravity covariates, the
strong relationship is driven by the exceptional performance of Chinese economies, Korea, and
India. Removing development levels, on the other hand, leads to a more nuanced picture with
a broader set of nations contributing to the positive relationship. The sample composition
exercises below directly evaluate the importance of different ethnic groups to the measured
elasticity.2 3
The constructed dataset builds on two rich sources for economic data, and thus trade and
ethnic patenting data are available for all observations (subject to the ethnicities identifiable
with the ethnic-name database). The base specification, however, excludes observations if the
gravity covariates are missing or if the export volume is zero. Columns 3 and 4 evaluate whether
these restrictions are overly influencing the measured elasticity. First, gravity covariates are not
always available for very small importers, resulting in a 22% loss from the maximum possible
sample size of non-zero bilateral exports. Column 3 demonstrates, however, that this attrition
is unimportant as the elasticity estimate in the larger sample is very close to Column 2.
Second, approximately 25% of the possible bilateral exchanges have zero values. In some
cases these zero values reflect explicit restrictions on trade, but most are due to a combination
of geographic distance and small country sizes. Zero values are undefined in a log specification
like (2.8), and the base regression drops these observations. To ensure this procedure is
not dictating the results, Column 4 retains the zero-valued observations through recoding and
including appropriate indicator variables. The results are again very close to the base regression
in Column 1, indicating that ignoring zero-valued observations is not overly influencing the
estimated elasticities. Moreover, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 also find a positive relationship at the
exporter-year level, where no zero values are encountered.
As highlighted in the data description section, the base sample is asymmetric in the sense
23 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 exclude Belize, Cuba, the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam, all of which are included
in Table 2.3's reduced-form analysis. This done for consistency with TFP graphs examined later, when these
countries are dropped due to missing TFP indices. The exports of the former Soviet Union and Vietnam also
demonstrate strong correlations to their US ethnic human-capital stocks. For visual ease, the figures also exclude
three other trade outliers (Panama 1988, Paraguay 1991, Venezuela 1991); the inclusion or exclusion of these
observations does not have a noticeable effect on the results.
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that it only considers bilateral exports from the forty-four countries with ethnicities identifiable
with the ethnic-name database; the countries receiving the imports, however, can be of any
ethnicity (including English). Column 5 restricts the base sample to consider only bilateral ex-
ports within the countries associated with the ethnic patenting dataset. There is no significant
difference from Column 1.
More importantly, this balanced panel serves as a platform for further characterizing the
direction of trade due to technology differences. Column 6 introduces the similarly constructed
importer's human-capital stock with respect to the US frontier. The strong elasticity of man-
ufacturing exports to the exporter's scientific integration is preserved. On the other hand,
the elasticity to the importer's integration is smaller and not statistically different from zero.
A related regression of bilateral imports on the two ethnic human-capital stocks equivalently
finds that imports respond positively to the foreign country's technology development and less
to own-country ethnic human-capital stocks for US technologies.
Finally, Columns 7 and 8 present two reduced-form regressions that correspond directly to
the IV regressions (with gravity covariates) later in this section. Belize, Cuba, the former Soviet
Union, and Vietnam are excluded from the IV regressions since TFP indices are not available.
While this attrition is only 10% of the countries in the sample, the number of non-English
ethnicities is reduced from eight to six. Comparing Column 7 to Column 1, the elasticity of
bilateral exports to the exporter's US ethnic human-capital stocks is somewhat weaker but still
statistically significant in the smaller sample. Column 8, however, finds a substantial reduction
in the measured elasticity of exports to the importer's human-capital stocks for US technologies,
although the large standard errors in both cases indicate the estimate is imprecisely measured.
This contrast is further discussed in the IV section.24
2.4.2 Sample Composition
The assembled dataset is a diverse set of countries and experiences. While Figures 2.3 and 2.4
suggest the unique outcomes of a single exporter or ethnicity (e.g., Mainland China, India) are
not solely responsible for the positive correlations, Columns 9-16 formally test the robustness
24The standard errors for the importer's technology regressor in Columns 6 and 8 are calculated through dual
regressions clustering on the importer's ethnicity.
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of the measured elasticity to sequentially dropping each ethnicity. The H coefficient remains
strong and statistically significant throughout; the regressions are individually discussed below
to highlight further the underlying features of the dataset.
First, Column 9 drops the four Chinese economies. Perhaps surprisingly, the measured
elasticity strengthens when these economies are excluded (although the coefficient is not statis-
tically different from the base regression). The US Chinese research community exhibits the
strongest growth over the 1980-1997 period, and therefore receives significant attention in the
fixed effect estimations. All four economies exhibit strong export growth during the period
studied and contribute to a high elasticity in the regressions without the gravity covariates
(evident in Figure 2.4). After the gravity covariates are included, however, Taiwan's export
growth is weaker than the expanding US Chinese human-capital stock would have predicted
(evident in Figure 2.3). Dropping this ethnicity thus raises the estimated elasticity from the
base regression. Individually excluding each Chinese economy also results in 10%-20% positive
or negative shifts, but the results are remarkably robust to dropping this special case.
The constructed sample also includes several industrialized economies that are undertaking
extensive R&D themselves. For example, Japanese inventors living in the US, who are well
identified with the ethnic-name database, patented less than 10,000 inventions from 1985-1997;
almost 300,000 patents were awarded to Japanese inventors living outside of the US during this
period.25 Positive correlations of export growth to US ethnic research may simply be capturing
reverse technology flows, intra-company patenting, or defensive patenting from these advanced
economies. Columns 10 and 13 demonstrate, however, that excluding the large European bloc
or Japan only results in small increases in the estimated elasticity. Hispanic countries also
account for about 45% of the sample, and Column 11 demonstrates that the results are robust
to dropping these nations too. Individual European and Hispanic countries can similarly be
excluded. 2 6
The last five columns turn to the ethnicities with single country mappings. India and
Korea, like the Chinese ethnicity, are widely noted for their export growth and US research
25The estimates are sums over inventor ethnicity percentages at the patent level. Japanese inventors are
associated with more patents due to multiple inventors.
26 An alternative strategy to mapping multiple countries into the Chinese, European, and Hispanic ethnicities
is to run the export regressions at the ethnicity level (thereby also removing intra-ethnicity trade). As these
sample composition exercise suggest, this approach yields similar results to the country-level analysis.
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presence during the 1980-1997 period. Excluding these two countries in Columns 12 and 14
leads to only small declines in the estimated elasticity. Finally, the seventeen years covered
by this study witnessed the integration of the former Soviet Union and Vietnam into the world
trading community. During this period, the US research presence of these two ethnicities
also increased, especially Vietnamese which roughly quadrupled its ethnic share of US patent
applications (from a low initial position of 0.1%). Columns 15 and 16 show these groups
contribute to the estimated elasticity, but that the measured effect is not being driven by their
integration alone.
Finally, unreported regressions divide the sample into two smaller, overlapping time periods:
1980-1992 and 1985-1997. The positive dependence of exports on technological advancement is
clearly present in both subsamples, but the relationship is stronger in the later years (elasticities
of 0.4 and 1.0, respectively). This higher elasticity stems from the stronger growth of Asian
research communities in US high-tech industries and their associated export growth in the later
years. Section 2.5's industry-level regressions further evaluate the different elasticities in high-
tech versus low-tech industries. In summary, the sample composition adjustments find positive
export growth from scientific integration with the US is evident throughout the panel studied.
2.4.3 US Immigration Reform Estimations
The reduced-form estimations demonstrate a strong correlation between the growth of US eth-
nic scientific communities and their home country's export development. In preparation for the
IV specifications, it is important to question whether these correlations capture causal relation-
ships. Of particular concern is reverse causality. A plausible alternative to technology transfer
from the US is that foreign human-capital development leads to both export growth abroad,
perhaps with industry shifts due to the Rybczynski effect, and the emigration of scientists to the
US. If true, using US ethnic research communities measured through the patenting database
as an instrument for foreign technology levels would not solve the endogeneity problem. 27
US immigration law is a foothold for establishing greater confidence in the direction of
2 7 Another concern may be omitted variables that simultaneously boost the productivity of US ethnic re-
searchers and the exports of their home countries (e.g., Japanese technology diffusion through Asian business
networks). The ability to contrast exporter and importer technology levels substantially weakens this concern,
and most of the ensuing discussion centers on reverse causality.
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causation as it only influences foreign exports (to countries other than the US) through the sizes
of US ethnic research communities and their associated technology transfer. If the populations
of immigrant scientists and engineers (ISEs) are exogenously determined by legal restrictions,
a second reduced-form strategy for ethnic human-capital stocks with respect to the US frontier
can be developed within the US quotas system. US immigration law does not control the
population sizes of foreigners in the US, but it does control the inflow of new immigrants.
Define the quota on ISE inflows from country c to the US to be QUOTAct. Assuming that
only the previous three years of immigration matter for a research stock28 , a reduced-form
immigration estimator for ethnic scientific integration to the US is modelled as
ln(IMMcF) = n [(QUOTAct-s + QUOTA,t-s-i + QUOTAC,ts_2) . (2.10)
The summation over the previous five years maintains the human-capital stock modelling tech-
nique employed with the ethnic patenting dataset. This section designs and implements an
empirical version of (2.10) using exogenous changes in US immigration quotas from the Immi-
gration Act of 1990 (1990 Act).
The disproportionate influence of ISEs in the US is staggering: while immigrants account
for 10% of the US working population, they represent 25% of the US science and engineering
workforce and 50% of those with doctorates. Even looking within the Ph.D. level, immigrant
researchers have an exceptional contribution to science as measured by Nobel Prizes, election to
the National Academy of Sciences, patent citation counts, and so on.29 Yet, the US immigration
system significantly restricted the inflow of ISEs from certain nations prior to its reform with
the 1990 Act.
US immigration law applies two distinct quotas to numerically restricted immigrants. 30
Both of these quotas were increased by the 1990 Act, and their combined change dramatically
2 8The immigration reform examined below focuses on a very sharp surge in immigration that makes this
assumption reasonable.
2 9For example, Stephan and Levin (2001), Burton and Wang (1999), Johnson (1998, 2001), and Streeter (1997).
30US immigrants are admitted through numerically restricted categories, governed by the quotas discussed in
this section, and numerically unrestricted categories (e.g., immediate relatives of US citizens). The reduced-form
estimator centers on the numerically restricted categories that admit 75% of ISEs (versus 43% of all immigrants).
Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1998) outline US immigration policy and the 1990 Act; they further discuss
behavioral responses to changes in quotas. ISE inflows through the unrestricted categories are stable in the
years surrounding the 1990 reform.
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released pent-up immigration demand from researchers in constrained countries. The first
quota governs the annual number of immigrants admitted per country. This quota is uniform
across nations, and the 1990 Act increased the limit from 20,000 to approximately 25,620.31
Larger nations are more constrained by country quotas than smaller nations and benefited
most from these higher admission rates. Second, separately applied quotas govern the relative
admissions of family-based versus employment-based immigrants. Prior to the 1990 Act, the
quotas substantially favored family-reunification applications (216,000) to employment appli-
cations (54,000). The 1990 Act shifted this priority structure by raising employment-based
immigration to 120,120 (20% to 36% of the total) and reducing family-based admissions to
196,000.32 Moreover, the relative admissions of high-skilled professionals to low-skilled work-
ers significantly increased within the employment-based admissions.
The uniform country quotas and weak employment preferences constrained high-skilled im-
migration from large nations, and long waiting lists for Chinese, Indian, and Filipino applicants
formed in the 1980s. When the 1990 Act simultaneously raised both of these quotas, the num-
ber of ISEs entering the US dramatically increased. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 detail the response.
Figure 2.5 plots the number of ISEs granted permanent residency in the US from 1983-1997 for
selected ethnicities (summed over countries within each ethnicity). Prior to the 1990 Act, no
trends are evident in ISE immigration. The 1990 Act took effect in October 1991, and a small
increase occurred in the final three months of 1991 for Chinese and Indian ISEs. Immigration
further surged in 1992-1995 as the pent-up demand was released.33
National Science Foundation surveys of graduating science and engineering doctoral stu-
dents, the group most important for developing human capital with respect to US innovations,
confirm the strong responses evident in the INS data. The questionnaires ask foreign-born
Ph.D. students in their final year of US study about their plans after graduation. Figure 2.6
exhibits the percentage intending to remain in the US for available countries. The 60% to 90%
jump for Mainland China from 1990 to 1992 is striking. Substantial increases are also apparent
31 The worldwide ceiling for numerically restricted immigration now fluctuates slightly year-to-year based on
past levels; maximum immigration from a single country is limited to 7% of the worldwide ceiling.
32The employment limit increased to 140,000, but 120,120 corresponds to the previously restricted categories.
33 Kerr (2005a) shows that low-skilled immigration remained constant during the 1990 reform; temporary
versus permanent immigration and the responses of other skilled occupations are also discussed. ISE trends
are developed from immigrant-level INS records using the Engineers, Natural Scientists, and Mathematical and
Computer Scientists occupations.
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for India and Western Europe.
The second reduced-form strategy exploits differences in the extent to which countries were
affected by the 1990 reform. It is inappropriate, however, to use the outcomes exhibited in
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 to determine treatment and control groups. Kerr (2005a) undertakes
a formal analysis of researcher immigration responses to the legislation change, finding the
constrained countries to be India, Mainland China, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The reduced-
form immigration estimator (2.10) then takes the form
5
ln(IMMcRF) = ln (QUOTAJS + QUOTAcffs -1 + QUOTAEfs_ 2) (2.11)
s=1
where QUOTA E ff is the effective quota for country c in year t. Raising the numerical ceilings
did not change the effective quota for nations unconstrained by the former immigration regime,
and their effective quota is held constant at a pre-reform theoretical limit of the 20,000 country-
level quota multiplied by the 20% employment allocation. The effective quota for the four
constrained countries increases to reflect both the higher country limit of 25,600 and the larger
employment preference allocation of 36% (i.e., 120,120/336,000). This quota increase occurs
in 1991, and the shift is moved forward to 1990 for Mainland China to account for the Chinese
Student Protection Act.34
Table 2.4 documents the reduced-form specifications (2.8) using the immigration quotas
estimator (2.11) in place of the ethnic patenting estimator. The format of Table 2.4 mirrors
Table 2.3. Exports are found to increase with an elasticity of about 0.5 to the exporter's
scientific integration with the US. Although the H coefficients from the two reduced-form
estimators should not be directly compared, their similar qualitative directions do provide
confidence that reverse causality is not responsible for the positive reduced-form elasticities
3 4The extremely large Chinese response and sharp decline in Figure 2.5 is partly due to a second law that
slightly modified the timing of the 1990 Act's reforms. Following the Tiananmen Square crisis in June 1989,
Chinese students present in the US from the time of the crisis until May 1990 were permitted to remain in the
US until at least 1994 if they so desired. The Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA), signed in 1992, further
granted this cohort the option to change from temporary to permanent status during a one-year period lasting
from July 1993 to July 1994. The CSPA stipulated, however, that excess immigration from the CSPA, over
Mainland China's numerical limit, be deducted from later admissions. The timing of the CSPA partly explains
the 1993 spike, and the ability of graduating Chinese science and engineering students to remain in the US in
1990 is factored into the timing of the reduced-form estimator.
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evident in Table 2.3. The elasticity of exports to the importer's technology integration is
negative with this quotas-based estimator. If the gravity covariates are excluded, however, this
elasticity is instead positive and very small.35
2.4.4 TFP Estimations
With both instruments and their reduced-forms described, this subsection completes the country-
level analysis with OLS and IV regressions of bilateral export volumes on the TFP indices (a
proxy for the country technology location parameter Ti). Column 1 of Table 2.5 estimates
the structural specification (2.7). While the TFP indices vary by country, the standard errors
are still clustered by ethnicity for comparison to the IV regressions. In contrast to Tables 2.3
and 2.4, the bilateral export elasticity to the exporter's TFP development is much weaker (0.2)
and statistically insignificant when the gravity covariates are included. Column 2, however,
shows a much stronger response when the gravity covariates are excluded. Figures 2.7 and 2.8
illustrate these regressions in a form similar to Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
The large coefficient swing from Column 1 to Column 2 brings to the forefront an underlying
data concern. Unlike the reduced-form estimations, the TFP indices and the gravity covariates
are derived from the same PWT data and are highly colinear by construction (recall the 92%
correlation in growth rates for the TFP indices and the exporters' GDP per capitas). As
a result, the TFP elasticity is very sensitive to small specification changes. For example,
substituting the non-interacted exporter's and importer's GDPs and GDP per capitas for the
two interacted covariates restores the measured elasticity to 0.8. Moreover, it is questionable
whether the gravity covariates should be included in the upcoming IV regressions anyway due
to their endogeneity. Fortunately, the IV regressions are robust to including or excluding the
gravity variables, and Table 2.5 maintains the same baseline estimation as the reduced-form
exercises for consistency.
Examining the remainder of Table 2.5, the balanced panel specifications of Columns 5
and 6 find a stronger and statistically significant elasticity of exports to the exporter's TFP
index, while the elasticity to the importer's TFP index is negative and statistically insignificant.
Column 8 shows the positive elasticity derives from the latter part of the sample, while the
35Graphs for the immigrations quotas estimator are presented in the appendix.
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sample decompositions find the Chinese and Indian outcomes are most responsible for the
partial correlations evident between export and TFP growth. As noted in Section 2.3, TFP
indices are unavailable for the former Soviet Union and Vietnam (as well as Belize and Cuba),
and these two ethnicities are dropped from the sample considered in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 and
Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
The core IV regressions using the US ethnic human-capital stocks instruments are presented
in Table 2.6A. The first four columns document again the OLS permutations with and without
the importer's TFP regressor and gravity covariates. As noted earlier, the inclusion of the grav-
ity covariates substantially reduces the coefficient on the exporter's TFP regressor. Columns
5-8 of Table 2.6A instrument for the exporter's and importer's technology development with
the ethnic human-capital stocks developed from the US patenting dataset. The first-stage re-
gressions in Panels B and C demonstrate that ethnic scientific integration with the US improves
the TFPs of their home countries. The gravity covariates are included in the first-stages of
Columns 6 and 8, but the coefficients are not reported to conserve space. Figures 2.9 and 2.10
plot the first-stage regressions for the exporters, highlighting that technology transfer is most
evident for the Chinese, Indian, and Korean ethnicities. The first-stage relationship is weaker
among European economies and is not present for Latin America or Japan unless the gravity
covariates are included.
In contrast to the OLS regressions, the instrumented elasticities for the exporter's technology
state are strong and statistically significant regardless of whether the gravity covariates are
included. The IV specifications are able to overcome the measurement error and colinearity
problems from the coarse TFP proxy. The estimated elasticity for the importer's technology
state, on the other hand, is not robust to the including the gravity covariates. Unfortunately,
the null hypothesis that the two elasticities are equal cannot be rejected due to the large
standard errors for the importer's technology state, but the greater importance of the exporter's
technology does appear to hold true.
Columns 5-8 of Table 2.6B present the IV regressions using the immigration-based instru-
ments. The instrumented export elasticities of 1.1-1.7 to the exporter's technology state are
50% larger than those using the patent-based instrument; all of the elasticities but Column
8 are again statistically significant. Moreover, the importer's technology development is not
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found to increase export volumes and is statistically different from the exporter's contribution
in Column 7. Taken together, these IV regressions find strong support for Ricardian technology
differences as a source of trade. 36
A definitive explanation for the larger elasticity with the immigration-based instrument
cannot be given, but two hypotheses are readily identified. First, the theoretical development in
Section 2.2 assumes both constant country sizes and that the labor resources of each country are
fully employed in manufacturing. Several countries in the sample, however, have large reservoirs
of underutilized labor in agriculture, and the transition of these workers to manufacturing is
important for characterizing their economic development (e.g., Harris and Todaro 1970). Kerr
(2005a) finds that technology transfer from the US to these emerging economies produces a
larger growth in manufacturing output compared to industrialized economies due employment
growth from sector reallocation complementing labor productivity gains.
In the current framework, this transition process is equivalent to an increase in effective coun-
try size. If wage equality with the agricultural sector is also maintained, general-equilibrium
increases in the input costs c for the manufacturing sector are also depressed. Both effects
further promote growth in export volumes. The immigration-based instrument focuses atten-
tion on three economies undergoing this transition. The 1980 agriculture employment share
for Mainland China, India, and the Philippines are 70%, 74%, and 52%, respectively, compared
to 8% in Taiwan and a sample mean of 22%.37 Additional sector reallocation to manufacturing
in these economies following technology transfer from the US may explain part of the larger
elasticity.
A second candidate explanation, however, is an omitted variable bias. The reduced variation
inherent in the immigration estimator's design potentially exposes it to correlation with omitted
factors that differentially affect the four treatment economies from the control group around
the 1990 Act. To take one case, India undertook several trade reforms in the early 1990s as
part of an IF-supported adjustment program (e.g., Topalova 2004). While it is possible to
argue these reforms are endogenous outcomes to facilitate the expansion of exports, it certainly
36 Table 2.A2 in the appendix shows the IV results are robust to the sample decompositions undertaken in the
reduced-form analysis. The only major departure is for the immigration quotas instrument when the Chinese
ethnicity is excluded.
37 Agricultural shares are from the United Nations Statistical Division and Sun, Fulginiti, and Peterson (2003).
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conceivable that India's reforms are in fact independent and potentially bias technology's role
with the immigration IV upward. The price of the exogeneity in the immigration quotas
instrument is greater exposure to these types of concerns.
To summarize the material presented in this section, two estimators are developed to model
heterogeneous technology diffusion from the US through ethnic scientific networks. The first
uses ethnic patenting data to measure the human-capital stocks of each ethnicity with respect to
US innovations, while the second exploits exogenous changes in the sizes of US ethnic scientific
communities following the Immigration Act of 1990. In both reduced-form and IV specifi-
cations, the exporter's integration with the US frontier consistently yields growth in export
volumes, while the importer's integration has an inconsistent and often negligible effect. Taken
together, these country-level regressions provide strong evidence that Ricardian technology dif-
ferences across countries are important for explaining trade patterns.
2.5 Empirical Extensions
The bilateral perspective taken in Section 2.4's country-level regressions affords a detailed con-
trast of the exporter's and importer's technology development. The large number of exporter-
importer permutations, however, prohibits the use of much of the underlying industry and
geographic variation available in the ethnic patenting and trade datasets. This section under-
takes two extensions that highlight instead these other dimensions.
The first extension sums multilateral exports across destination countries to focus on industry-
level exports for each country. Technology advancement is again found to increase exports at
this disaggregated level. Moreover, this result is robust to including detailed country-level
trends that remove aggregate changes for the manufacturing sectors in each nation. This
finding argues against alternative hypotheses for the earlier results that would operate at the
country-level (e.g., entry into trading blocs). Through matching exercises that further group
industries according their capital and skilled-labor intensities, the industry-level analysis also
provides confidence that a generalized Rybczynski effect due to factor accumulation is not
responsible for the positive elasticities assigned to technology growth.
The second extension returns to the bilateral trade data to explore how the elasticity es-
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timates differ by different geographic distances to import destinations. Export growth is
strongest in bordering and nearby countries, but positive growth is evident at all distances. 38
2.5.1 Industry Analysis
The industry-level analysis sums exports for each country i across import destinations by the
ISIC industries listed in Table 2.A1. For comparison, non-US imports are also calculated
for each economy. As in the bilateral exercises, some observations have zero values that are
undefined in a log specification. The multiple specification checks undertaken in Table 2.7
(e.g., first differences, time trends) are best conducted with panels of uniform series length.
Accordingly, country-industry observations are excluded if they do not maintain $10k in non-
US multilateral exports and imports throughout the 1980-1997 period. A second bar of one
ethnic patent per annum is also applied. These hurdles focus the analysis on economically
important interactions, but the results are robust to raising or removing these hurdles.
The basic industry-level regressions for country i and industry j in year t take the form
in (Xijt) = + in (Hijt) + y ln(GDP/CAPit) + ( in (GDPit) + Oij + jt + ijt. (2.12)
All of the industry-level specifications employ the detailed US ethnic human-capital stocks
Hijt that are constructed through the ethnic patenting database. The regressions retain the
exporting country's gravity covariates and include vectors of country-industry fixed effects qij
and industry-year fixed effects rjt. In Table 2.7, Column 1 of the top panel finds a : coefficient
of 0.7 when estimating (2.12). As in the country-level regressions, positive integration with
the US technology frontier increases manufacturing exports. The industry-level elasticity is
statistically significant, with the standard errors now clustered at the ethnicity-industry level
to reflect the more disaggregated data employed.
By itself, this industry-level regression provides two important checks on the earlier results.
First, the data development in Section 2.3 asserted that five-year sums of ethnic patents could
proxy for the underlying sizes of ethnic research communities because changes in the patenting
productivity of US researchers would be absorbed into the aggregate year effects At. This
3Industry-level analyses do not follow directly from the Eaton and Kortum model, which requires random
industry technologies around the country technology aggregate to satisfy the Frechet distribution.
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assumption may be cavalier, however, as the patenting rate per researcher likely increased faster
in high-tech sectors than in more mundane fields. With ethnicities specializing in different
industries (e.g., the US Chinese in computer research), this composition effect could potentially
bias the results. By narrowing the focus to within-industry variation, this liability is minimized
because the patenting productivity is now controlled for at the industry-year level by the fixed
effects ]jt. Likewise, differential changes in industry prices (e.g., the rapid decline in computer
prices) in the nominal export volumes are now captured.
The second column in Panel A weights the observations by each industry's patenting level
from 1980-1982. This weighting scheme focuses more attention on high-tech industries, finding
a small growth in the estimated elasticity. The stability of the elasticity across Columns 1
and 2 highlights, however, how pervasive the industry-level response of exports to technology
integration is.
The country-level exercises found weak export elasticities to the importer's technology de-
velopment. The analogous industry-level prediction is that non-US multilateral imports should
respond less to scientific integration with the US frontier than exports. This Ricardian out-
come is evident in Columns 3 and 4, which present the unweighted and weighted regressions
for imports using a specification similar to (2.12). Unreported regressions further find that
multilateral imports respond more to the scientific integration of other ethnicities to the US
frontier. This contrast between exports and imports again emphasizes the role of technol-
ogy in determining trade patterns. Moreover, the asymmetry argues against omitted trade
agreements affecting the outcomes measured.
Many empirical analyses first difference a levels specifications for estimation,
A ln (Xijt) = + /A ln (Hijt) + -yA ln(GDP/CAPit) + (A ln (GDPit) + qjt + ijt, (2.13)
where ijt = eijt - ijt-. The efficiency of a first-differences form versus the levels specification
turns on whether the error term is autoregressive. If autoregressive deviations are substantial,
the first-differences form is preferred; a unit-root error is fully corrected. If there is no serial
correlation, however, first differencing introduces a moving-average error component. Esti-
mations of the autoregressive parameter in the levels specification (2.12) find moderate serial
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correlations of 0.5-0.6. Columns 5-8 of Panel A show the Ricardian findings are evident in a
first-differences form too, although the measured export elasticity is weaker at 0.2-0.3.39
The lower panel in Table 2.7 presents a battery of specification checks to the base regressions
from Panel A. The tabulated coefficients are from separate regressions that modify the base
regressions as indicated in the left-hand column; the coefficients for the gravity covariates are
again omitted to conserve space. The first row of Panel B excludes the computer and drug
industries. Case studies of successful technology diffusion often focus on the computer and
pharmaceutical industries, and the exceptional outcomes of Asian scientific communities in
Silicon Valley are widely noted. While the industry-year effects control for the overall growth
in each industry's research and output (e.g., Griliches 1994), it would be important to note
if ethnic differences in high-tech industries alone are responsible for the positive correlations.
The minor elasticity changes indicate that they are not.
More importantly, the bottom four rows introduce aggregate ethnicity-level and country-
level controls. The power of the industry-level analysis is its ability to isolate within-country
variation, even after removing levels differences and global industry trends. A positive 3
coefficient in these regressions requires that China's exports in the computer industry grow
faster than its exports in the pharmaceuticals industry if Chinese integration to the US computer
frontier grows faster than its integration to the pharmaceutical frontier. Strong performance
in these regressions places this same burden on any competing explanations.
The elasticity estimates are remarkably stable to these country-level controls. The spec-
ifications become more stringent as one moves down the rows from the linear time trends to
nonparametric country-year effects; the coefficient estimates naturally decline as the additional
variation is removed. Yet, a strong elasticity of export growth to scientific integration with the
US frontier is maintained even when the triple combination of country-industry, industry-year,
and country-year fixed effects are introduced. Moreover, the asymmetric growth of multilat-
eral exports over multilateral imports is maintained throughout. The robust conclusion from
Table 2.7 is that Ricardian technology differences are important determinants of industry-level
39As first differencing exacerbates the downward bias in estimated coefficients due to measurement error in
the regressor, the levels form remains the preferred specification in this study. GLS estimations that correct the
autoregressive parameter yield elasticity estimates bounded by the levels and first differences results presented.
Lagged dependent variable specifications that test for mean reversion also demonstrate export growth with
scientific integration.
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patterns even after aggregate country trends are removed.
2.5.2 Testing for the Rybczynski Effect
In contrast to the Ricardian framework, Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) models describe trade as
resulting from factor differences across countries (e.g., labor, capital, natural resources). During
the period studied, some countries experienced significant growth in their skilled labor forces
and physical capital stocks, as well as their technology sets, and the former could lead to growth
in manufacturing exports due to the Rybczynski effect. Table 2.7's finding of strong technology
elasticities using only within-country variation already argues against this interpretation for the
manufacturing sector as a whole (e.g., a shift from agriculture to manufacturing due to capital
accumulation). This subsection provides additional evidence that technology's role is not
reflecting changes in trade patterns due to factor accumulations by using industry comparisons
within the manufacturing sector itself.
The intuition behind the proposed test is straightforward. Under the Rybczynski effect,
the accumulation of skilled workers in country i shifts country i's specialization towards manu-
facturing industries that employ skilled labor more intensively than other factors. By grouping
manufacturing industries by their skilled-labor intensities, tests examine if technology's im-
portant role is preserved after time trends are removed for these industry groups within each
country. To illustrate, both the computer and pharmaceutical industries are highly skill in-
tensive. A general Rybczynski effect due to skilled worker accumulation in China would favor
specialization and export growth in these industries equally. Additional confidence for technol-
ogy's role is warranted if China's exports grow faster in the skill-intensive industry that receives
the strongest technology transfer from the US relative to its peer industries.
To implement this matching exercise, industries are grouped into quintiles based upon their
mean 1980-1997 factor intensities in the US. Three intensities are studied -the industry's
capital-labor ratio, the share of non-production workers in the industry's labor force, and the
industry's average wage. Table 2.A1 lists for each industry the quintile groupings assigned.
Textiles rank in the lowest quintiles in all three classifications schemes, while chemicals and
industrial machinery consistently fall into the top quintiles. Some differences do exist though.
The correlations among quintile groupings are 76% for capital-labor and wage, 59% for wage
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and non-production share, and 37% for capital-labor and non-production share.
These detailed comparisons place a premium on the number of industries available for each
country. Accordingly, the matching test employs a slight variant of (2.12) that regresses the
share of country i's manufacturing exports in industry j on the share of its US ethnic human-
capital stock in industry j,
(Xit) = C ( + ( t) +k + jt + Ejjt. (2.14)Xit~ ~~k Hit ] Zi +lt+ it
The regression retains the vectors of country-industry fixed effects ij and industry-year fixed
effects Tjt. This regression is similar to the specification that included country-year fixed
effects, but without the log transformation the zero export values can be incorporated.
The first column in Table 2.8 finds an unweighted 3 coefficient of 0.7 with this modified
specification. The next three columns incorporate into (2.14) the ethnicity time trends inter-
acted with each quintile group. For all three factor intensity comparisons, the positive role of
technology is preserved. The robustness of technology's role in this matching exercise is also
evident in the weighted regressions of Columns 5-8.40
These findings suggest an omitted factor accumulation is not confounding the strong role
for technology identified throughout this study. Of course, the test is not foolproof. In
particular, specialized foreign development could produce both export shifts within intensity
groups and the emigration of ethnic researchers trained in these specialized fields to the US. The
earlier specifications employing the US immigration quotas argued against this reverse causality
interpretation, but this estimator does not provide the industry-level variation necessary for
this analysis. Nevertheless, this study concludes that the importance of Ricardian technology
differences identified here are robust to alternative factor-based explanations of trade. 41
4 0Vietnam is excluded as its US ethnic patenting is very small in the early years of the sample, producing
several outliers in this industry-comparison exercise. The coefficient estimates are lower if Vietnam is included,
but they remain statistically significant and convey the same results.
41The ideal test would simply remove factor-based trade from the export volumes studied. This is test is
unattainable for several theoretical and practical reasons. First, while 2x2x2 HOV models (two countries,
factors, and goods) cleanly predict a country exports goods that intensely use the factors in which the country
is well endowed, this prediction does not hold universally in settings with multiple goods and factors (e.g.,
the critique of Leamer (1980) on Leontief's (1953) paradox). Likewise, bilateral trade patterns due to factor-
based differences are only determined for special cases in a multi-country world (e.g., Romalis 2004). Thus,
strong assumptions would be required for distinguishing factor-based trade in this empirical setting. Practically
speaking, the data constraint is also prohibitive as factor data and industry input-output matrices are very poorly
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2.5.3 Geographic Expansion
This study closes with some initial findings regarding the geographic margin of export growth
due to technology advances. This margin is quantified in the reduced-form specification (2.8)
for country-level bilateral exports. Table 2.9 begins by repeating the basic regression with the
bilateral exports for which distances are available (using the Great Circle distances between
capital cities). The sample is then divided into bordering countries in Column 2 and non-
bordering countries in Columns 3-7. Non-bordering countries are further separated into five
distance categories: 0-1500 km., 1501-3000 km., 3001-6000 km., 6001-9000 k, and greater
than 9000 km. To give a feel for these demarcations, the distances from Beijing, China, to
the capitals of Taiwan, Bangladesh, United Arab Emirates, and Spain are 1723 km., 3029 km.,
5967 km., and 9229 km., respectively.
The estimated elasticities suggest export growth declines slightly with distance and in a
non-linear way. The strongest elasticities are found for bordering countries, although the
small sample size yields substantial standard errors, and non-bordering countries within 1500
km. The remaining groupings, however, are not very different from the average elasticity
estimate and do not display an obvious trend. This latter stability is a comforting result as it
suggests local shocks (e.g., regional trade agreements, macroeconomic cycles) are not responsible
results. A complete characterization of the interaction between distance and export growth
from technology advancement is left for future work.
2.6 Conclusions
While the principle of Ricardian technology differences as a source of trade is well established in
the theory of international economics, empirical evaluations of its importance are relatively rare
due to the difficulty of quantifying and isolating technology differences. This study exploits
heterogeneous technology diffusion from the US through ethnic scientific networks to make
additional headway using panel estimation techniques. Country-level regressions find bilateral
exports respond positively to the exporter's technology development. This result is robust
measured for most of the countries and years covered by this study. See Davis and Weinstein (2001) for an
application using richer OECD data.
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to 1) including the importer's technology development as a regressor, 2) instrumenting for
technology development using scientific integration with the US frontier, 3) testing for reverse
causality using an exogenous reform of US immigration quotas, and 4) considering industry-
level specifications that focus on within-country variation and test for factor accumulation
alternatives. The results strongly support the conclusion that technology differences are an
important determinant of trade.
Several promising extensions are currently being pursued using the additional geographic
and industry variation discussed in Section 2.5. The first project seeks a fuller characterization
of the industry and geographic margins of export expansion (including their joint interactions
for intensive and extensive growth). This research will bring specific attention to industry
entry and exit decisions and characterize the importance of different country sizes. A second
project is exploring the impact of technology transfer for trade policies and political institutions
(and vice versa). This additional work will further refine our understanding of how Ricardian
technology differences influence trading patterns among countries.
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Table 2.A1: ISIC Revision 2 Industry Codes
US Quintiles (5 = Highest)
ISIC Industry Title K/L Wage Skill
Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat
Man. of dairy products
Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables
Canning, preserving and processing of fish and crustaceans
Man. of vegetable and animal oils and fats
Grain mill products
Man. of bakery products
Sugar factories and refineries
Man. of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery
Man. of food products n.e.c.
Man. of prepared animal feeds
Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits
Wine industries
Malt liquors and malt
Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries
Tobacco manufactures
Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
Man. of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel
Knitting mills
Man. of carpets and rugs
Cordage, rope and twine industries
Man. of textiles n.e.c.
Man. of wearing apparel, except footwear
Tanneries and leather finishing
Fur dressing and dyeing industries
Man. of products of leather, except footwear and wearing apparel
Man. of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic
Sawmills, planing and other wood mills
Man. of wooden and cane containers and small cane ware
Man. of wood and cork products n.e.c.
Man. of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal
Man. of pulp, paper and paperboard
Man. of containers and boxes of paper and paperboard
Man. of pulp, paper and paperboard articles n.e.c.
Printing, publishing and allied industries
Man. of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
Man. of fertilizers and pesticides
Man. of synthetic resins, plastic and man-made fibres except glass
Man. of paints, varnishes and lacquers
Man. of drugs and medicines
2
4
4
5
5
1
3
2
n.a.
3
4
3 2
4 2
n.a.
3 2
n.a.
5 4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
5
1
n.a.
1
2
n.a.
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
3
3
3
5
5
5
4
5
1
4
1
4
4
5
2
3
5
3111
3112
3113
3114
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3121
3122
3131
3132
3133
3134
3140
3211
3212
3213
3214
3215
3219
3220
3231
3232
3233
3240
3311
3312
3319
3320
3411
3412
3419
3420
3511
3512
3513
3521
3522
Table 2.Al: ISIC Revision 2 Industry Codes (continued)
US Quintiles (5 = Highest)
[SIC Industry Title K/L Wage Skill
3523 Man. of soap and cleaning, preparations, perfumes, cosmetics, etc. 4 4 5
3529 Man. of chemical products n.e.c. 4 4 5
.3530 Petroleum refineries 5 5 4
3540 Man. of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 5 4 4
3551 Tyre and tube industries 5 5 1
3559 Man. of rubber products n.e.c. 2 2 3
3560 Man. of plastic products n.e.c. 2 2 2
3610 Man. of pottery, china and earthenware 1 2 2
362() Man. of glass and glass products 4 3 1
3691 Man. of structural clay products 3 2 2
:3692 Man. of cement, lime and plaster 4 3 3
:3699 Man. of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 4 3 3
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 5 5 2
3720 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 5 4 3
:3811 Man. of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 3 3 3
:3812 Man. of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal n.a.
3813 Man. of structural metal products 2 3 3
:3819 Man. of fabricated metal products except mach. and equip. n.e.c. 3 3 3
:3821 Man. of engines and turbines 5 5 4
3822 Man. of agricultural mach. and equip. 4 3 3
3823 Man. of metal and wood-working mach. 3 4 3
3824 Man. of special ind. mach./equip. except metal and wood-working 2 4 5
3825 Man. of office, computing and accounting mach. 4 5 5
3829 Mach. and equip. except electrical n.e.c. 3 4 4
3831 Man. of electrical industrial mach. and apparatus 2 3 4
3832 Man. of radio, television and communication equip. and apparatus 3 5 5
3833 Man. of electrical appliances and household goods 3 2 3
3839 Man. of electrical apparatus and supplies n.e.c. 4 4 4
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 2 3 2
3842 Man. of railroad equip. 3 4 3
3843 Man. of motor vehicles 4 5 1
3844 Man. of motorcycles and bicycles 2 3 2
3845 Man. of aircraft 3 5 5
3849 Man. of transport equip. n.e.c 3 5 5
3851 Man. of prof. and scientific, measuring/controlling equip., n.e.c 2 4 5
3852 Man. of photographic and optical goods 4 4 5
3853 Man. of watches and clocks 2 2 3
3901 Man. ofjewellery and related articles 1 2 4
3902 Man. of musical instruments 1 2
3903 Man. of sporting and athletic goods 2 1 3
3909 Manufacturing industries n.e.c. n.a.
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Chapter 3
The Ethnic Composition of US
Inventors
Summary 3 The ethnic composition of US scientists and engineers is undergoing a signficant
transformation. This study applies an ethnic-name database to individual patent records granted
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office to document these trends with greater detail
than previously available. Most notably, the contribution of Chinese and Indian scientists to
US technology formation increased dramatically in the 990s. Growth in ethnic innovation
is concentrated in high-tech sectors; the institutional and geographic dimensions are further
characterized.
3.1 Introduction
The contributions of immigrants to US technology formation are staggering: while foreign-born
account for just over 10% of the US working population, they represent 25% of the US science
and engineering (SE) workforce and nearly 50% of those with doctorates. Even looking within
the Ph.D. level, ethnic researchers have an exceptional contribution to science as measured by
Nobel Prizes, election to the National Academy of Sciences, patent citation counts, and so on.1
Moreover, ethnic entrepreneurs are very active in commercializing new technologies, especially
1For example, Stephan and Levin (2001), Burton and Wang (1999), Johnson (1998, 2001), and Streeter (1997).
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in high-tech sectors (e.g., Saxenian 2002a). The magnitude of these ethnic contributions raises
many research and policy questions: debates regarding the appropriate quota for H1-B tempo-
rary visas, the possible crowding out of native students from SE fields, and the brain drain or
brain circulation effect on sending countries are just three examples.2
Econometric studies quantifying the role of ethnic scientists and engineers for technology
formation and diffusion are often hampered, however, by data constraints. It is very difficult
to assemble sufficient cross-sectional and longitudinal variation for large-scale panel exercises.3
This paper describes a new approach for quantifying the ethnic composition of US inventors with
previously unavailable detail. The technique exploits the rarely used inventor names contained
in the NBER Patent Data File, originally compiled by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).
This dataset provides micro-records for all patents granted by the USPTO from January 1975
to December 1999. Each patent record lists one or more inventors, with 4.3 million inventor
names associated with the 2.9 million patents. The USPTO grants patents to inventors living
within and outside of the US, with the latter accounting for just under half of the total.
This study maps into these inventor names an ethnic-name database typically used for
commercial applications. 4 This approach exploits the idea that inventors with the surnames
Chang or Wang are likely of Chinese ethnicity, those with surnames Rodriguez or Martinez of
Hispanic ethnicity, and so on. The match rates range from 93%-99% for US domestic inventor
records, depending upon the procedure employed, and the process affords the distinction of nine
ethnicities: Chinese, English, European, Hispanic/Filipino, Indian/Hindi, Japanese, Korean,
Russian, and Vietnamese. Moreover, because the matching is done at the micro-level, greater
ethnic composition detail is available annually on multiple dimensions: detailed technology
categories, MSAs, companies, and so on.5
The next section details the ethnic-name matching strategy, outlines the strengths and
2 Representative papers are Lowell (2000), Borjas (2005), and Saxenian (2002b) respectively.
3While the decennial Census provides detailed cross-sectional descriptions, its longitudinal variation is nec-
essarily limited. On the other hand, the annual Current Population Survey provides poor cross-sectional detail
and does not ask immigrant status until 1994. The SESTAT database offers a better trade-off between the
two dimensions, but suffers important sampling biases with respect to immigrants (Kannankutty and Wilkinson
1999).
4The database is constructed by the Melissa Data Corporation for the design of direct-mail advertisements.
I am grateful to the George Schultz Fund for financial assistance in its purchase.
5 This ethnic patenting database is employed by Kerr (2005) and associated papers to study the role of ethnic
scientists and entrepreneurs in technology formation and diffusion.
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weaknesses of the database selected, and offers some validation exercises using patent records
filed by foreign inventors with the USPTO. Section 3.3 then documents the growing contribution
of ethnic inventors to US technology formation. The rapid increase during the 1990s in the
percentage of high-tech patents going to Chinese and Indian inventors is particularly striking.
The relative contributions from scientists of European ethnicity, however, decline somewhat
from their levels in 1980. The institutional and geographic dimensions of ethnic innovation are
further delineated. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Ethnic-Name Matching Strategy
This section describes the ethnic-name matching strategy employed with the inventor names
contained in the NBER Patent Data File. To begin, two common liabilities associated with
using ethnic-name databases are identified. Addressing these limitations guides the selection
of the Melissa database and the design of the matching strategy, which is described in detail.
The section concludes with descriptive statistics from a quality-assurance exercise of applying
the ethnic-name strategy to inventors residing outside of the US who file patent applications
with the USPTO.
Ethnic-name databases suffer from two inherent limitations - not all ethnicities are covered,
and included ethnicities usually receive unequal treatment. The Melissa database's strength
is the identification of Asian ethnicities, especially Chinese, Indian/Hindi, Japanese, Korean,
Russian, and Vietnamese names. The database is comparatively weaker for looking within
continental Europe. For example, Dutch surnames are collected without first names, while
the opposite is true for French names. The Asian comparative advantage and overall cost
effectiveness led to the selection of the Melissa database, as well as the European amalgamation
employed in this study. In total, nine ethnicities are distinguished: Chinese, English, European,
Hispanic/Filipino, Indian/Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese. 6 ,7 The largest
6 The Melissa database provides lists for the Hispanic/Latino and Filipino/Tagalog ethnicities. However,
extensive overlap exists between these two groupings (e.g., the common surnames Martinez and Ramirez are in
both ethnic lists). The final matching procedure combines these groups into a joint Hispanic/Filipino ethnicity,
while in earlier work they are kept separate (Kerr 2004). This choice is not a first-order concern.
7 The ethnic groups employed: Chinese, English, European (including Dutch, French, German, Italian,
and Polish names), Hispanic/Filipino (including Latino and Filipino/Tagalog names), Indian/Hindi (includ-
ing Bangladeshi and Pakistani names), Japanese, Korean, Russian (including Armenian and Carpatho-Rusyns
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ethnicity in the US SE workforce absent from the ethnic-name database is Iranian, which
accounted for 0.7% of bachelor-level SEs in the 1990 Census.
The second limitation is that commercial databases vary in the number of names they
contain for each ethnicity. These differences reflect both uneven coverage and that some
ethnicities are more homogeneous in their naming conventions.8 Two polar matching strategies
are employed to ensure coverage differences do not overly influence ethnicity assignments.
Full Matching: This procedure utilizes all of the name assignments in the Melissa
database and manually codes any unmatched surname or first name associated with
100 or more inventor records. This technique further exploits the international dis-
tribution of inventor names within the patent database to provide superior results.9
The match rate for this restricted procedure is 98% (98% US, 97% foreign).10°
Restricted Matching: A second strategy employs a uniform name database using
only the 3000 and 200 most common surnames and first names, respectively, for
each ethnicity. These numerical bars are the lowest common denominators across
the major ethnicities studied. The match rate for this restricted procedure is 89%
(93% US, 85% foreign).
For matching, names in both the patent and ethnic-name databases are capitalized and
truncated to ten characters. Approximately 89% of the patent name records have a unique
surname, first name, or middle name match in the Full Matching procedure (77% in the Re-
stricted Matching), affording a single ethnicity determination with priority given to surname
matches. For inventors residing in the US, representative probabilities are assigned to non-
unique matches using the masters-level SE communities by MSA. Ethnic probabilities for the
names), and Vietnamese. Jewish ethnic names overlapped extensively with other ethnic groupings and are
excluded. The Bangladeshi and Pakistani name counts are extremely small (8 and 15 respectively) and do not
influence the Indian/Hindi outcome. A handful of names classified as Arab, Burmese, and Malay are discarded.
8For example, the Herfindahl indices for Korean (470) and Vietnamese (1121) surnames are significantly
higher than Japanese (132) and English (164) due to frequent Korean surnames like Kim (16%) and Park (12%)
and Vietnamese surnames like Nguyen (29%) and Tran (12%).
9A simple rule is applied to take advantage of the information embedded in the patent database itself. If over
90% of USPTO records associated with a name are concentrated in a non-English ethnicity country or region,
the name is assigned that ethnicity. As the test includes the domestic US inventors, comprising over 50% of
all inventors, this technique is very stringent and mainly bolsters European ethnic matching (the comparative
weakness of the Melissa database). The rule is not applied to names with fewer than ten occurrences.
1
°The matching rate should be less than 100% with the Melissa database as not all ethnicities are included.
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remaining 3% of records (mostly foreign) are calculated as equal shares. 11
The application of the ethnic-name database to the inventors residing abroad provides a
natural quality-assurance exercise for the technique. The top panel of Table 3.1 summarizes
the results, with the rows presenting the matched characteristics for countries and regions
grouped to the ethnicities identifiable with the database. The results are very encouraging.
First, the Full Matching procedure assigns ethnicities to a large percentage of foreign records,
with the match rates greater than 94% for all ethnicities but Indian (82%). In the Restricted
Matching procedure, a success rate of greater than 74% holds for all ethnicities.
Second, the estimated inventor compositions are reasonable. The own-ethnicity shares
are summarized in the fourth and fifth columns. The weighted average is 88% in the Full
Matching procedure, and own-ethnicity contributions are greater than 80% in the UK, China,
India, Japan, Korea, and Russia regardless of the matching procedure employed. Like the US,
own-ethnicity contributions should be less than 100% due to foreign researchers. The high
success rate using the Restricted Matching procedure indicates that the ethnic-name database
performs well without exploiting the international distribution of names, although power is lost
with Europe. Likewise, uneven coverage in the Melissa database is not driving the ethnic
composition trends.1 2
The bottom panel of Table 3.1 presents the complete ethnic compositions estimated for
the foreign countries. Many of the positive off-diagonals are to be expected, either due to
foreign expatriates (UK), small sample sizes (Vietnam), or overlaps of common names.13 One
advantage the matching technique possesses for inventors residing in the US is the ability to
use the Census to assign probabilistic estimates for overlapping names; foreign records are only
11MSA ethnic compositions are averages of the 1980 and 1990 5% Census files. The sample considers civilians
aged 22-54 listing Engineers, Mathematical and Computer Scientists, or Natural Scientists as their occupations.
The master's degree cut-off reflects the higher average education level of patenting scientists within the scien-
tific community (Kannankutty and Wilkinson 1999). Country-of-birth is used to assign ethnicities into broad
categories that match the name records. To illustrate, take the San Francisco scientific community to be 12.1%
Chinese, 66.1% English, and 4.6% European (with other ethnicities omitted). A San Francisco-based record
matching to Chinese, English, and European surnames would be assigned a probabilistic ethnicity of 14.6%
Chinese, 79.8% English, and 5.6% European (summing to 100%). A China-based record matching all three
ethnicities would be assigned a 33.3% probability for each.
12 The main US SE ethnicity missing from the database is Iranian. Running the ethnic-name database on the
few patents from Iran yields a 42%-65% match rate. Iran's predicted composition does not favor any of the nine
ethnicities studied, with the largest overlap being the Russian ethnicity at 31%.
l3 Two prominent examples are the surname Lee (Chinese, English, and Korean) and the first name Igor
(Hispanic and Russian). The most overlap occurs between the European and Hispanic ethnicities.
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assigned as equal shares. The last two columns of Table 3.1's top panel indicate the percentage
of the foreign inventors assigned at least partially to their own-ethnicity. While this study
does not make the strong assumption that ties should go to the country's own-ethnicity, the
additional power provided by using the US Census for breaking domestic ties is illustrated.
Finally, visual confirmation of the top 1000 surnames and first names in the USPTO records
confirms the matching technique works well.14 While some inventors are certainly misclassified,
the measurement error in aggregate trends building from the micro-data is minor. The Full
Matching procedure is the preferred technique, and underlies the trends presented in the next
section, but most applications find little to no difference when the Restricted Matching dataset
is employed instead.
3.3 Ethnic Composition of US Inventors
Table 3.2 describes the ethnic composition of US inventors for 1975-1997.15 The trends demon-
strate a growing ethnic contribution to US technology development, especially among Chinese
and Indian scientists. Also matching popular perceptions, ethnic inventors are more con-
centrated in high-tech industries like computers and pharmaceuticals and in gateway cities
relatively closer to their home countries (e.g., Chinese in San Francisco, European in New
York, and Hispanic in Miami). The final three rows demonstrate a close correspondence of the
estimated ethnic composition to the country-of-birth composition of the US SE workforce in
the 1990 Census. 16
Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolving ethnic composition of US inventors from 1980-1997. Look-
ing across all technology categories, the European ethnicity is the largest foreign contributor
14 Appendix Table 3.A1 lists the fifty most common surnames for each ethnicity, along with their relative
contribution, for US inventors. The counts sum the ethnic contribution from inventors with each surname,
including partial or split assignments, and are not necessarily direct or exclusive matches (e.g., the ethnic match
may have occurred through the first name).
i 5The NBER database contains records for patents granted by the USPTO through December 1999. The ap-
plication years of patents, however, provide the best description of when innovative research is being undertaken,
due to the substantial and uneven lags in the USPTO reviews. Accordingly, the annual descriptions employed
in this study are undertaken by application years. Unfortunately, this approach does lead to significant attrition
in the last two years of the 1990s - patents are only included in the database if they have been granted, but a
smaller number of applications close to the December 1999 cut-off have completed the review cycle.
16The name-matching procedure has limited power for distinguishing first-generation versus later-generation
immigrants. This is most relevant for the European ethnicity, and the estimated European contribution is
naturally higher than the immigrant contribution measured by foreign born.
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to US technology development. Like the English ethnicity, however, the European share of US
domestic inventors declines steadily from 8% in 1981 to 7% in 1997. This declining share is
partly due to the exceptional growth of the Chinese and Indian ethnicities, which increase from
3% to 6% and 2% to 4%, respectively, over the seventeen years. As shown below, this Chi-
nese and Indian growth is concentrated in high-tech sectors, where Chinese inventors supplant
European researchers as the largest ethnic contributor to US technology formation.
Among the other ethnicities, the Hispanic contribution grows from 3% in 1980 to 4% in
1997. The level of this series is likely mismeasured due to the extensive overlap of Hispanic
and European names, but the positive growth is consistent with stronger Latino and Filipino
scientific contributions in Florida and California. While small, the Korean and Russian shares
almost double from 1980 to 1997 (0.5% to 0.9% and 1.2% to 2.0%, respectively). Although
difficult to see with Figure 3.1's scaling, much of the Russian increase occurs in the 1990s
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Japanese share also increases from 0.6% to
0.9%. Finally, while the Vietnamese contribution is the lowest throughout the sample, it does
exhibit the strongest relative growth from 0.1% to 0.5%.
3.3.1 Contributions by Technology
Figure 3.2 documents the total ethnic contribution by the six broad technology groups into
which patents are often classified: Chemicals, Computers and Communications, Drugs and
Medical, Electrical and Electronic, Mechanical, and Others. The miscellaneous group includes
patents for agriculture, textiles, furniture, and the like. Growth in ethnic patenting is clearly
stronger in high-tech sectors than in more traditional industries. Figures 3.3 through 3.8
provide the ethnic contributions within each technology category. The growing ethnic contri-
bution in high-tech sectors is easily traced to the Chinese and Indian ethnicities. Moreover,
these two ethnicities exhibit the most interesting and economically meaningful variation across
technologies, as summarized in Figures 3.9 and 3.10.
3.3.2 Contributions by Institution
Figure 3.11 demonstrates that intriguing differences in ethnic scientific contributions also exist
by institution type. Over the 1980-1997 period, ethnic inventors are more concentrated in gov-
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ernment and university research labs and in publicly listed companies than in private companies
or as unaffiliated inventors.1 7 Part of this levels difference is certainly due to visa sponsorships
by larger institutions. Growth in ethnic shares are initially stronger in the government and
university labs, but publicly listed companies close the gap by 1997. The other interesting
trend in Figure 3.11 is for private companies, where the ethnic contribution sharply increases in
the 1990s. This rise coincides with the strong growth in ethnic entrepreneurship in high-tech
sectors. For example, the Chinese share of computer patenting in private firms grows from
1.5% in 1980 to 3.7% in 1990, before exploding to 9.0% in 1997.
3.3.3 Contributions by Geography
This paper closes its descriptive statistics with an examination of the 1985-1997 ethnic inventor
contributions by major MSAs.1 8 The first three columns of Table 3.3 document each city's
share of US ethnic patenting. Not surprisingly, these shares are highly correlated with city
size, with the three largest ethnic centers for 1990 found in New York (13%), San Francisco
(8%), and Los Angeles (7%). Comparing these ethnic patenting percentages with the total
patenting shares, listed in the second set of three columns, reveals the more interesting fact
that ethnic patenting concentration is higher than that of general innovation. The 1990 patent
shares of New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles are lower at 9%, 6%, and 6%, respectively.
Similarly, 75% of ethnic research occurs in the major MSAs listed in Table 3.3, compared to
68% of total patenting. The final three columns exhibit the raw patent counts by city.19
Not only are ethnic scientists disproportionately concentrated in major cities, but growth
17Industry patents account for 72% of patents granted from 1980-1997. Public companies account for 59% of
industry patents during the period and are identified through Compustat records. Government and university
institutions are identified through institution names and account for about 4% of patents granted. Federally
funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) are included in both industry and government groups.
Unaffiliated applications account for about 26% of patents granted.
1 8MSAs are identified from inventors' city names using city lists collected from the Office of Social and Economic
Data Analysis at the University of Missouri, with a matching rate of 98%. Manual coding further ensures all
patents with more than 100 citations and all city names with more than 100 patents are identified.
19 Raw patent counts should be treated with caution. Changes in the personnel resources and review policies of
the USPTO influence the number of patents granted over time (Griliches 1990), and the explosive climb in patent
grants over the last two decades is difficult to interpret (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000, Kim and Marshcke 2004,
and Hall 2004). Accordingly, this study considers patent shares, which avoids these interpretation concerns.
Studies seeking to quantify the number of ethnic researchers in the US should supplement this data with
immigration records or demographic surveys (with an unfortunate loss of detail). Trajtenberg (2005) also
employs the USPTO inventor names to identify individual scientists.
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in a city's share of ethnic patenting is highly correlated with growth in its share of total US
patenting. San Francisco is the most prominent example. Its share of ethnic invention rose
from 8% in 1980 to 17% in 1997, while its patenting share also increased from 6% to 10%.
Across the whole sample and including all of the intervening years, an increase of 1% in an
MSA's ethnic patenting share correlates with a 0.6% increase in the MSA's total invention
share. This coefficient is remarkably high, as the ethnic share of total invention during this
period is around 20%. Shifts in the concentration of ethnic inventors appear to facilitate
changes in the geographic composition of US innovation. 20
3.4 Conclusion
Ethnic scientists and engineers are an important and growing contributor to US technology
development. The Chinese and Indian ethnicities, in particular, are now an integral part of
US invention in high-tech sectors. This paper describes how the probable ethnicities of US
researchers can be determined at the micro-level through their names available with USPTO
patent records. The ethnic-name database this study employs distinguishes nine ethnic groups,
and the matched database describes the ethnic composition of US inventors with previously
unavailable cross-sectional and longitudinal detail. This richer variation can support more
detailed and informative empirical analyses than feasible otherwise.
2°The ethnic-name approach does not distinguish ethnic inventor shifts due to new immigration, domestic
migration, or occupational changes. It is likewise beyond the scope of this descriptive note to explore issues of
causality or effects on native workers.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Country Patent Records
Match Rate %
Full Rest.
Own-Ethnicity %
Full Rest.
Own-Match %
Full Rest.
United Kingdom
China, Singapore
Western Europe
Hispanic Nations
India
Japan
South Korea
Russia
'Vietnam
Estimated Ethnic
ENG CHN
Composition of Country's
EUR HIS IND
or Region's
JAP
Inventors
KOR
(Full Matching)
RUS VNM
United Kingdom
China, Singapore
Western Europe
Hispanic Nations
India
Japan
South Korea
Russia
Vietnam
87 1 4 3 2
3 89 1 1 0
18 1 73 6 1
14 1 9 72 1
8 1 4 5 80
0 0 0 0 0
4 11 0 0 0
5 1 2 9 0
5 18 16 0 0
0 0 2 0
1 5 0 1
0 0 2 0
1 0 2 0
0 0 2 0
100 0 0 0
1 83 0 0
0 0 83 0
0 0 0 62
Notes: Greater China includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Western Europe includes Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Nethlerlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Hispanic Nations includes Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Russia includes former Soviet Union countries.
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Table 3.A1: Most Common Ethnic Surnames for Inventors Residing in the US
Chinese English European Hispanic / Filipino Indian / Hindi
1335 Adams
3214 Allen
427 Anderson
163 Bailey
4306 Baker
1057 Bell
351 Bennett
584 Brown
164 Burns
427 Butler
513 Campbell
468 Carlson
1184 Carter
160 Clark
363 Cohen
256 Cole
184 Collins
298 Cook
220 Cooper
248 Cox
182 Davis
379 Edwards
194 Erickson
817 Evans
161 Fischer
517 Fisher
1153 Foster
494 Fox
1545 Gardner
317 Gordon
281 Graham
350 Gray
225 Green
600 Hall
466 Hanson
491 Harris
578 Hayes
1325 Hill
500 Hoffman
403 Howard
1652 Hughes
418 Jackson
194 Jensen
202 Johnson
178 Johnston
2348 Jones
211 Keller
1981 Kelly
503 Kennedy
650 King
437 Klein
178 Larson
2545
3019
6271
1559
2883
1677
1522
6818
1145
1131
2339
1542
1522
3273
1513
1228
1681
1994
1788
1370
5229
1962
1191
2494
1126
1585
1650
1230
1257
1500
1284
1521
2051
2928
1289
2838
1200
2061
1433
1158
1340
2319
1227
10718
1167
6068
1132
1685
1303
2591
1372
1561
Abel
Albrecht
Antos
Auerbach
Baer
Bauer
Beck
Bender
Berg
Berger
Bodor
Budzich
Caron
Cerami
Chandraratna
Collette
Crivello
D'Amico
Dietrich
Dietz
Eberhardt
Eckenhoff
Effland
Ehrlich
Ferrari
Fischell
Fuchs
Gelardi
Grabbe
Grasselli
Gunther
Guttag
Haas
Hansen
Hartman
Hartmann
Hause
Hecht
Heinz
Henrick
Horodysky
Horvath
Jacobs
Kanner
Kasper
Kempf
Knapp
Knifton
Koenig
Kresge
Kukes
Lange
180
327
220
138
286
931
1094
332
933
784
135
112
188
117
126
116
119
126
200
298
136
118
133
187
124
161
219
127
136
135
173
127
514
1730
757
220
134
142
116
123
232
221
1122
118
155
144
529
201
307
125
123
443
Acosta
Acquaviva
Adell
Alvarez
Arroyo
Ayer
Ayres
Bales
Bartos
Blanco
Bolanos
Boles
Cabrera
Calderon
Camacho
Cardenas
Carnes
Castillo
Chavez
Contreras
Cruz
D'Alelio
D'Silva
Das
Delgado
Dias
Diaz
Dominguez
Duran
Elias
Fernandes
Fernandez
Francisco
Freitas
Gagnon
Garcia
Garza
Gomes
Gomez
Gonsalves
Gonzales
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Halasa
Hernandez
Herrera
Herron
Jimenez
Konopka
Kulprathipanja
Lee
Lieb
65 Adler
58 Agarwal
86
235
68
134
151
173
58
71
116
60
62
77
59
58
69
61
76
61
118
69
87
409
102
101
303
111
87
163
81
285
64
78
157
612
76
89
179
60
131
441
387
147
324
71
220
90
62
Aggarwal
Agrawal
Ahmad
Ahmed
Akram
Ali
Arora
Ash
Aslam
Badesha
Baliga
Banerjee
Basu
Bhat
Bhatia
Bhatt
Bhattacharya
Bhattacharyya
Bose
Brunelle
Chandra
Chatterjee
Chattha
Cherukuri
Chubb
Datta
Desai
Dixit
Dutta
Fazan
Gaffar
Gandhi
Ganguly
Garg
Ghosh
Goel
Goli
Gupta
Harandi
Hassan
Hussain
Imran
lyer
Jain
Joshi
Kamath
Kapoor
76 Khanna
126 Krishnakumar
62 Krishnamurthy
319
184
94
375
148
337
98
193
95
183
90
90
111
137
101
94
172
105
105
90
159
116
91
293
90
134
90
202
442
132
103
107
150
105
110
138
237
208
100
851
159
110
98
118
219
397
319
111
145
210
97
119
Chan
Chang
Chao
Chau
Chen
Cheng
Cheung
Chiang
Chien
Chiu
Chou
Chow
Chu
Chuang
Fan
Fang
Feng
Fong
Fu
Fung
Guo
Han
He
Ho
Hou
Hsieh
Hsu
Hu
Huang
Hung
Jiang
Kao
Kung
Kuo
Lai
Lam
Lau
Lee
Leung
Lew
Li
Liang
Liao
Lien
Lirn
Lin
Ling
Liu
Lo
LuJ
Ma
Mao
Table 3.A1: Most Common US Ethnic Surnames (continued)
Chinese English European Hispanic I Filipino Indian I Hindi
451 Lee
232 Lewis
198 Long
444 Marshall
165 Martin
669 Miller
194 Mitchell
151 Moore
513 Morgan
264 Morris
152 Murphy
318 Murray
286 Myers
443 Nelson
691 Olson
178 Palmer
283 Parker
366 Peters
769 Peterson
242 Phillips
213 Price
270 Reed
178 Richardson
441 Roberts
255 Robinson
218 Rogers
281 Ross
302 Russell
173 Ryan
3381 Scott
428 Shaw
2210 Smith
354 Snyder
1956 Stevens
368 Stewart
297 Sullivan
1315 Taylor
208 Thomas
335 Thompson
482 Turner
304 Walker
159 Ward
1207 Watson
236 White
629 Williams
223 Wilson
162 Wood
269 Wright
196 Young
5438
2788
1446
1213
4214
9011
1862
3572
1663
1908
1968
1246
1573
3854
1722
1145
1976
1200
2769
2299
1148
1625
1224
2524
2112
1770
1499
1476
1245
2191
1535
13623
1402
1317
1678
1473
4081
2923
3736
1622
2758
1679
1289
3792
5982
4650
2257
2798
Lapeyre
Laskaris
Lemelson
Lorenz
Ludwig
Lutz
Maier
Mayer
Meyer
Milberger
Mitra
Molnar
Morin
Mueller
Muller
Nagel
Nilssen
Novak
Pagano
Pastor
Pittet
Ponticello
Rao
Reitz
Rivier
Roman
Rostoker
Schmidt
Schneider
Schultz
Schulz
Schwartz
Schwarz
Speranza
Spitz
Straeter
Theeuwes
Trokhan
Uskokovic
Van Scott
Vock
Wachter
Wagner
Weber
Weder
Weiss
Wolf
Zimmerman
3593 Zimmermann
161
120
299
198
304
402
319
704
1815
114
140
162
170
1349
546
263
213
436
112
204
119
126
241
138
125
226
201
2025
1377
1230
518
1493
418
188
119
253
224
111
124
115
407
124
1512
1646
530
935
961
931
Lomas
Lopez
Machado
Mares
Marin
Marquez
Martinez
Medina
Menard
Mendoza
Molina
Molitor
Munoz
Nestor
Nunez
Ondetti
Ortega
Ortiz
Padilla
Pallos
Pereira
Perez
Pfiester
Quintana
Ramirez
Ramos
Regnier
Reis
Reno
Reyes
Rivera
Robeson
Rodrigues
Rodriguez
Romero
Ruiz
Salazar
Sanchez
Silva
Solar
Soled
Soto
Souza
Suarez
Torres
Varga
Vasquez
Vazquez
119 Vinals
63
377
79
82
103
75
534
92
89
79
85
71
62
96
66
104
71
168
66
92
87
269
69
77
168
114
70
86
73
69
174
96
74
520
103
159
77
327
217
70
59
62
95
99
172
70
64
73
Krishnan
Kulkarni
Kumar
Lal
Malik
Mathur
Mehra
Mehrotra
Mehta
Menon
Mishra
Misra
Mookherjee
Nair
Narang
Narayanan
Natarajan
Nath
Parekh
Parikh
Patel
Patil
Prasad
Puri
Qureshi
Rahman
Raj
Rajagopalan
Ramachandran
Ramakrishnan
Raman
Ramesh
Rao
Ravichandran
Saari
Sandhu
Shah
Sharma
Singh
Singhal
Sinha
Sircar
Srinivasan
Srivastava
Subramanian
Thakur
Varma
Venkatesan
231 Vora
Ng
Ong
Pai
Pan
Peng
Shen
Shi
Shieh
Shih
Shu
Shum
Sih
Song
Su
Sun
Tai
Tam
Tan
Tang
Teng
Ting
Tong
Trinh
Tsai
Tsang
Tsao
Tseng
Tung
Wan
Wang
Wei
Wong
Woo
Wu
Xu
Yan
Yang
Yao
Yee
Yeh
Yen
Yin
Yu
Yuan
Zhang
Zhao
Zheng
Zhou
Zhu
167
119
777
175
179
112
102
126
436
125
114
113
271
203
96
231
144
102
107
123
1819
188
240
108
102
133
97
108
175
94
95
96
526
91
93
252
1115
408
914
97
149
171
271
177
173
118
117
116
176
Table 3.A1: Most Common US Ethnic Surnames (continued)
Japanese Korean Russian Vietnamese
46 Ahn
73 Bae
36 Baek
51 Bak
40 Bang
55 Bark
54 Cha
64 Chai
35 Chin
96 Cho
72 Choe
103 Choi
33 Chon
35 Chong
76 Choo
40 Chun
33 Chung
53 Drozd
111 Ewbank
92 Eyuboglu
33 Gang
84 Gu
34 Hahm
37 Hahn
59 Hansell
140 Hogle
32 Hohn
48 Hone
45 Hong
72 Hosking
59 Hwang
32 Hyun
64 Ih
33 Im
56 Jang
44 Jeong
63 Ji
37 Jin
34 Joo
132 Ju
125 Jung
81 Kahng
32 Kang
36 Kim
78 Ko
32 Koh
54 Koo
83 Kun
39 Kwak
40 Kwon
103 Lee
49 Lim
94 Aghajanian
65 Anscher
25 Askin
34 Avakian
34 Babler
23 Banko
20 Barna
77 Benko
541 Blonder
448 Borsuk
100 Danko
322 Dombroski
16 Duvdevani
99 Elko
37 Favstritsky
155 Frenkel
688 Garabedian
22 Gelfand
21 Georgiev
27 Ginzburg
20 Gitlin
118 Godlewski
18 Goralski
620 Gordin
29 Gorin
17 Gregorian
19 Grinberg
16 Grushkin
319 Grzybowski
24 Gurevich
517 Guzik
32 Hrib
16 Hynecek
37 Ibrahim
94 Iranmanesh
34 Ivanov
42 Janko
175 Jastrzebski
19 Juhasz
100 Kahle
205 Kaminski
17 Kaminsky
275 Kaplinsky
1987 Keritsis
217 Khan
40 Khandros
90 Kneller
54 Korsunsky
46 Kowal
156 Kozel
325 Kulka
82 Kurkov
64 Bahn
44 Banh
39 Be
35 Bearce
58 Bi
34 Bich
46 Bien
33 Bihn
66 Bui
42 Can
52 Chich
37 Diem
42 Dien
36 Diep
44 Dinh
50 DoMinh
60 Doan
81 Dominh
41 Donlan
62 Dotrong
50 Dovan
38 Duan
57 Due
42 Duong
58 Eskew
34 Gran
64 Hoang
37 Hopping
36 Huynh
45 Huynh-Ba
48 Khau
37 Khaw
58 Khieu
103 Khu
44 Kiem
37 Lahue
34 Laursen
37 Lavan
39 Le
89 Le Duc
254 Le Van
62 Leen
49 Loan
35 Luong
62 Ly
55 Minh
41 Nellums
80 Nghiem
57 Ngo
33 Nguyen
35 Nguyen-Dinh
35 Nguyenphu
Arakawa
Asato
Chen
Doi
Fujii
Fujimoto
Fujioka
Fukuda
Furukawa
Hasegawa
Hashimoto
Hayashi
Hey
Higham
Higuchi
Honda
Hori
Hornak
Ide
Imai
Inoue
Irick
Ishida
Ishii
Ishikawa
Ito
Iwamoto
Iwasaki
Izu
Kaneko
Kato
Kaun
Kautz
Kawakami
Kawasaki
Kaya
K imura
Kino
Kirihata
Kiwala
Kobayashi
Maki
Maruyama
Matsuda
Matsumoto
Matsunaga
Miyano
M izuhara
Mori
Morita
Moslehi
Motoyama
7
6
5
7
35
15
59
7
109
6
5
17
6
26
60
16
204
5
17
8
26
33
6
52
7
11
103
8
101
8
5
9
13
5
5
10
19
11
415
6
7
10
5
30
31
17
12
5
196
1514
7
7
Table 3.A1: Most Common US Ethnic Surnames (continued)
Japanese Korean Russian Vietnamese
Najjar 76 Mennie 33 Lapidus 34 Nho 7
Nakagawa 74 Min 71 Lee 48 Nhu 6
Nakajima 32 Minshall 18 Lisak 36 Nieh 53
Nakamura 74 Nam 18 Lopata 50 Nim 12
Nakanishi 46 Nevins 24 Lukacs 37 Ninh 8
Nakano 53 Nyce 18 Lysenko 39 Pham 286
Nakao 41 Oh 151 Magnotta 35 Phy 19
Nemoto 50 Paek 25 Mankovitz 34 Postman 8
Nishimura 32 Paik 82 Messing 47 Quach 24
Nishioka 43 Pak 64 Metlitsky 81 Quy 6
Noda 48 Park 912 Mikhail 70 Roch 26
Ogawa 39 Quay 58 Milkovic 46 Sien 6
Ogura 57 Rhee 120 Minaskanian 39 Sinh 7
Ohkawa 48 Rhim 17 Mooradian 50 Ta 39
Okada 37 Rim 30 Nadelson 92 Takach 11
Okamoto 62 Ronen 19 Nappholz 38 Tau 7
Okumura 45 Ryang 24 Narayan 203 Thach 11
Ono 34 Ryu 46 Neuwirth 42 Thai 16
Ovshinsky 194 Sahm 24 Onopchenko 59 Thiem 10
Saito 49 Sahoo 22 Orloff 36 Thut 16
Sasaki 70 Sellstrom 23 Papadopoulos 47 Tiedt 6
Sato 134 Seo 18 Pinchuk 62 Tiep 11
Seto 37 Sheem 21 Pinsky 34 Tietjen 32
Shibata 52 Shim 101 Raber 45 To 7
Shida 45 Shin 149 Rabii 34 Ton-That 6
Shimizu 32 Shinn 64 Rabinovich 52 Tran 631
Shinkai 48 Sim 43 Rubsamen 47 Trandai 7
Shoji 45 Sjostrom 18 Sahatjian 40 Trang 12
Sigmund 35 So 149 Sarkisian 35 Trank 7
Suto 33 Sohn 42 Sarraf 38 Tri 7
Suzuki 152 Son 72 Schwan 77 Trieu 8
Takahashi 81 Sue 36 Simko 70 Trong 7
Takekoshi 50 Suh 188 Sipos 38 Truc 8
Takeuchi 61 Suk 23 Skowronski 44 Tu 190
Tamura 50 Sung 255 Smetana 42 Tuten 19
Tanaka 191 Uhm 16 Sofranko 61 Tuy 14
Ueda 34 Um 22 Sorkin 52 Ty 21
Wada 47 Whang 40 Stanko 37 Van 18
Watanabe 140 Won 48 Tabak 85 Van Cleve 30
Yamada 62 Yi 56 Tepman 41 Van Dam 8
Yamaguchi 42 Yim 55 Terzian 75 Van Le 18
Yamamoto 178 Yohn 16 Tsinberg 38 Van Nguyen 11
Yamasaki 42 Yoo 133 Tults 34 Van Pham 8
Yamashita 32 Yoon 405 Uram 43 Van Phan 27
Yasuda 50 You 58 Vartanian 42 Van Tran 13
Yasui 51 Yuh 40 Veltman 39 Vo 95
Yokoyama 52 Yum 69 Warchol 34 Vo-Dinh 19
Yoshida 127 Yun 68 Wasilewski 34 Vu 141
Yuan 40 Zhu 24 Welsch 44 Vuong 33
Chapter 4
Income Inequality and Social Norms
for Compensation Differentials and
Government-Led Redistribution
Summary 4 In cross-sectional studies, countries with greater income inequality typically ex-
hibit less support for government-led redistribution and greater acceptance of wage inequality
(e.g., United States versus Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this pattern, a
vicious cycle could form with reduced social concern amplifying primal increases in inequality
due to forces like skill-biased technical change. Exploring movements around these long-term
levels, however, this study finds increases in inequality are met with greater, not less, support
for redistribution. Larger compensation differentials are accepted as inequality grows, but of
a smaller magnitude than the actual increase. These findings suggest short-run responses in
social norms do not amplify inequality shocks.
4.1 Introduction
Accounting for the substantial increase in wage and income inequality over the last three decades
is a central theme of recent economic research. The bulk of the literature focuses on forces
operating within the labor market on the supply and demand for skilled workers. These include
the slower growth rate in the supply of educated workers, the introduction of labor-saving
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production and computing technologies, and capital deepening. Others researchers consider
structural changes of the labor market itself, like the decline of institutions and policies that have
historically compressed the wage structure (e.g., unions, minimum wages)2 and the proliferation
of "superstar" labor markets where top performers earn disproportionate sums to those just
behind them. 3 The potential erosion of social norms regarding compensation inequality and
redistribution is also widely discussed. For the United States, particular emphasis is placed on
the explosion in executive pay and deepening within-establishment inequality.4
While the early work considers each of these determinants in isolation, it is increasingly
clear that the interactions among the factors bear significant responsibility. Moreover, a
greater potential for the entrenchment or amplification of inequality exists in this general-
equilibrium setting.5 Taking skill-biased technical change as an example, its individual effect
on inequality will be checked in the long-run as firms substitute towards cheaper factors of
production or labor supplies adjust. If the bias is sufficient, however, the technical change and
its concomitant increase in inequality may also prompt lasting changes in the structure of the
labor market (e.g., deunionization, increased segregation of skilled workers) that magnify its
solitary effect. Of course, interactions can alternatively dampen inequality shocks.
This potential for amplification is particularly strong for social norms regarding income
equalization. First, if changes in inequality directly influence ideology, then social norms are a
propagation channel for any shock to the income distribution, regardless of the source. Second,
of all the factors discussed, social attitudes are the least governed (if at all) by market-like
mechanisms that can retard excessive changes. The potential thus exists for the formation of a
"vicious cycle" where increases in disparity weaken concern for wage equality or redistribution.
This weakened concern affords greater future compensation differentials, a shrinking of the
welfare state, and so on that further increase inequality and again shift norms. Alternatively,
changes in social norms can counteract inequality increases.
Support for the vicious-cycle hypothesis can be taken from the cross-sectional distributions
'Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Katz and Murphy (1995); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Krusell
et. al. (2000); and Card and Lemieux (2001).
2 DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Lee (1999); Card (2001); and Golan, Perloff, and Wu (2001).
3Rosen (1981); Frank and Cook (1995); and Economist (1999).
4Bok (1993); Economist (1999); Piketty and Saez (2001); and Krugman (2002).
5Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001); Benabou (2002); and Hasser et. al. (2003).
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of countries (particularly long-term OECD members) and regions of the United States. Na-
tions with greater income inequality typically demonstrate less support for redistribution and
greater acceptance of wage inequality than their more-equal counterparts. While the evolu-
tion of countries or regions along this pattern would be consistent with hypotheses of reduced
social concern, this response is not guaranteed as many primal factors determining these long-
term ideology positions (e.g., beliefs regarding social mobility) may be stable. 6 The empirical
response of social norms to changes in inequality has yet to be explored systematically.
This paper investigates this question by focusing on short-term movements in inequality
and social attitudes around the long-term level of each country or United States region. A
fixed-effect estimation strategy removes permanent differences in inequality and redistribution
philosophies, as well as common time trends. The contribution of this study is to characterize
how the resulting longitudinal responses resemble and differ from the cross-sectional pattern.
How responses differ by income class and neighborhood racial heterogeneity is also considered. 7
The primary results are drawn from a panel of countries repeatedly surveyed by the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS). Additional
support and extensions are developed through regional variation in the United States captured
by the General Social Survey (GSS). To establish causality, an instrument-variable specifica-
tion that exploits exogenous changes in the real federal minimum-wage rate interacted with
predetermined regional characteristics is also employed.
The results of this study suggest that increases in income inequality are met with greater, not
less, concern for inequality. Moreover, the greater concern translates into increases in support
for government-led redistribution and more-progressive taxation. In line with changing factors
of production, norms for compensation differentials do increase with greater inequality, but the
response is significantly less than one-for-one. While greater class conflict is perceived along
income dimensions, the increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are as
6 The determinants of this cross-sectional pattern have been a frequent and lively political-economy topic since
at least de Toqueville. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) offer a broad study of why the United States has
both higher inequality and a smaller welfare state than Western Europe, including appropriate references.
7Political-economy models differ in their predictions of how responses to inequality changes vary by income
class. Piketty (1995) constructs a Rawlsian model where increases in the inequality of opportunity, holding
fixed beliefs regarding the incentive costs of effort, promote greater support for redistribution independent of
current income. On the other hand, the standard median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981) suggests
increases in inequality lead to a divergence in preferences for redistribution as gaps to the median income widen.
159
strong as those of poorer individuals. Taken together, these findings suggest localized increases
in inequality alone are unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle of changing social norms amplifying
primal inequality changes.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worthwhile to place these findings in the context
of several other research strands. First, it was earlier noted the decisions of skilled workers
to take higher-wage jobs may lead to structural changes in the labor market that promote a
further expansion of inequality. For example, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) argue
biased technical change increases the outside options of skilled workers and thereby prompts
the decline of unions, an institution that often compresses the wage structure. The rational
decisions by skilled workers to take the higher-paid, non-union jobs are not at odds with this
study's findings; in fact, increases in inequality are found to be associated with modest increases
in support for wage differentials. The important point this study makes, however, is that this
segregation is not accompanied by a reduced concern over distributive equality.
It is also important to distinguish ideology regarding inequality from other norms that
influence perceptions of distributive justice. Political economists have long considered how
beliefs regarding the determinants of success affect attitudes towards redistribution. Individuals
and societies who believe hard work and effort are more important for outcomes than luck or
ancestry often choose systems characterized by higher inequality and lower redistribution. 8 Past
mobility experiences and future expectations of social position are also significant for attitudes
towards income equalization. 9 If the forces driving higher inequality also alter these underlying
beliefs, then social norms for equality may weaken. The analysis presented below controls for
changes in these social-mobility beliefs to isolate the effect of inequality, concluding that the
increase in inequality alone is insufficient for the formation of a vicious cycle. Additional
research needs to evaluate whether other norms (and non-norms) multiplier mechanisms exist.
Finally, while inequality has risen throughout the income distribution, the exceptional in-
crease in the very upper echelons (i.e., the top 1% and higher) is one of its more notable traits
8Alesina and Angeletos (2004) demonstrate how differences in these beliefs can create multiple equilibria
among otherwise similar economies, as rational agents select taxation and redistribution policies (and their
associated distortions) that fulfill their original expectations. Benabou and Tirole (2002) develop a related
general-equilibrium model where different beliefs regarding how just the world is create two distinct redistribution
states.
9Piketty (1995); Benabou and Ok (2001); and Alesina and La Ferrara (2001).
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(e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003). Many suggest this concentration of wealth has lead to a substan-
tial shift in norms regarding executive compensation and a disproportionate political influence
for elites. Unfortunately, the data employed here do not afford an analysis of these super-
wealthy individuals, and examinations of social norm changes by income classes are restricted
to quintile groupings. Further research is required to assess whether this study's finding - that
responses to inequality changes do not vary significantly by income level - can be applied to
these extremely rich families, executive compensation committees, and the like.1 0
The next section visually presents the international findings before turning to a regression
framework for detailed results. Section 4.3 then explores regional variation in the United States.
The overall inequality metrics (i.e., gini, 80-20 income percentile differential) used for the United
States study are also disaggregated into measures for the upper and lower halves of the income
distribution (i.e., 80-50 and 50-20 differentials), tentatively finding changes in the lower half
to be more significant for explaining shifts in social norms. Section 4.4 refines the United
States findings through an instrumental-variable specification combining exogenous changes
in the federal minimum wage with predetermined regional characteristics. Finally, Section
4.5 explores whether responses differ by income level or neighborhood racial heterogeneity.
Section 4.6 concludes the paper with a further discussion of this developing literature strand
and directions for future research.
4.2 International Evidence
The international portion of this study focuses on how social attitudes towards redistribution
respond to changes in national income inequality. Evidence is drawn from the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS) using fixed-effects estima-
tions that combine repeated opinion surveys with aggregate inequality metrics. The questions
taken from both surveys are described, followed by the important construction of the inequality
series.
1
°The limited philanthropy of the super-wealthy is frequently criticized (e.g, Economist 1998). Norms for
redistribution through non-government channels (e.g., churches, charities) are not considered in this study.
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4.2.1 Data Structure
The ISSP conducts annual surveys in member countries (38 nations in 1999) on rotating topics
ranging from religion to environmental protection. This study primarily considers questions
that were included in the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module. Responses to three
complementary questions proxy social norms for government-led income redistribution, the first
focusing on the acceptability of current income differences (Inequality Acceptance), the second
considering the role of the government in the transfer of income (Government Responsibility),
and the last focusing on the progressive nature of taxation (Progressive Taxation). Higher
responses on a five-point scale indicate more discontent with current inequality and greater
support for government intervention or progressive taxation.
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occu-
pations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current
pay scales. From these responses, a Proposed Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio is developed as the
log ratio of the wages ascribed for an "unskilled worker in a factory" and a "doctor in general
practice." A higher ratio indicates a more-compressed wage distribution (i.e., a log ratio of
zero would indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount), while a lower
ratio indicates support for greater compensation differentials.
Finally, two questions regarding the presence of conflicts between social groups are con-
sidered. The first, focusing on conflicts between the poor and the rich (Poor-Rich Conflict),
is used to validate respondents' awareness of the inequality in their countries, while a second
question regarding conflict between young and old people is considered as a falsification exercise
(Young-Old Conflict). A higher score on a four-point scale indicates a greater perception of
conflict.
As a complement to the ISSP, responses to a question included in the 1990 and 1995 rounds
of the WVS are studied. For this question (WVS Income Equalization) respondents are asked
to rate their views regarding income equalization, with a higher score on a ten-point scale
expressing greater concern. Table 4.1 details for both surveys the countries included, sample
sizes, and average responses to these questions. The Data Appendix describes in detail the
wording of each question.
As a final ingredient, this study estimates changes in national income inequality using
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log gini series constructed from the United Nations Development Programme's World Income
Inequality Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding
(2000), and various national statistics agencies. With a few exceptions, these gini estimates are
estimated with national samples of disposable (after-transfers) household income and lagged
one year. The Data Appendix details the international series constructed and the techniques
employed.l
4.2.2 Graphical Analysis
Before considering detailed empirical estimations, it is helpful to discuss visually the main find-
ings of this study. Figure 4.1 plots the mean country responses for four ISSP outcomes against
the inequality levels at the time of the surveys. Trend lines indicate higher inequality levels are
associated with lower average responses. That is, respondents in more-unequal countries are
less likely to feel income differences are too high (Inequality Acceptance) or to assign transfer
responsibilities to the government (Government Responsibility); they also propose a wider wage
distribution evidenced in the smaller log Proposed Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio.
Three notes should be made. First, the negative correlations are not due to respondents
being unable to gauge the inequality in their countries. The fourth graph of Poor-Rich Conflict
indicates more-unequal societies are more likely to recognize social conflicts exist along income
dimensions. Second, the negative correlations are not a product of pooling surveys - the
majority of the individual cross-sections also associate higher-inequality areas with reduced
concern. Finally, Figure 4.1 highlights that the extreme responses of transition or developing
economies may overly influence the findings. To address this concern, Figure 4.2 restricts the
sample to long-term OECD members and finds similar results.
The levels patterns evident in the cross-sections, however, do not necessarily dictate the
movement of countries over time. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 thus take the next step of plotting how
changes in inequality correlate with changes in social norms. The x92 (x99) observations are the
Illn the visual and empirical work below, gini estimates are preferably lagged one year, although contem-
poraneous and two-year or three-year lags are accepted when necessary. Data restrictions prevent the use of
gross (pre-transfers) family-income inequality estimates, a more theoretically appropriate metric that is less in-
fluenced by current and past norms for redistribution. Lagging disposable-income inequality one year allows it
to be predetermined in the year of the survey. The United States study later finds that gross-inequality and
disposable-inequality estimates yield similar results.
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mean changes for country x between 1987-1992 (1992-1999). For both the whole sample and the
OECD sub-sample, societies experiencing increases in inequality become more concerned about
income differences and assign an increasing responsibility to the government for transferring
income. Note, however, that these societies do support an increase in wage dispersion; the
empirical estimations below more closely examine the magnitude of this increase. Finally,
changes in Poor-Rich Conflict ratings indicate that inequality changes are being perceived.
4.2.3 Empirical Estimations
While important for framing the analysis, the visual correlations fail to control adequately for
factors influencing both inequality and social attitudes for redistribution. First, common shifts
in attitudes over time (e.g., a greater worldwide concern for inequality not necessarily linked
to changes in the inequalities of individual countries) can affect the results. A robust analysis
should also control for changes between surveys in national income and demography (e.g.,
an aging population). Finally, and most importantly, social-mobility experiences and beliefs
regarding the sources of success are primary determinants of attitudes toward redistribution.
It is important to account for changes in these experiences and perceptions to isolate the role
of increasing inequality.
To characterize more rigorously the visual correlations, a series of regressions are estimated
with individual responses to the surveys as dependent variables. For simplicity, only least-
squares specifications are discussed; ordered-logit specifications that allow for non-linearities
in responses yield similar results. The primary estimation equation takes the following form
(person i, country c, year t):
RESPi,C,t = a + l1 ln(GINI,t_l) + 2 ln(GDP/CAP,,t) + 3Xi,c,t + Xc + qt + ei,c,t, (4.1)
The 01 coefficient is the focus of this study. Survey responses are ordered so that a positive
01 coefficient reflects a more-concerned position: greater concern for inequality, more support
for government intervention, a more-compressed wage structure, etc. The log GDP per capita
controls for national wealth at the time of the survey. The Xi,c,t vector of covariates includes
personal demographics and responses to social-mobility questions as controls. A vector of
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country effects c control for systematic level differences among countries, while a vector of
year effects ]t absorb systematic differences in responses among surveys.
Table 4.2 presents the international results for the /1 coefficient, with each row representing
a separate set of regressions for the ISSP or WVS dependent variable indicated. To conserve
space, only the observations for the Government Responsibility regressions are listed, but these
are representative for the other ISSP estimations. Variables are transformed to have a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one to aid in interpretation. Thus, the 0.179 coefficient on
the gini estimate in the first regression for Government Responsibility indicates a one standard-
deviation change in the inequality level is estimated to be partially correlated with a change of
about 18% of one standard deviation in survey responses.
The first column of results is for regressions that include only country and year fixed ef-
fects. 12 It is clear that the correlations noted earlier are statistically significant, but of a
modest magnitude. An increase inequality is met with greater concern for income differences,
a heightened role for government intervention, and a desire for a more-progressive tax struc-
ture. 13 Statistically significant increases in awareness of social conflict between poor and rich
again highlight that changes in inequality are being perceived. In a falsification exercise, Table
4.2 also finds inequality changes are not correlated with changes in awareness of social conflict
between young and old people.
Respondents are more likely, however, to propose a wider wage distribution. This is not very
surprising as the productive force causing the inequality (e.g., skill-biased technical change) will
certainly influence compensation norms. It is important to note, however, that the magnitude
of this change is not very negative - that is, norms adjust to support additional inequality, but
they fall short of endorsing the full expansion of inequality that is occurring.14 An unreported
12 Statistical agencies conducting surveys within each country provide weights for forming nationally representa-
tive samples; these weights are further adjusted so that all country-year observations carry the same significance.
The results are not sensitive to employing weights or different weighting strategies. Standard errors are clustered
on country-year observations.
13 Levels regressions without country fixed effects also confirm the pooled cross-section correlations of Figures
4.1 and 4.2. Nations with greater inequality have a statistically significant reduced concern for income differences,
weaker support for government intervention, and lower desire for a progressive tax structure. While critical for
the results, only one other study considering fixed-effect specifications with inequality levels has been identified.
Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2001) employ a similar strategy in their study of differences in happiness
between the United States and Europe. Suhrcke (2001) combines measures of inequality and an indicator dummy
for post-socialist countries in a single cross-section from the 1999 ISSP Social Inequality survey.
'
4 The ISSP surveys also ask respondents, in addition to proposing wages for various occupations, what they
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disaggregation of changes in the Proposed Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio finds the expansion
to be primarily occurring between doctors and skilled workers rather than skilled workers and
unskilled workers.
The second column adds each nation's log GDP per capita to capture movements in the
overall wealth of the country, as well as Demographic Controls and Mobility Controls. Demo-
graphic Controls include sex, married, age, education, and income dummies. Mobility Controls
incorporate respondents' answers to other ISSP and WVS questions that reveal beliefs and ex-
periences regarding social mobility. ISSP regressions include two questions asking respondents
to rate the importance of being from a wealthy family or of knowing the right people for get-
ting ahead. Respondents believing these important significantly favor more redistribution.
Past mobility experiences are also modeled by respondents' ratings of the status of their jobs
compared to their fathers' jobs; respondents believing their jobs are better than their fathers'
are significantly less likely to support redistribution. WVS regressions incorporate a question
asking respondents to rate whether hard work or luck determines success or failure.
The magnitudes and significance of the coefficients on the gini estimates are robust to
including these Demographic and Mobility Controls. Column 3 further shows the results to
be robust to including Work Controls of dummies for self-employed, supervisor, unemployed,
and a union member.1 5 After including these covariates, a one standard-deviation change in
inequality now accounts for 20%-25% of a standard-deviation change in responses for most ISSP
variables. Note, however, that the coefficients in the WVS regressions suggest a substantially
higher explanatory power of 40%-60%. The higher percentage of developing countries in the
WVS sample likely plays a role in these larger partial correlations. Also, the larger estimates
may be the product of offering respondents ten choices rather than five, making it easier to
think those occupations actually earn. Regressions of proposed wage ratios on perceived wage ratios yield
significant coefficients but with magnitude less than one-for-one. That is, respondents with a higher perception
of current wage inequality do propose a wider wage structure, but not as wide as the inequality they perceive.
15 The coefficients on the Demographic and Work Controls follow the patterns found in previous cross-sectional
studies and are not reported here (e.g., Suhckre 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2001). As the quality of income
data varies substantially across surveys and countries, respondents are grouped into family-income quintiles
for each survey year. Support for redistribution declines with income; support also tends to be lower among
male, older, and more-educated respondents. Self-employed workers and supervisors tend to have less support
for redistribution, while unemployed workers and union members are more supportive. While reasonable, the
direction of these findings should be treated with caution as income variation not captured by the quintile
groupings may be loading onto other demographic and work characteristics. Finally, race/minority status is not
included in the demographics; later results indicate this is an important factor for the United States.
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capture shifts in attitude. 16
As discussed earlier, poorer and transitional countries appear visually to possess substan-
tially higher support for redistribution than their OECD counterparts with similar levels of
inequality.17 Moreover, they demonstrate significant changes in attitudes and inequality lev-
els that dwarf the more-stable advanced nations. To ensure the sample composition between
OECD and non-OECD countries is not driving the results, Column 4 includes Year x OECD
dummies. Likewise, the fifth column incorporates Year x Transition Economy dummies. With
the exception of the ISSP Progressive Taxation variable, the significance levels of the gini esti-
mates are robust to forcing the variation into the subgroups. Column 6 also shows the results
are robust to substituting a time trend for the year dummies.
While the results in Table 4.2 are for regressions employing only responses to the ISSP
Social Inequality module, the Government Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions
are also included in the 1985, 1990, and 1995 Role of the Government module. A longer panel
can be constructed that combines surveys from these two modules. While the panel enjoys
more countries and higher-frequency variation in macroeconomic conditions, it unfortunately
does not afford the inclusion of the important Mobility Controls. The findings from this longer
panel (presented in an earlier version of this paper) mirror those in Table 4.2, with the positive
coefficient for the Progressive Taxation question more robust to forcing the variation into the
OECD and Transition Economy subgroups. A second version of the Government Responsibility
question is also included in the Role of the Government surveys and the 1991 and 1998 ISSP
Religion module. Results from this third panel are also consistent with those presented in
Table 4.2. The stability of the findings through shifting time intervals and countries surveyed
speaks to the robustness of the redistribution response.
4.2.4 Discussion of Results and Identification
The findings of Table 4.2 suggest a one standard-deviation increase in inequality is partially
correlated with about 20% of a standard-deviation change in social norms. In words, it sug-
gests that increases in inequality are met with a greater concern for inequality and a stronger
16It is also possible that the relative wording of the WVS question is responsible for these higher coefficients
(see the Data Appendix).
1 7Austen (1999) and Suhckre (2001).
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desire for government-led redistribution, but this increased concern is modest and reflects small
movements around the long-term levels of the countries. Taking the United States as a specific
example, a 20% response would be sufficient to achieve the average responses of other Anglo-
Saxon countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Great Britain), but would fall short of the levels
of Continental Europe and especially transition economies.
A causal interpretation for these results is reasonable, although not assured. Two basic
concerns are the endogenous relationship between inequality and norms (i.e., that norms also
influence the inequality levels) and omitted-variable biases. In addition to the lagging of in-
equality one period, the direction of the results suggests that the reverse-causality concern is
weak. It could not have been the case that changes in social norms to favor more income equal-
ization produced increases in inequality, while it is very reasonable that increased inequality led
to greater support for redistribution. Employing disposable-income inequalities rather than
gross-income inequalities may affect the coefficient magnitudes slightly, but will not change the
direction of the findings.
It may be possible, however, to argue an omitted factor prompted both the increases in
inequality and the changes in social norms. For example, an increased openness to trade
may have raised inequality and also increased desire for government income stabilization out
of fear of globalization (and unrelated to the change in inequality itself). The consistent
results of higher inequality being associated with higher concern over disparities and increased
conflict between the poor and rich, however, suggest that the most-plausible interpretation is
the increased inequality acted directly on social norms. A more-rigorous instrument strategy
employed with the United States data will also support this interpretation.18
4.3 United States Evidence
To complement and verify the international findings, regional variation in inequality and support
for income equalization from the United States is explored next. In addition to being a
1sIt is, however, quite possible that weakening concern over compensation differentials contributes to rising
wage inequality (reverse causality), particularly the significant increase in executive salaries. Unfortunately, the
United States survey employed in the next section does not contain wage differential questions like the ISSP.
Thus, while the instrumentation will be able to assign causality for the general redistribution result, this study
is limited to partial correlations regarding rising inequality and compensation differentials.
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check for the earlier results, this study is of interest for three reasons. First, while national
inequality would be the most-perceived dimension for smaller countries such as Bulgaria or
Ireland, regional differences may be more important for large nations that display significant
heterogeneity in economic activity. Moreover, a substantial fraction of policy and budget
decisions in the United States are made at the state or city level, with officials accountable to
their local constituents. Finally, but certainly not least from a research perspective, the quality
and quantity of United States data afford extensions and instruments that are not possible in
international studies.
4.3.1 Data Structure
United States social norms are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS), which has
been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from
1400 to 3000 adults. The analysis considers four questions. The first question asks on a
three-point scale whether the United States should be spending more or less money on welfare
(Welfare Spending); an identical question regarding spending for the space exploration program
(Space Exploration Program Spending) is also considered as a falsification exercise similar to
the conflict between the young and old question in the international study. A third question
(GSS Income Equalization) documents respondent support on a seven-point scale for the federal
government's reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor. A fourth question
surveying political-party affiliation is described below. Responses are again ordered so that
higher values correspond to higher support for the reduction of inequality.
An important criticism of studies employing opinion polls is that they may be capturing only
cheap talk - that is, respondents are willing to say redistribution should be higher, but they do
not expect the government to take serious action and do not change their own behavior. There
are a number of ways to substantiate that norms regarding redistribution do matter. Luttmer
(2001), for instance, demonstrates that over 30% of the variation in state welfare-benefit levels
can be explained through an interaction of attitudes towards welfare with state demographic
compositions. He also considers how norms for redistribution modeled with the GSS mirror
voting patterns in a California proposition.
Keeping the analysis focused on the GSS survey, this project instead considers how shifts in
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reported political-party affiliation correlate with changing inequality levels. Respondents are
asked to state their party preference and the strength of this association on a seven-point scale
(Party Identification), with one being strongly Republican and seven being strongly Democrat.
Of course, many other factors influence party affiliation, and the platforms of parties demon-
strate temporal and regional variation. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to portray the Democratic
Party over the last three decades as supporting higher levels of transfer from the United States'
wealthy classes to its poorer classes than the Republican Party. Regressions with this question
study whether higher inequality is associated with changes in political affiliation, in addition
to changes in support for welfare programs. The Data Appendix details the wording of these
four questions.
The final requirements for the United States analyses are the important inequality met-
rics. The richness of United States data offers additional flexibility, and two metrics of overall
inequality are considered. Modeling inequality with regional log gini estimates affords compar-
isons to the earlier international work. The detailed data also allow consideration of inequality
trends for different parts of the income distribution. Thus, overall inequality is additionally
modeled as the differential between the log 80th and 20th percentiles. After considering overall
inequality, the 80-20 differential is disaggregated into the changes in inequality in the upper and
lower halves of the distribution (i.e, the 80-50 and 50-20 differentials). Inequality estimates
in this section are calculated over disposable family income for the four primary Census re-
gions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) from the March Current Population Surveys
(CPS); in the next section these results will be shown representative of other income definitions
(e.g., pre-tax family labor earnings, hourly wage) and lower levels of regional aggregation (e.g.,
nine Census regions, states).19
19Three levels of geographic aggregation and three forms of inequality are considered for the United States.
On the geographic dimension, inequality estimates for Census regions (four or nine) are calculated from the
March CPS files. These annual measures are preferred since decade-based measurements can miss important
fluctuations (most noticeably the significant expansion in family-income inequality during the recessions of the
early 1980s and 1990s). The sample sizes of the March CPS are insufficient, however, for state-level analyses
(and states are not identified until 1977). State-level statistics are instead calculated from the Census for each
decade, with standard errors clustered at the decade level.
Three income definitions are considered: post-tax disposable family income from all sources, pre-tax family
labor earnings, and hourly wages. The first two family measures are calculated over family equivalents using
Danziger and Gottschalk's (1995) procedure of dividing by an inflation-adjusted poverty-line estimate for a family
of similar composition (i.e., the number and ages of adults and children in the family unit). Additional procedures
for preparing the sample (e.g., the exclusion of military families, adjustment of top-codes) follow the common
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4.3.2 Discussion of Identification
It is important to highlight some identification issues for the United States findings before
discussing the empirical results. While a motivation for this exercise is to explore whether
regional inequalities matter more for social norms than national trends in large countries, the
data suggest they are in fact second-order for the United States. Figure 4.5 plots the mean
response to the GSS Welfare Spending question and the 80-20 income differential for each region
by year.20
Two features of this graph deserve inspection. First, some differences in regional inequality
exist (the solid line). While the South begins with significantly higher inequality than the other
regions in the early 1970s, the strong growth in inequality in the Northeast and West results
in the three regions being approximately equal by the late 1990s. The Midwest, while also
experiencing an increase in inequality, remains significantly lower than the South throughout
the period. Unlike the international analysis, however, none of the regions experience a period
of substantial decline in inequality. Thus the inference is from stable inequality or increases
in inequality. Second, the dramatic swings in the mid-1970s and 1990s highlight that regional
variation in welfare support is second-order to large national shifts, likely due to political
swings. 21
The national trends in inequality and social norms are absorbed by the year effects, while sys-
tematic levels differences between regions are controlled for by geographic fixed effects. Given
the importance of these national elements, the regression coefficients for the regional variation
should be smaller than those captured in the international estimations.22
practices outlined in Danzinger and Gottschalk (1995); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); and Katz and Autor
(1999).
In each analysis, the regional fixed effects, median income levels, and standard-error clustering are adjusted
to the appropriate geographic aggregation; median income levels are additionally adjusted to reflect the income
definition used in the inequality calculation. The Data Appendix reports the regional disposable-income 80-20
differential estimates employed in the primary regressions.
20 While representative, the mean regional responses should be treated with caution. The sampling design
of the GSS results in certain states or metropolitan areas with distinct differences in social norms from their
surrounding region entering and leaving the survey (e.g., the more-religious Utah in the West). While the
regression results control for these shifts, the regional mean responses do not.
2 1The significant decline in support in the mid-1970s is linked to the explosion in welfare caseloads in the
prior decade (e.g., Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm 1998), while the large dip in the mid-1990s surrounds the 1994
Republican Revolution during Clinton's first term. The close co-movement of regional inequality and Welfare
Spending norms between these periods is quite striking.
22To conserve space, a graphical analysis similar to that presented for the international evidence is omitted.
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4.3.3 Empirical Estimations
Table 4.3A considers a set of specifications similar to the international regressions studied in
Table 4.2; Table 4.3B replaces the log gini inequality metrics with log 80-20 income differentials
that are employed throughout the remainder of this section. Column 1 of both specifications
finds changes in regional inequality partially correlate with a statistically significant increase in
support for all three norms when only year and region fixed effects are included. As expected,
the coefficients are smaller than those found in the international regressions, as the regional
variation is second-order to national trends. As a falsification exercise for Welfare Spending,
no significant correlation is registered for Space Exploration Program Spending.
As before, Columns 2 and 3 further show the magnitudes and statistical significance of
the coefficients are robust to including the regional median income (akin to the national GDP
per capita) and Demographic Controls, Mobility Controls, and Work Controls. Unfortunately,
incorporating many GSS social-mobility variables severely limits the sample size; the regressions
only include a question that asks whether the financial position of a respondent's family has
improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the last few years.23 The GSS does, however,
collect race data. Non-white respondents are found in the fourth column to have significantly
higher support for redistribution, even after including income levels and the other Demographic
Controls. The coefficients for Welfare Spending and Party Identification remain of similar size
and significance, but those for Income Equalization diminish.
The last two columns offer some robustness checks. Excluding the South in Column 5
affects the significance of several estimates, but the shifts are sporadic. The seventeen states
defined as the South comprise about a third of all GSS respondents, and it is not too surprising
that the smaller sample size influences several estimations. The final regression includes a time
While the same patterns generally exist, they are weaker (as the upcoming regressions quantify). In the
pooled cross-section, regions with higher inequality exhibit reduced support for income equalization and more
right-winged politics, although a levels correlation with greater support for welfare spending is evident. While
most individual ISSP cross-sections also display the negative relationships evident in the pooled graphs, the
substantial national shifts in GSS responses do produce some positive trends when examining smaller time
intervals. As in the international presentation, increases in inequality visually correlate with greater support for
income equalization and welfare spending; the mean party affiliation also shifts towards the Democratic Party.
Employing disaggregated inequality metrics does not affect the direction of these responses.
23Demographic surveys often find respondents over-estimate their relative financial position (e.g., Brooks 2002).
In addition to actual incomes, the GSS collects respondents' perceptions of their incomes compared to the national
average. The results are robust to using these perceptions rather than actual income levels.
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trend. The coefficients on all the variables shift substantially, but the large increase for Welfare
Spending is particularly noticeable. As Figure 4.5 highlighted, the norms series, and to some
extent inequality, exhibit significant, non-linear national shifts. Replacing the year effects with
a linear trend allows more of this variation to load onto the regional inequalities.
A significant concern about the analysis thus far is that gini estimates only measure overall
inequality. A detailed exploration should further identify the subsets of the income distribution
that are most important for changes in social norms. While more-disaggregated international
statistics are very rare and typically of poor quality, United States data are available. Table
4.4 decomposes the 80-20 inequality into the 80-50 and 50-20 differentials. The results suggest
that trends in inequality in the lower half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly
left behind) are most responsible for the aggregate results previously identified for the United
States. 2 4 , 2 5
4.4 Minimum-Wage Instrument
United States regional estimations agree with the earlier international results: increases in
inequality partially correlate with increases in desire for government-led redistribution. In
addition to finding this effect on two levels, it was earlier noted that the direction of the results,
the lagging of inequality, and the significance of survey questions focused on inequality itself
suggest a causal interpretation is reasonable, although still not assured. In this section, an
instrument designed for the United States regional variation further undergirds this claim.
In recent empirical studies, labor economists note the role of the minimum wage in rising
United States inequality, especially during the 1979-1989 period when the real (i.e., inflation-
24 Using 90-50 and 50-10 trends, which demonstrate less co-movement than the 80-50 and 50-20 series, yields
significant results for the 50-10 ratio in all regressions (including Income Equalization). It should be noted,
however, that a rigorous characterization of the relative contributions of inequality in the two halves of the
income distribution requires separate instruments be designed for each portion. This is left for future research.
These results should not be applied to the earlier international findings, especially the compensation differential
metrics between doctors and factory workers.
25Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) find evidence that declining welfare-benefit levels can be linked to declin-
ing low-skill wages, as voters seek to maintain a target benefit-wage ratio (perhaps to preserve equity between
working and non-working poor or to minimize employment disincentives). The disaggregated income inequality
results (in particular, the positive and significant coefficient on the 50-20 ratio) are robust to including measures
of the 15th or 25th percentile wages.
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adjusted) value of the federal rate declined by 24%.26 While these substantial swings in
mandated federal rates can be taken as exogenous from the perspective of individual states
or regions, they do not provide the necessary regional variation by themselves. A credible
instrument can be designed, however, through the interaction of these national trends with
predetermined regional characteristics that govern how important minimum-wage mandates are
for the local economy. The year effects absorb the national dynamics of the changing federal
rate, and the pre-existing regional traits are controlled for by the geographic fixed effects. The
identifying assumption is that the residual region-year interactions can serve as an instrument
for the region-year inequality trends (which are themselves also subject to the fixed effects).
This study employs regional coverage ratios, defined as the percent of the working pop-
ulation protected by the minimum-wage statutes, as its interaction term. Regions differ in
the composition of their economic activity, and the federal minimum-wage mandates are not
applied equally to industries (e.g., 1970-2000 coverage rates in agriculture averaged 41% versus
manufacturing's 97%). The larger the fraction of a region's population covered by the federal
statutes, the more impact federal rates have on the local economy. The simplest interaction
term would be the 1970 coverage rate; in a slight design improvement, the interaction term
is built instead as the expected coverage in year t for each region. This modification allows
incorporation of trends in national coverage rates due to changing federal legislation (especially
in the mid 1970s), thereby raising the quality of the first-stage estimations. The inequality
instrument for region r and year t takes the form27
INEQIVr,t = ln(FED1970oFEDt) E197oCOVr,t,
where
E1970COVr,t = 1 - Ej IND% j,r,1970 (COVj,1970/COVj,t),
with j indexing industries. The two parts of this interaction deserve careful explanation. The
construction of the second element E1970COVr,t is the more complicated. It is the expected
coverage rate in region r for year t, estimated from the 1970 industrial composition of the
26DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Lee (1999); and Golan, Perloff, and Wu (2001).
27 Recall that inequality is lagged one year in the estimations; the instrument will be lagged as well.
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working poor and changes in national coverage rates by industry. IND%j,r,1970 is the percent
of a region's workforce from the 1970 Census who are both earning less than the minimum
wage and working in industry j. By itself, Ej IND%j,r,1970 would produce the actual percent-
age of the region's working population earning less than the federal minimum wage in 1970.
COVj,1970/COVj,t is the ratio of the national coverage rate for industry j in 1970 to that in
year t. From a starting value of one, the ratio moves above (below) one for industries where
the coverage rates decrease (increase) compared to 1970 levels.28
The combination of these terms is the expected percentage of a region's workforce earning be-
low the minimum wage in year t. The starting 1970 level of Ej IND%j,r,1970 (COVj, 1970/COVj,t)
is still the actual workforce percentage earning below the 1970 federal rate in each region (as the
coverage ratio for all industries is one). For subsequent years, it is expected that the percentage
of the population earning below the minimum wage will decline in region r if its poor workers
were primarily employed in industries where the coverage rate later increased. On the other
hand, little change is expected in states or regions where very few workers were initially below
the minimum wage or where the poor worked in industries for which the coverage rate did not
change significantly. Finally, I - Ej> IND%j,r, 1970o (COVj,1970/COVj,t) estimates the percent
of the population covered by the minimum-wage mandates and thus the potential importance
of changes in the federal rate for the region's inequality level.
Turning to the first term, ln(FED 970o/FEDt), the log ratio of the real federal minimum-
wage rate in 1970 to the rate in year t takes an initial value at zero for 1970. In years when
the real federal rate is greater (less) than the real federal rate for 1970, this component of the
instrument has a negative (positive) value. Note that some states have mandated minimum
wages that exceed the federal rate. These are not considered as the local legislation could clearly
be endogenous to the inequality levels. The Data Appendix provides descriptive statistics for
these two components of the instrument.
The instrument is then the interaction of shifts in the real federal rate with the expected
28 Coverage rates are at the one-digit SIC level and exclude government employees (e.g., Nordlund 1997, United
States Department of Labor 1998). Coverage rates have not been identified for 1989 or after 1996. For the main
estimations, a linear interpolation is employed for 1989 and observations post-1997 are assigned 1996 values; the
results are robust to dropping these missing years. Unfortunately, the coverage data are not disaggregated to
where each observation's own region could be excluded. As Data Appendix shows, the expected coverage rate
calculations produce only a slight trend vis-a-vis fixed 1970 levels.
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coverage level, or how much the federal legislation matters for a region. Note again that the
instrument comes only from the interaction between these two elements. The individual trends
of the real federal rate and industry coverage rates are absorbed by the year effects. Geographic
fixed effects control for the region's predetermined industrial composition of poor workers. Note
too that the instrument does not have a level per se - its value for all regions is zero when
the real federal rate is equal to its 1970 level (i.e., 1970 itself, approximately so in 1975/1976
and 1981). It relies on the region fixed effects to control for the mean inequality positions
of each area. Finally, the instrument is designed to have a positive first-stage coefficient.
The E1970COVr,t term is always positive and only governs the magnitude of the response; the
ln(FED1 970o/FEDt) component is positive when the current federal rate is below its 1970 level,
which should correspond to rising inequality, and vice versa.2 9
Table 4.5 presents the detailed results of the instrumental-variable specifications for the log
80-20 differential.3 0 The first-stage results are presented for the Welfare Spending sample; the
positive coefficients and R2 values are reflective of the samples of the other dependent variables.
Figure 4.6 plots for each region the residual trends (i.e., after year and geographic fixed effects
are removed) for the minimum-wage instrument (the solid line) and the inequality level (the
line with circles). The expected first-stage relationship is apparent within each region.
The second-stage results confirm the least-square specifications discussed earlier; a one
29 The robustness of the instrument design has been verified on several dimensions. First, the results are mostly
robust to simply fixing the coverage rate at its 1970 level for each region; the only trouble spot is in regressions
that contain only year and region fixed effects, as the simpler interaction captures some of the median-income
level trend when it is excluded. Second, the total industrial composition of the region can be substituted for
the industrial composition of the poor workers. Finally, as noted above, the instrument incorporates two
aggregate trends - changes in the federal rate and changes in industry coverage rates. Close observation shows
the instrument can work against itself. Focusing on movements in the minimum-wage level, the instrument
correctly predicts regions with higher coverage levels will be more affected by federal changes. Yet, over a short
horizon and holding the minimum wage fixed, the instrument incorrectly predicts an increase in the coverage
rate will raise inequality if the real federal rate is below its 1970 level; its predicted direction is correct if the
real federal rate is above its 1970 level. An alternative specification removes the competing effects by using
two instruments, one interacting the dynamics of the federal rate with fixed 1970 coverage rates and the second
interacting industry coverage rate trends with the 1970 industrial composition. The results are again very close
to those presented in the main text.
3 0The battery of regressions is similar to Table 4.3, although the time-trend specification is dropped since the
instrument design requires year fixed effects be included. The instrument specifications are robust to using other
forms of aggregate inequality (e.g., gini, 90-10, entropy). Estimations employing only the 50-20 differential also
yield similar results, but excluding inequality in the upper half of the distribution may create a bias since some
workers in high-income families are affected by minimum-wage legislation (Card and Krueger 1995). While first-
stage coefficients for the 80-20 or 50-20 specifications are almost always positive and highly significant, potential
first-stage coefficients for the 80-50 inequality are of mixed sign and significance.
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standard-deviation increase in inequality is now found to produce 10%-20% of a standard-
deviation shift in support for government-led redistribution. Table 4.6 concludes by replicating
the Column 2 regressions of Tables 4.3 and 4.5 (i.e., estimations including median income levels,
Demographic Controls, and Mobility Controls) across three levels of geographic aggregation and
three income definitions. The first three columns are for least-squares regressions, while the last
three columns are for instrumental-variable specifications.31 The least-squares permutations
are well-behaved and generally indicate a moderate decline in coefficient size as specifications
move away from disposable family income towards the hourly wage definition. The declining
coefficient sizes with lower levels of geographic aggregation mirror the earlier coefficient reduc-
tion from the international regressions to the four Census regions variation. However, these
two trends are weaker in the instrumental-variable permutations. While larger standard errors
are evident in some state-level or hourly wage specifications, the instrumental-variable results
in general are robust across these dimensions.
4.5 Income and Neighborhood-Heterogeneity Extensions
This final section extends the United States analysis to consider whether the average increase
in support for redistribution with rising inequality masks differences among income classes.32
While the demographic characteristics of respondents are statistically significant for explaining
survey answers, Piketty (1996, 1999) notes the overall level of disagreement within a country
about distributive equality is usually small vis-A-vis other social issues (e.g., death penalty).
Section 4.2 found, however, that perception of conflict between the poor and the rich increases
with rising inequality, and it is important to clarify if the average response belies increasing
disagreement among classes about appropriate redistribution levels. The rich may become
more protective of their wealth as the gap grows, perhaps out of concern over larger transfers
or perhaps out of reduced fear that they too may one day be poor. Altruistic motives, however,
31 The regional specifications are annual and derived from the March CPS while the state specifications are at
the decade level and derived from the Census.
32An earlier version of this paper replicated this analysis for the ISSP and WVS panels, finding similar results
for the income-quintile interactions. These results are available upon request. Neighborhood racial heterogeneity
is not available for study at the international level.
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may yield greater assistance from the wealthy as disparity widens.33
Exploring this issue, Table 4.7 presents three least-squares regressions for the United States
norms studied. The first regression of each triplet simply includes Demographic Controls,
Mobility Controls, and Racial Controls (i.e., a replication of Column 4 from Table 4.3). The
second regression interacts the 80-20 differential with whether respondents are in the top-two
income quintiles or the bottom-two income quintiles. The estimations do not find significant
differences by class for the Welfare Spending or Income Equalization variables. Respondents
in the bottom-two quintiles are more likely to align themselves with the Democratic Party as
inequalities in their regions increase. This result is not robust, however, to interacting a time
trend with being in the upper-two or lower-two income quintiles.34
The third regression of each trio interacts the 80-20 differential with whether the respondent
lives near someone of the opposite race (and also adds a main effect for being in a heterogeneous
neighborhood). Luttmer (2001) finds support for welfare spending increases as the share of local
recipients from a respondent's racial group rises. Lind (2003) also finds aggregate evidence that
inequality between racial groups versus inequality within racial groups can have opposite effects
for redistribution outcomes. The interacted coefficient for the Welfare Spending regression (but
not Income Equalization) agrees with these studies - the increase in redistribution support
associated with rising inequality is diminished in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods.3 5
The results of this section suggest changes in support for government-led redistribution are
fairly uniform across income groups. The data do not support hypotheses of rising class warfare
as inequality increases. This finding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995),
where different classes have similar views on distributive equality holding fixed beliefs about
incentive costs. A limitation to these findings, however, is important to note. Piketty and
33 The Economist (1998, 2001, 2003) provides several discussions of the class-warfare issue and its relationship
to redistribution and the American political landscape.
34McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003) note increases in United States inequality have moved in tandem with
stronger ideological differences over redistribution and more-polarized party politics. While income has become
a stronger predictor of party affiliation over the last twenty-five years, their work also suggests inequality bears
limited responsibility for the polarization.
35 The significant coefficient on the Party Identification interaction (i.e., that respondents are significantly
less likely to lean towards the Democratic Party as inequality increases in their region if they live in a racially
heterogeneous community) should again be treated with caution. It is a product of the increasing popularity
of the Republican Party in the South during this period; dropping this region from the regression yields an
insignificant interaction
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Saez (2003) find a tremendous increase in the concentration of wealth among the very rich in
the United States (i.e., the top 1% and even smaller fractions). Unfortunately, the data cannot
be used for an analysis for these super-wealthy individuals and their disproportionate influence
(e.g., Krugman 2002).
4.6 Conclusions
This study characterizes how changes in inequality affect social attitudes for government-led re-
distribution and compensation differentials. Market-based factors have substantially increased
inequality in the United States over the last three decades. If the inequality caused by these
mechanisms reduces social norms regarding distributive equality, the inequality can become
amplified and entrenched. While international and United States regional cross-sections often
display a strong, negative correlation between inequality and support for redistribution, this
study finds countries and states do not evolve along this pattern in the short-run.
Controlling for initial positions and respondent views of social mobility, local changes in
inequality are positively and significantly correlated with changes in support for government-
led redistribution. Acceptance of wage disparity does increase with higher inequality levels,
but the response is less than one-for-one. While greater class conflict is perceived along
income dimensions, the increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are
as strong as those of poorer individuals. To the extent the forces driving inequality also alter
the underlying beliefs (e.g., determinants of success, mobility experiences, incentive costs) most
important for determining the long-term tradeoff between inequality and redistribution norms,
then these forces may contribute to reduced concern over the disparity. The conclusion of this
study, however, is that the increase in inequality itself is insufficient for weakened social norms
for equality.
Several important areas for future research exist. Political economists have long studied
reasons for the negative cross-sectional relationship between inequality and support for redis-
tribution; this study explored localized movements around these long-run positions. Recent
theoretical research considers endogenous shifts in long-term positions36 ; as more data become
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36 Benabou (2002) and Hassler et. al. (2003).
available, future research should empirically test these longer-term dynamics. Such shifts will
further clarify the primal factors behind cross-sectional differences, highlight whether the con-
cerned responses noted here are governed by important thresholds or critical-mass points, and
identify mechanisms beyond ideology that can contribute to the formation of vicious cycles.
It is also important to characterize the channels through which inequality and norms inter-
act. For instance, increasing social stratification 37 may amplify or diminish the direct effect of
increasing inequality on social norms. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) report greater inequality
is particularly correlated with reduced membership in church and service groups, activities of-
ten associated with assisting the less fortunate. This deterioration of civic bonds may weaken
support for redistribution. On the other hand, Luttmer (2001) argues free-rider concerns likely
reduce support for welfare policies, and perhaps these concerns are weakened in more-segmented
communities. It is also unclear how the non-pecuniary status desires that can limit support for
redistribution change in a more-stratified society.3 8 A better understanding of how stratifica-
tion and other channels facilitate the interaction of inequality and norms will afford more-causal
assessments and aid in policy recommendations.
Finally, and most importantly, future research should trace how different political systems
(including such diverse issues as government structure, campaign financing laws, voter partic-
ipation, etc.) govern the translation of changes in social norms into policy outcomes. Recent
research notes in particular the importance of franchising groups favoring higher redistribution
and the disproportionate influence of elites.39 The adoption of more-conservative redistribu-
tion policies in several Anglo-Saxon countries during periods of rising inequality suggests this
issue is a primary concern.4 0 How political systems are structured will govern whether rising
latent concerns for redistribution produce higher effective support to which politicians are held
accountable.
37 Putman (2000); Benabou (1993, 1996); and Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000).
38Corneo and Gruner (2000, 2002).
39Husted and Kenny (1997) and Lott and Kenny (1999).
4 0Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) and Hassler et. al. (2003). Interestingly, little correlation exists at the
state level between inequality and Democrat vote percentages in United States Presidential elections (Rodriguez
1999). Whether uneven declines in voter participation can reconcile the findings of this study with the aggregate
outcomes is being explored in current research.
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4.7 Data Appendix
4.7.1 International Opinion Polls (ISSP and WVS)
The international exercises employ the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the
World Value Survey (WVS). To maintain a consistent presentation across international and
United States surveys, responses are ordered such that more-concerned views are associated
with higher numbers.
The ISSP analysis focuses on the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module; the Gov-
ernment Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the 1985, 1990,
and 1996 Role of the Government module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy
social norms for government-led income redistribution: the first focusing on the acceptability
of current income differences, the second considering the role of the government in the transfer
of income, and the last focusing on progressive taxation:
Q. (Inequality Acceptance) "Are differences in income in <Respondent's country>
too large?"
1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Q. (Government Redistribution) "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce
the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low
incomes."
1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Q. (Progressive Taxation) "Do you think that people with high incomes should pay
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a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share,
or a smaller share?"
1. Much smaller share
2. Smaller
3. The same share
4. Larger
5. Much larger share
Three important characteristics of these questions should be noted. They shy away from
sensitive wording (e.g., words like "welfare" carry negative connotations) and they offer re-
spondents a range of options that include a neutral stance. The Government Redistribution
and Progressive Taxation questions also do not reference a country's current policy position
(e.g., "do you think the government should be doing more to reduce the differences... "). Such
relative questions are more difficult to evaluate in panel exercises.
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occu-
pations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current
pay scales. From these responses, a Proposed Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio is developed as
the log ratio of the wages ascribed for an "unskilled worker in a factory" and a "doctor in
general practice." A higher ratio indicates a more-compressed wage distribution (i.e., a ratio of
one would indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount), while a lower
ratio indicates support for greater compensation differentials.4 1
Finally, two questions regarding the presence of conflicts between social groups are employed.
The first focuses on conflicts between the poor and the rich to validate respondents' awareness
of the inequality in their countries, while a second question regarding conflict between young
and old people is considered as a falsification exercise.
Q. (Poor-Rich Conflict) "In all countries there are differences or even conflicts
41 Other occupations present in all three Social Inequality surveys include a skilled factory worker, a government
minister, and a chairman of a large national company. When discussing compensation differentials, the text
also describes the evolution of the wage premiums between skilled workers and unskilled workers or doctors. An
unfortunate top-coding change in the 1999 survey restricts analysis of the proposed chairman salary, although
rough estimations not correcting for this top-coding yield results comparable to those presented. This top-coding
also has the potential to affect the doctor wage rate; regressions excluding the 1999 survey demonstrated similar
outcomes to primary panel.
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between different social groups. In your opinion, in <R's country> how much
conflict is there between poor people and rich people?"
1. No conflicts
2. Not very strong conflicts
3. Strong conflicts
4. Very strong conflicts
Q. (Young-Old Conflict) "... between young people and older people?"
1. No conflicts
2. Not very strong conflicts
3. Strong conflicts
4. Very strong conflicts
As a complement to the ISSP, this study also considers responses to a question included in
the 1990 and 1995 rounds of the WVS. This question (WVS Income Equalization) asks respon-
dents to rate their views regarding income equalization on a ten-point scale. Ten is labeled,
"Incomes should be made more equal." One is labeled, "We need larger income differences as
incentives for individual effort." While the WVS panel enjoys a more-diverse group of develop-
ing economies, interpretation of this question is limited by its reference to the country's current
position (i.e., more equal, larger differences) and asymmetric labeling of the two extreme val-
ues. Only being able to consider one period of change is also a handicap. Nevertheless, finding
quantitatively and qualitatively similar results in a different sample is an important robustness
check.
4.7.2 International Inequality Series
This subsection details the construction of the international gini estimates employed in the
main text. Nations participating in multiple International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or
World Values Survey (WVS) rounds are included, although the former is this study's primary
interest. Table 4.A1 outlines the sources and their characteristics (e.g., income definition);
data collection relies heavily on the United Nations Development Programme's World Income
Inequality Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding
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(1997, 2000), and the individual publications of national statistics agencies. The WIID includes
the earlier work of Deininger and Squire (1996). Table 4.A2 documents the constructed series,
with shaded boxes highlighting the years in which countries participated in the ISSP Role of
the Government or Social Inequality modules employed in the primary regressions.42
The target gini concept is disposable household income based upon a nationally representa-
tive sample. Although many sources, including LIS, divide by the square root of the household
size, equivalency scales are not consistent across countries. Data limitations prevent consider-
ation of gross household-income inequality, a more theoretically sound measure (although one
can argue disposable-income differences are what respondents are recalling when questioned).
In the United States portion of this study, the form of inequality (e.g., gross versus disposable
household income, household labor earnings, hourly wage) is not critical for the results. A
one-year lag in inequality is targeted for each survey round, but contemporaneous and two-year
or three-year lagged measures are also accepted when necessary.
Selected series include multiple observations derived with a consistent technique and dataset.
Other sources not listed in Table 4.A1 are also used to substantiate both levels and trends of
the chosen series, as well as to provide comparisons for how other income concepts are behaving
during the same period. In a number of cases, two or three series are pieced together to span the
time frame of this study (or as much of it as possible). In such cases, observations must share a
common or adjoining year as a levels check; moreover, overlapping intervals are examined when
available to ensure the series are following similar trends. Auxiliary series are also employed
in these exercises for verification purposes. Finally, the gini estimates are rescaled to match
the levels of LIS estimates around 1990 if the LIS is not employed directly in the construction
of the series (participating countries only).43
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) outline a number of pitfalls that can occur when piecing
together series from secondary datasets. The dataset developed for this study attempts to
address these concerns while still assembling a meaningful panel of countries. However, it
42The task here is to develop gini series covering the years included in the two survey programs. In doing
so, a longer horizon is often considered than what the surveys require for a particular country to establish more
confidence in the trends developed. These series, however, do not exhaust the inequality data available; gaps in
the sequences do not necessarily mean appropriate gini estimates are not available.
43These adjustments produce minor differences between the reported series and source data. The notes column
of Table 4.A1 highlights how the LIS is employed with each country if it does not serve directly as a source for
the series.
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certainly falls short of achieving "double harmonization" across countries and time, and Table
4.A1 identifies questionable series due to poor quality data, alternative income concepts, splicing
concerns, and so on. The consistency of the results across the ISSP and WVS samples, dropping
low-quality series, and looking at harmonized United States inequalities should nevertheless
instill confidence that the findings of this study are not the product of irregularities in the
constructed series.
4.7.3 United States Opinion Poll (GSS)
Social norms for the United States are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS), which
has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from
1400 to 3000 adults. This study focuses on two complementary questions that are included for
the full term of the survey. The first gauges respondent attitudes towards spending more or
less money on welfare, while the second asks a similar question regarding the space exploration
program (another falsification exercise):
Q. (Welfare Spending) "Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about
the right amount on welfare?"
1. Too much
2. About right
3. Too little
A second question, included in most surveys since 1978, asks respondents to rate on a seven-
point scale how much the federal government should concern itself with the income differences
between the rich and poor (GSS Income Equalization). Seven is labeled, "The government
ought to reduce income differences between the rich and poor." One is labeled, "The government
should not concern itself with reducing income differences."
For both the Welfare Spending and GSS Income Equalization questions, alternative versions
are included in some years (e.g., substituting "assistance to the poor" for "welfare"). As the
mean responses shift significantly with these alternative word choices, these questions are not
incorporated; a visual check indicates trends for these alternative questions mirror those of
the main questions. It should also be noted that the Welfare Spending question references
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current policies. Luttmer (2001) considers several corrections for this relative inquiry, and
finds his results using the base question alone are robust. This study does not attempt any
such corrections.
Finally, respondents since 1972 are asked their political-party preference and the strength
of this association on a seven-point scale.
Q. (Party Identification) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as
a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"
1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican
3. Independent, close to Republican
4. Independent (Neither, No Response)
5. Independent, close to Democrat
6. Not very strong Democrat
7. Strong Democrat
4.7.4 United States Inequality Series
Table 4A.3 provides the federal minimum wage ratios and expected regional coverage ratios used
to construct the minimum-wage instrument employed in the United States analysis. The last
four columns also document the log 80-20 income ratios employed in the primary estimations.
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Table 4.1: ISSP and WVS Descriptive Statistics
Total Sample Long-Term Non Long-Term
OECD OECD
A. ISSP Social Inequality Panel
Countries 18 10 8
Respondents 64,424 34,375 30,049
Inequality Acceptance 4.06 3.87 4.30
(1-5 Scale) (0.99) (0.99) (0.93)
Government Responsibility 3.66 3.42 3.97
(1-5 Scale) (1.18) (1.19) (1.08)
Progressive Taxation 4.02 3.97 4.10
(1-5 Scale) (0.77) (0.73) (0.83)
Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio 0.50 0.44 0.58
(0.45) (0.40) (0.50)
Poor-Rich Conflict 2.55 2.48 2.64
(1-4 Scale) (0.85) (0.78) (0.92)
Young-Old Conflict 2.22 2.23 2.20
(1-4 Scale) (0.81) (0.75) (0.87)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.39 3.35 3.44
(0.20) (0.13) (0:25)
B. WVS Social Inequality Panel
Countries 22 7 15
Respondents 79,127 32,989 46,138
WVS Income Equalization 5.04 5.18 4.95
(1-10 Scale) (2.95) (2.69) (3.11)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.48 3.33 3.63
(0.29) (0.15) (0.32)
Notes: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. To be included, a country must have
participated in at least two surveys and have appropriate inequality data for those survey periods. Sample
sizes in regressions are smaller than total respondents as some respondents skipped questions; surveys
also varied on the demographic and mobility information collected. ISSP Long-Term OECD Members
include AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, GBR, ITA, NOR, NZL, SWE, and USA. ISSP Non-Long-Term OECD
Members include BGR, CZE, HUN, PHL, POL, RUS, SVK, and SVN. WVS Long-Term OECD
Members include ESP, FIN, GBR, JAP, NOR, SWE, and USA. WVS Non-Long-Term OECD Members
include ARG, BGR, BLR, BRA, CHL, CHN, IND, KOR, LTU, LVA, MEX, POL, RUS, SVN, and ZAF.
Table 4.2: ISSP and WVS Regressions with Aggregate Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
Base Base Including Including Including Including
Regression Regression Worker OECD-Yr Trans.-Yr Time
Controls Effects Effects Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. ISSP Social Inequality Panel
Government Responsibility Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
Observations
0.179
(0.038)
54,054
0.186
(0.035)
38,066
0.261
(0.037)
19,970
0.158
(0.038)
38,066
0.149
(0.046)
38,066
0.185
(0.031)
38,066
Progressive Taxation Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
0.187
(0.102)
0.197
(0.097)
0.200
(0.100)
0.129
(0.113)
0.187
(0.121)
0.135
(0.087)
Inequality Acceptance Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
0.165
(0.045)
0.171
(0.048)
0.243
(0.056)
0.124
(0.056)
0.141
(0.064)
0.130
(0.048)
Log Unskilled/Doctor Wage Ratio Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
-0.452
(0.121)
-0.396
(0.120)
-0.365
(0.112)
-0.535
(0.186)
-0.331
(0.150)
-0.282
(0.120)
Poor-Rich Conflict Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
0.129
(0.047)
0.132
(0.035)
0.138
(0.039)
0.103
(0.053)
0.157
(0.051)
0.107
(0.036)
Young-Old Conflict Responses
Log National
Gini Coefficient
-0.014
(0.026)
-0.006
(0.023)
-0.029
(0.020)
-0.048
(0.050)
0.023
(0.024)
0.016
(0.017)
B. WVS Panel
WVS Income Equalization Responses
Log National 0.224 0.443 0.578 0.473 0.542 0.443
Gini Coefficient (0.098) (0.199) (0.224) (0.216) (0.340) (0.199)
Observations 79,127 62,378 49,574 62,378 62,378 62,378
Notes: Regressions include the log GDP per capita for each country, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Observations for Government Responsibility are representative for
other ISSP variables. Variables are transformed to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for
presentation. Demographic Controls include sex, married, age, education, and income dummies. Mobility Controls
include respondents' views on the determinants of success and comparisons of their jobs to their fathers' jobs (ISSP).
Work Controls include self-employed, unemployed, supervisor, and union-member dummies. Regressions are
weighted for nationally representative samples and equal cross-national weight.
Table 4.3A: GSS Regressions with Aggregate Inequality (Gini)
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
Base Base Including Including Excluding Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial South Time
Controls Controls Region Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Welfare Spending Responses
Log Regional 0.130 0.135 0.114 0.132 0.076 0.239
Gini Coefficient (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.053) (0.051)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965 14,658 21,965
Income Equalization Responses
Log Regional 0.086 0.040 0.059 0.023 0.072 0.016
Gini Coefficient (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.049) (0.044)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344 12,129 18,344
Party Identification Responses
Log Regional 0.198 0.206 0.217 0.196 0.183 0.129
Gini Coefficient (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.029) (0.048) (0.030)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791 22,469 33,791
Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Log Regional -0.044 -0.047 -0.067 -0.047 -0.117 -0.149
Gini Coefficient (0.032) (0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.049) (0.040)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757 14,592 21,757
Notes: Regressions include the log median income for each region, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Variables are transformed to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one for presentation. Demographic Controls include sex, married, age, education, and income
dummies. Mobility Controls include recent changes in family financial position. Work Controls include self-
employed, unemployed, and union-member dummies. Racial Controls include non-white respondent dummy.
Regressions are weighted for nationally representative samples.
Table 4.3B: GSS Regressions with Aggregate Inequality (80-20 Differential)
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
Base Base Including Including Excluding Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial South Time
Controls Controls Region Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
0.098
(0.027)
24,247
0.099
(0.025)
20,414
0.135
(0.024)
37,763
0.002
(0.025)
23,942
0.114
(0.032)
21,965
0.040
(0.032)
18,344
0.164
(0.027)
33,971
Welfare Spending Responses
0.127 0.112
(0.034) (0.032)
14,704 21,965
Income Equalization Responses
0.051 0.026
(0.033) (0.032)
17,293 18,344
Party Identification Responses
0.173 0.158
(0.035) (0.026)
23,026 33,791
0.081
(0.052)
14,658
0.103
(0.051)
12,129
0.108
(0.045)
22,469
Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
-0.015 -0.021 -0.016 -0.049
(0.029) (0.046) (0.029) (0.051)
21,757 14,574 21,757 14,592
Notes: See Table 4-3A.
0.217
(0.049)
21,965
0.132
(0.033)
18,344
0.036
(0.032)
33,791
0.081
(0.046)
21,757
Table 4.4: GSS Regressions with Disaggregated Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
Base Base Including Including Excluding Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial South Time
Controls Controls Region Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Regional
80/50 Differential
Log Regional
50/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/50 Differential
Log Regional
50/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/50 Differential
Log Regional
50/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/50 Differential
Log Regional
50/20 Differential
Observations
0.013
(0.035)
0.072
(0.018)
24,247
0.067
(0.030)
0.046
(0.020)
20,414
0.036
(0.034)
0.093
(0.020)
37,763
0.017
(0.032)
-0.006
(0.019)
23,942
0.013
(0.036)
0.084
(0.021)
21,965
0.042
(0.033)
0.011
(0.019)
18,344
Welfare Spending Responses
0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.034)
0.098 0.086
(0.023) (0.021)
14,704 21,965
Income Equalization Responses
0.042 0.028
(0.035) (0.032)
0.020 0.007
(0.020) (0.019)
17,293 18,344
Party Identification Responses
0.035 0.002 0.015
(0.038) (0.042) (0.036)
0.114 0.137 0.118
(0.020) (0.025) (0.018)
33,971 23,026 33,791
Space Exploration Program Spending
0.002 -0.008 0.010
(0.035) (0.046) (0.034)
-0.012 -0.013 -0.016
(0.018) (0.026) (0.019)
21,757 14,574 21,757
-0.019
(0.032)
0.096
(0.045)
14,658
0.047
(0.036)
0.058
(0.046)
12,129
-0.036
(0.038)
0.135
(0.038)
22,469
esponses
0.023
(0.039)
-0.067
(0.039)
14,592
Notes: See Table 4-3A.
0.163
(0.073)
0.104
(0.036)
21,965
0.061
(0.046)
0.077
(0.030)
18,344
0.047
(0.042)
0.009
(0.020)
33,791
-0.093
(0.055)
0.100
(0.030)
21,757
R(
Table 4.5: GSS Regressi
Base
Regressic
(1)
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
Log Regional
80/20 Differential
Observations
0.204
(0.075)
24,247
0.128
(0.077)
20,414
0.209
(0.057)
37,763
-0.054
(0.058)
23,942
ions with Minimum-Wage Instrument
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
Base Including Including Excluding
on Regression Worker Racial South
Controls Controls Region
(2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Second-Stage Coefficients
Welfare Spending Responses
0.206 0.207 0.200 0.111
(0.081) (0.067) (0.083) (0.082)
21,965 14,704 21,965 14,658
Income Equalization Responses
0.070 0.083 0.055 0.369
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.181)
18,344 17,293 18,344 12,129
Party Identification Responses
0.232 0.196 0.224 0.330
(0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.159)
33,971 23,026 33,971 22,469
Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
-0.035 -0.034 -0.038 -0.353
(0.056) (0.063) (0.056) (0.211)
21,757 14,574 21,757 14,592
B. First-Stage Coefficients (Welfare Spending)
Log Regional 80/20 Differential
Minimum Wage 2.216 1.958 1.958 1.958 6.004
Instrument (0.090) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.360)
R-Squared FS 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.12
Notes: See Table 4-3A.
Table 4.6: GSS Regressions with Extended Income Definitions and Regions
Source of Log OLS IV
80/20 Inequality Four Nine State Four Nine State
Metric Regions Regions Level Regions Regions Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Welfare Spending Responses
Post-Tax Family 0.114 0.061 0.081 0.206 0.194 0.177
Disposable Income (0.032) (0.028) (0.023) (0.081) (0.062) (0.066)
Pre-Tax Family 0.105 0.068 0.041 0.209 0.215 0.295
Labor Earnings (0.035) (0.030) (0.021) (0.075) (0.069) (0.169)
Total Population 0.030 0.056 0.067 0.593 0.227 0.217
Hourly Wage (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.474) (0.090) (0.095)
Income Equalization Responses
Post-Tax Family 0.040 0.027 0.068 0.070 0.042 -0.077
Disposable Income (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.064) (0.075) (0.105)
Pre-Tax Family 0.032 0.023 0.020 0.098 0.049 -0.204
Labor Earnings (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.097) (0.092) (0.350)
Total Population 0.054 0.018 0.053 0.305 0.047 0.321
Hourly Wage (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.879) (0.173) (0.568)
Party Identification Responses
Post-Tax Family 0.164 0.099 0.050 0.232 0.202 0.224
Disposable Income (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.052) (0.060) (0.080)
Pre-Tax Family 0.143 0.100 0.018 0.250 0.226 0.383
Labor Earnings (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.060) (0.063) (0.225)
Total Population 0.066 0.038 0.056 0.636 0.235 0.317
Hourly Wage (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.411) (0.090) (0.148)
Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Post-Tax Family -0.015 -0.006 0.012 -0.035 -0.022 0.059
Disposable Income (0.029) (0.024) (0.021) (0.056) (0.050) (0.054)
Pre-Tax Family -0.034 -0.055 -0.007 -0.033 -0.023 0.095
Labor Earnings (0.028) (0.023) (0.018) (0.055) (0.054) (0.095)
Total Population -0.022 -0.006 -0.012 -0.109 -0.032 0.076
Hourly Wage (0.022) (0.013) (0.015) (0.183) (0.066) (0.070)
Notes: Cells represent separate regressions. Regressions include Demographic and Mobility Controls, the log median
income for each region, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables are transformed to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for presentation. Regressions are
weighted for nationally representative samples.
Table 4.7: GSS Regressions with Income and Neighborhood Interactions
Base Income Racial
Regression Quintile Heterogeneity
Interaction Interaction
(1) (2) (3)
Welfare Spending Responses
Log Regional 0.114 0.105 0.141
80/20 Differential (0.032) (0.038) (0.032)
Log 80/20 x Bottom -0.001
Two Quintiles (0.024)
Log 80/20 x Top 0.023
Two Quintiles (0.024)
Log 80/20 x Racial -0.024
Heterogeneity (0.013)
Observations 21,965 21,965 20,359
Income Equalization Responses
Log Regional 0.040 0.033 0.035
80/20 Differential (0.032) (0.036) (0.033)
Log 80/20 x Bottom -0.011
Two Quintiles (0.024)
Log 80/20 x Top -0.005
Two Quintiles (0.022)
Log 80/20 x Racial -0.006
Heterogeneity (0.015)
Observations 18,344 18,344 17,493
Party Identification Responses
Log Regional 0.164 0.135 0.192
80/20 Differential (0.027) (0.029) (0.026)
Log 80/20 x Bottom 0.036
Two Quintiles (0.015)
Log 80/20 x Top 0.012
Two Quintiles (0.014)
Log 80/20 x Racial -0.039
Heterogeneity (0.010)
Observations 33,791 33,791 31,730
Notes: Regressions include Demographic, Mobility, and Racial Controls, the log median income for each
region, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes a main effect for Heterogeneous
Neighborhood. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Variables are transformed to have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one for presentation. Regressions are weighted for nationally representative
samples.
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